A Survey of Luther\u27s Understanding of the Proper Use of Ratio in Theology as Found in the Lectures on Galatians (1519),On the Bondage of the Will, and The Disputation Concerning Man by Reese, Kerry
Concordia Seminary - Saint Louis 
Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary 
Master of Sacred Theology Thesis Concordia Seminary Scholarship 
2-1-1987 
A Survey of Luther's Understanding of the Proper Use of Ratio in 
Theology as Found in the Lectures on Galatians (1519),On the 
Bondage of the Will, and The Disputation Concerning Man 
Kerry Reese 
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, rev.kdreese@frontier.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.csl.edu/stm 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reese, Kerry, "A Survey of Luther's Understanding of the Proper Use of Ratio in Theology as Found in the 
Lectures on Galatians (1519),On the Bondage of the Will, and The Disputation Concerning Man" (1987). 
Master of Sacred Theology Thesis. 48. 
https://scholar.csl.edu/stm/48 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Concordia Seminary Scholarship at Scholarly 
Resources from Concordia Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Sacred Theology Thesis by an 
authorized administrator of Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary. For more information, please contact 
seitzw@csl.edu. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION  1 
Chapter 
I. PRELUDE TO LUTHER'S THOUGHT  8 
Augustine of Hippo 11 
From Philosophy to Christianity  11 
Anthropology and Reason  14 
Predominance of Revelation 15 
Knowledge Leads to God 16 
Thomas Aquinas 17 
Assimilation of Aristotle  17 
Limitations of Ratio 19 
Faith and Reason 21 
Philosophy and Theology  22 
William of Ockham  23 
Toward a Proper Use of Aristotle 23 
Idealism Versus Realism  25 
Restrictions on Reason in Theology 26 
Reasoning That Involves Language 27 
'Right Reason' and Ethics  28 
Gabriel Biel 29 
The Age of Eclecticism 29 
De Potentia Absoluta and Ordinata  31 
Agreement With Ockham  32 
Reassessment of Philosophy and Theology .  33 
Three Levels of Apologetics  34 
II. LUTHER'S YEARNING FOR TRUTH  37 
Educational Development  37 
Early Education  37 
University of Erfurt 39 
The Order of Augustinian Hermits 42 
Teacher of Theology  45 
Selected Writings in the Context of Luther's 
Career 46 
Luther's Early Lectures and the Galatians  
Commentary of 1519 46 
Luther and Erasmus: On the Bondage of the  
Will 52 
The Later Disputations of Luther 58 
Epilogue to Chapter II 60 
ii 
III. RATIO BEFORE AND SINCE THE FALL: LUTHER'S VIEW 
OF MAN BEFORE GOD  62 
Definitions  62 
Ratio Before the Fall  65 
Man's Highest Attribute  66 
Limitations  67 
Ratio Since the Fall 70 
The Totality of Sin's Effect on Man . . . ▪ 70 
Ratio Impaired--Not Destroyed--by Sin . • 73 
Ratio in Relation to Man's Will  76 
Flesh and spirit 76 
Simul justus et peccator; the paradox of 
regenerate man 79 
Man in two kingdoms  80 
Ratio Coram Deo  81 
The magisterium and ministerium of man's 
use of reason  81 
Theologia crucis 82 
Deus absconditus and revelatus 83 
Revelation at God's initiative 85 
Three lights of illumination 86 
Enemy of the gospel; friend to the law.  87 
Reason as judge over God 90 
Invincible ignorance 91 
Ratio Coram Humanitate 92 
Reason's majestey  92 
Influence of the devil 93 
Right reason 95 
IV. LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF RATIO AS APPLIED TO 
SCRIPTURE  98 
Scripture as Word of God 98 
"Word of God" Defined  99 
Scripture as Revelation of God's Word . • 101 
Vehicle of the Spirit  101 
Means of grace 103 
Sola Scriptura 104 
The Content of Scripture 106 
The Competence of Ratio in Understanding 
Scripture  109 
The Nature of Scripture's Language 109 
Scripture is no dark book  109 
Problems of language 112 
Difficult articles 115 
The Letter and the Spirit of Scripture. ▪ 115 
Ratio and Method in Biblical Interpetation. • 118 
Distinction of Law and Gospel  119 
The Analogy of Faith 121 
Scripture Interprets Scripture 123 
Logical Reasoning  127 
iii 
Conclusion Concerning Luther's Method of 
Interpretation 132 
V. LUTHER'S POSITION CONCERNING THE USE OF RATIO  
IN APPLIED THEOLOGY  134 
Luther's Critique of Philosophy Versus 
Theology 134 
The Proper Realm of Philosophy 135 
Philosophy's area of competency  135 
Improper anthropology  138 
The Proper Sphere of Theology  141 
Epistemology 141 
A critical distinction: Law and Gospel. ▪ 144 
Against Joining Philosophy with Theology. ▪ 146 
The Employment of Ratio in Theological 
Discussion 149 
Defense by Reason  149 
Speculation  152 
Devices of Logic 154 
Philosophical Language 156 
Limitations  158 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  161 
Some Remaining Questions 165 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 168 
iv 
INTRODUCTION 
The five hundredth anniversary of the birth of 
Martin Luther was celebrated around the world with great 
fanfare in A.D. 1983, and well it should have been. Luther 
was a theological giant of a thinker, contributing volumes 
of writings that are the center of doctrinal studies even to 
our present day. But he was no mere philosopher of the 
church, who idled away his time in the contemplation of 
dogmatic trivia. Not only was Luther a theologian of few 
peers, but also was he a devout Christian man, who dedicated 
his work of prolific writing to the greater goal of enabling 
the people of God to rediscover the comforting Word of the 
Gospel--and this, that once terrified consciences might be 
stilled by the voice of the Triune God who offers a new 
beginning through His Son, to our world's races of people 
traveling on a collision course with their own self-
destruction. And so it is well that the world should have 
celebrated the birth of a man who fought towering obstacles 
in his time, so that God's promise of peace to men on whom 
God's favor rests could be heard as a herald of good news 
amidst the troubling realities of daily life. 
1 
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Luther broke into print with his writings only 
reluctantly.1 He did so, however, in order that the people 
of his day would be led to and into Scriptures.2 It is not 
without warrant that E. G. Schwiebert notes: 
Although Luther's Postils and Catechisms played an 
important role during the formative years of the 
emerging Lutheran Church, they pale into insignificance 
when compared with his translation of the Bible into 
German. . . . It is impossible to evaluate its role in 
the furthering of the Reformation, for its assistance in 
spreading the Gospel to the common man was immeasurable.3  
Luther would not have wanted to add to the volumes of theo-
logical writings, the reading of which served to keep men 
and women from the task of fervently studying the Scriptures.4 
Rather, he sought, above all else, to bring the sacred 
writings into the hearts and minds of all people within his 
reach. As will be seen in the survey of Luther's under-
standing of ratio presented in the following pages, his keen 
interest in turning the human mind away from its intro-
spective mode of thought, and toward an openness to God's 
revelation of Himself in Scripture, stemmed directly from 
the most crucial foundation of Luther's theology: a proper 
view of man in relation to God. 
'Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. 
Boehlau, 1883-), 6:480. Hereafter cited as WA. 
2WA 10 III, p. 176. 
3Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The 
Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950), p. 643. 
4„ The number of books on theology must be reduced 
and only the best ones published. It is not many books that 
3 
Seeing ourselves in a proper relation to God is not 
an easy task. The inherent pride that we possess causes us 
not always to see facts as they are, but as we would like 
them to be; and for us, who live in these days of the Post-
Enlightenment, this problem has only become more compounded. 
Our human reason has stolen the day from the fear of God 
that is the beginning of wisdom. The ratio of man, which 
God meant to be a special gift to mankind (distinguishing 
man from the lower animal kingdom), has become instead a 
curse for us. In our inner search for the peace which only 
God can give, our reason stubbornly resists yielding its 
place of highest honor to any superior source of truth. 
Modern theological scholarship bears testimony of 
our desire to render more credit to reason's capacity for 
knowing the truth about God and our relation to Him than is 
due it. Many biblical scholars no longer are willing to 
define Scriptures as being the word of God; rather, the 
sacred writings are sifted through the sieve of human reason 
as an a priori guide to determining truth, with the hope 
that some grain of truth will pass through the test to lead 
make men learned, nor even reading. But it is a good book 
frequently read, no matter how small it is, that makes a man 
learned in the Scriptures and godly. Indeed, the writings 
of all the holy fathers should be read only for a time so 
that through them we may be led into the Scriptures. As it 
is, however, we only read them these days to avoid going any 
further and getting into the Bible. . . ." Martin Luther, 
Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and 
Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House and 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 44:205. Hereafter 
cited as LW. 
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us into a deeper relationship with God and one another. 
Especially those events recorded in Scripture that do not 
meet the rigors of empirical substantiation, are cast off by 
reason as being mythological cloakings for an underlying 
truth which can be determined only through further specula-
tion and evaluation (for some scholars, as was the case for 
Karl Barth, God reveals His truth through the written word 
of God, as the latter "gives occasion" for the Word of God 
to take place).5  
In seeking a fitting place for ratio in the realm of 
Christian proclamation, the expected extremes present them-
selves. Some see any use of ratio in the arena of Christian 
doctrine to be an encroachment on the integrity of God's 
revelation to man, and would have us to throw human reason 
out of the picture altogether, with an invitation into the 
province of pure mysticism. Others have no use for any 
system which is in any part irrational or unreasonable (any 
thought that requires an element of "faith"); hence, they 
will have nothing to do with a religion that boasts of an 
outside revelation that is able to approach truths not 
accessible to human reason via observation and experience. 
In establishing a less radical--perhaps mediating--
view of the proper place of ratio within the parameters of 
5See Samuel H. Nafzger, "Scripture and Word of God," 
in Studies in Lutheran Hermeneutics, ed. John Reumann, in 
collaboration with Samuel H. Nafzger and Harold H. Ditmanson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 111. 
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theological pursuits, one must ask some pertinent questions: 
What is a "responsible" use of human reason in the systematic 
formulating of dogma within God's Church? What is reason's 
proper relationship to revelation? What relationship does 
reason bear to the interpretation of Scripture? To what ef-
fect does the employment of reason in making defense of the 
truth claims of the Christian faith work, both inside and 
outside the circle of the Christian church? What is reason's 
competence since the Fall of man, to discern truths which lie 
beyond the empirical evidence of the world? 
Martin Luther must have wrestled with the same kinds 
of questions in arriving at his own conclusions concerning 
the proper place of ratio in Biblical theology. The follow-
ing pages will present the Reformer's understanding on this 
crucial issue. That investigation will be conducted on the 
basis of three primary writings: The Lectures on Galatians  
(1519) [also referred to in this thesis as the "Galatians  
Commentary (1519)"], On the Bondage of the Will [also called, 
simply, "Bondage of the Will" in these pages], and The Dis-
putation Concerning Man [also referred to simply as the 
"Disputation"]. 
The survey concerning Luther's understanding of the 
use of reason in theology will be presented in what this 
writer believes to be a very logical order. Chapter One 
will present the ideas on the subject, as developed by ex-
tremely significant forerunners of Luther, which helped give 
6 
shape to the prevalent attitude toward theological method in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Chapter Two will pre-
sent Luther's own educational background, and a section 
lending historical information concerning the three primary 
works under consideration in this thesis, with attention 
given to their context within Luther's career. Chapter Three 
will outline Luther's views of man's ratio, especially since 
the Fall in Eden. In that chapter, special importance will 
be placed upon the Reformer's concept of reason's competence, 
and incompetence, to know that which is 'true.' Chapter Four 
shall survey Luther's ideas concerning the proper place of 
reason as regards the interpretation of Sacred Scriptures. 
Chapter Five will then give attention to his position on the 
employment of ratio within the field of applied theology. 
The final chapter will offer a brief summary and conclusion, 
as well as presenting some questions for further investiga-
tion. 
Through the research and study required for the prep-
aration of the discussion which follows, this writer has come 
to heed the warnings of those historians and dogmaticians who 
have turned their immense energy and skill to the field of 
Luther scholarship. It is dangerous, at best, to present 
rash hypotheses concerning where one thinks Luther would take 
his stand today, in the midst of the thoroughgoing debates 
concerning the proper place of reason in theological studies. 
The purpose of this thesis is not to speculate regarding 
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where this writer thinks Luther would stand today in the 
midst of the battles fought to give ratio its proper place 
in Christian theology. Instead, this writer finds merit in 
the practices of the Augustinian scholars of Luther's day, 
allowing an author's writings to speak for themselves when 
presenting another's point of view on a given subject.6 
That shall be the attempt of the following pages: to permit 
the primary sources themselves the opportunity to speak out 
on the topic of Luther's concept of the proper use of reason 
in knowing truths about God, and man's relationship to Him. 
6 This practice of late medieval Augustinian scholar- 
ship is discussed on page 259 of David C. Steinmetz, "Luther 
and the Late Medieval Augustinians: Another Look," Concordia 
Theological Monthly, September 1973, pp. 245-260. Note how 
Carlstadt, Luther and Staupitz relate to Augustine. 
CHAPTER I 
PRELUDE TO LUTHER'S THOUGHT 
John Donne (ca. 1571-1631) perceptively wrote, "No 
man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of 
the Continent, a part of the maine; . . ."1 Curiously, the 
words of that esteemed author are as appropriately quoted in 
a thesis discussing the theology of Luther, as in a man-
uscript detailing the most famous passages in English liter-
ature. Whether consciously or unconsciously, theologians 
are no less affected by their cultural and philosophical 
environment than are other scholars. While the theologian 
may have an advantage over others in possessing a timeless 
norm of objective truth--the sacred Scriptures,2 which are 
the very center of concern for the study of theology3--he 
1John Donne, "Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: 17. 
MEDITATION," in The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of  
John Donne, The Modern Library, vol. 12, ed. James H. 
Dempsey, with an introduction by Charles M. Coffin (New York: 
Random House, 1952), p. 441. 
2The difficult problem that confronts the student of 
theology includes also the understanding that the timeless 
truths of Scripture are couched in human language that is 
itself historically conditioned by the distinctive eras in 
which these writings were penned. 
3This is the definition for the study of theology, as 
given by Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols. (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 1:3; however, as 
8 
9 
is, nonetheless, conditioned by the setting and persons of 
his day to think and to inquire in a manner consistent with 
his distinctive historical time. 
If the premise is correct, that each person's 
thought and mode of inquiry are molded, not only by one's 
present environment, but also by especially important fore-
runners who contributed shape and substance to the process 
of cultural development, then Luther, too, owes a certain 
amount of credit to his predecessors for the fruition of his 
own contributions to theological insight.4 In this light, 
those who would seek to gain the firmest grasp of Luther's 
thought become obligated to determine to what extent pre-
vious contributors to the field of theology affected his 
ideas. This is a formidable task. Not only are we presented 
with the huge problem of determining which forerunners should 
be credited with being of major significance toward the 
development of Luther's thought, but also are we confronted 
with the unsolvable puzzle of trying to determine to what 
extent those individuals influenced his thinking. Both of 
those endeavors carry with them the grave dangers of subjec- 
is noted even in this reference, there is no concensus of 
agreement regarding the centrality of Scriptures in theology, 
especially concerning the view that Scripture is word of 
God, and the sole source and standard of truth in this field 
of study. 
4Perhaps another premise which is being assumed as a 
"given," is that one holds a linear view of history, which 
has a definite beginning and which is progressing toward an 
imminent end. 
10 
tivity's clouding the distinction between fact and specula-
tion. 
Throughout this thesis, this writer shall not even 
attempt to solve the latter problem--that of trying to deter-
mine to what extent Luther's predecessors influenced his 
thinking. That is an impossible task, one which could be 
resolved only by a personal conversation with Luther himself. 
Only the former question of ascertaining the most predominant 
forerunners of Luther's ideology will be confronted, by giv-
ing a brief survey of some of the important theologians who 
preceded him. 
Naturally, space here does not permit a thorough 
review of the history of theology from the time of the New 
Testament era to the sixteenth century, nor is that the focus 
of this thesis. Instead, we shall have to be very selective 
in choosing such pre-eminent individuals who made the great-
est impact upon theological studies to the time of Luther. 
The most distinctive criterion for determining which of Lu-
ther's forerunners to include in this survey, is the deter-
mination of how pivotal to the study of theology were their 
views concerning the use of ratio in the pursuit of theolog-
ical truths; admittedly, even this kind of standard is sub-
jective to a fault. Nevertheless, such selections have here 
been made on the basis of their pertinence to a survey of 
Luther's understanding of ratio's relationship to theological 
inquiry. They are: Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, 
11 
William of Ockham, and Gabriel Biel. 
Augustine of Hippos  
From Philosophy to Christianity 
Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430) profoundly 
impacted the theology of the Christian church through his 
writings and teaching, certainly no less than has Luther. 
Augustine's early life can best be characterized as a 
fervent search for truth. His mother, Monica, was a Chris-
tian; but it was not until he heard the Bishop of Milan, 
Saint Ambrose (340-397), proclaiming Christianity from the 
Scriptures in his preaching, that Augustine was to receive 
the Christian faith as his own. In illustrating the impor-
tance of the influence which Ambrose apparently had on 
Augustine, Peter Brown cites one account: 
'When my mother followed me to Milan', he once told a 
correspondent, 'she found the church there not fasting 
on Saturdays. She began to be troubled, and to hesitate 
as to what she should do: upon which I, though not taking 
a personal interest in such things, applied on her behalf 
to Ambrose for his advice. He answered me that "he could 
only teach me to do what he himself did, for, if he knew 
of any better rule, he would have observed it." I had 
thought that he was intending just to tell us to give up 
fasting on Saturdays merely by an appeal to authority, 
without giving any reason (and, evidently, Augustine had 
turned away, feeling snubbed). . . . But he followed 
after me, and said "When I go to Rome, I also fast on 
Saturday: when here, I do not. If you go to any church, 
observe the local custom. . . ." As for me, on fre- 
5 . Significant sources for this section are: Peter 
Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1967; also in paperback edition by the same 
publisher, 1969); and Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St.  
Augustine to Ockham (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959). 
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quently thinking back on this statement I have always 
treated it as if it were an oracle from heaven.'6 
Augustine's conversion to Christianity climaxed his 
diligent search for truth. That quest had led him to 
consider the philosophies of Manichaeism, scepticism, and 
Neoplatonism;7 and this width of experience could easily 
have lent contour to his theological contributions. Gordon 
Leff gives substantiation to this theory, by outlining how 
Augustine's interaction with those philosophical systems may 
6Epistolae 54, ii, 3, quoted in Augustine, p. 87; 
Brown cites that Augustine's first contact with Ambrose took 
place in Milan, in 384; see also Augustine, p. 79. The full 
significance that Ambrose's preaching and argumentation had 
for Augustine is well expressed by St. Augustine himself in 
Confessions 5. 14. In that reference to Confessions, Augus-
tine reveals a heightening of his doubting of the philosophy 
of the Manichees, and his entrance into a time of indecision 
and scepticism. It is at this time that his mother comes to 
Milan to help Augustine in his search, in 385. Augustine 
was baptized by Ambrose in 387. 
7Manichaeism originated with the philosopher, Mani, 
in the third century A.D. Its basic tenets were to uphold a 
dualistic theory of the existence of two ultimate principles, 
a good principle, that of light, God or Ormuzd, and an evil 
principle, that of darkness, Ahriman. These principles are 
both eternal and their strife is eternal, a strife reflected 
in the world which was produced by the two principles in 
conflict with each other. Evil was of such strength as to 
limit God's dominion, and against which God struggled. Mani-
chaeism was characterized by a strict, ascetic code of ethics, 
which sometimes produced the opposite response--libertinism 
--among its adherents. Compare Bengt Haegglund, History of  
Theology, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publish-
ing House, 1968), p. 115; and Frederick Copleston, A History 
of Philosophy, vol. 2, part 1: Mediaeval Philosophy: Augus-
tine to Bonaventure (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 
1959; Image Books, 1962), p. 56. 
Neoplatonism proceeded from Plato's idea that there was 
an ultimate reality of pure unchanging forms or Ideas, and 
that the world was a pale reflection of these perfect forms. 
The forms or Ideas existed in their own right and their 
13 
well have directed his line of inquiry when seeking to 
defend and strengthen the Christian faith: 
From the Manicheans he had had confirmation of his own 
inclination to follow evil ways; and sin remained ever 
one of his deepest preoccupations. As a Christian he 
subsequently devoted much attention to its nature and 
cause, for which he was able to reach a solution. Scep-
ticism, whereby he lacked any certitude, remains appar-
ent in his distrust of all sensory and material knowledge 
and the realization that true faith comes only through 
inner conviction, independently of all external pheno-
mena. Such a position ultimately buttressed his Chris-
tian belief that all truth was spiritual. Neoplatonism, 
the third stream in St [sic] Augustine's thought, was by 
far the most influential: it provided him with a cosmol-
ogy, a pattern of the universe by which he was able to 
judge the relationship of the spiritual and the eternal 
to the material and the temporal. It was from Neopla-
tonism that St Augustine held that the truth was imma-
terial, residing in forms of Ideas (rationes) which 
derived from God; that God contained in Himself these 
immaterial archetypes of all things; that to know the 
truth is to know God, even though not directly; that only 
the soul, as a spiritual being, can attain to truth which 
is itself immaterial; that there is a distinction between 
such intelligible knowledge, alone the path to truth, and 
sensible knowledge which is dependent upon mutable things; 
that the soul can only reach the truth by dissociating 
itself from the sensible; that all being, as coming from 
God, is in itself good; that evil is negative, a privation 
of being; that everything material derives from seminal 
first principle was the Good, the source of all other forms 
and the means by which they were known. The Neoplatonists 
translated Plato's ultimate Good into the One, the principle 
of all existence. From the One's self-knowledge emanated 
the first Intelligence, the Logos, containing the immaterial 
Ideas of all beings. The Logos in turn gave rise to a second 
Intelligence, the World Soul, from which the individual in-
telligences derived. A hierarchy was developed from intel-
ligence to intelligence, until the moon and sub-lunar world 
was reached. The human soul was last in the hierarchy of 
spiritual beings. This very concise explanation of Neopla-
tonism is found in Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought, pp. 13-15. 
Scepticism distrusted any knowledge as certain, espe-
cially knowledge derived from the material world, experience, 
or sensual perception. 
14 
forms latent in matter, including those things yet to 
appear.8  
Anthropology and Reason 
Though Christianity became the highest truth for 
Augustine, his conception of man seems to bear resemblance 
to Neoplatonic thought. Man, says Augustine, is made of three 
things: (1) a body; (2) the kind of life that makes the body 
live and grow; and (3) "a head or eye of our soul, as it 
were, or whatever term can be more aptly applied to our 
reason and understanding." It is man's reason [ratio] that 
sets him apart from the animal kingdom, and is man's most 
noble gift.9  
Reason, for Augustine, is not merely common sense; 
rather, reason bears a sharp contrast to it. He contends 
that reason makes judgments differently than does common 
sense: 
Reason judges by the light of truth so that, by right 
judgment, it subordinates lesser things to the more 
important ones. Common sense, on the other hand, 
inclines toward the habit of convenience, so that it puts 
a higher value on those things that truth proves to be of 
lesser value. While reason places celestial bodies far 
over terrestrial ones, what carnal man would not prefer 
that the stars be missing from the sky, rather than a 
single bush from his field, or a cow from his herd?10 
8Medieval Thought, pp. 34-35. 
9 Saint Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, The 
Library of Liberal Arts, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. 
Hackstaff, with an introduction by L. H. Hackstaff (Indian-
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), 2. 6. 53. pp. 48-49. 
10 Ibid., 3. 5. 61. p. 100. 
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In Augustine's thought, reason is the highest and 
most excellent faculty of created man. A man's body, bodily 
senses, and the "inner sense" are under reason's judgments. 
But since even reason is inferior to God, and because of the 
consequences of sin, reason has been shown to be mutable.11 
Augustine therefore distinguishes between mutant reason and 
that reason which continues to be man's norm for what is 
good--a reason which can never be used for evil. This 
latter kind of reason he calls recta ratio, "right reason." 
Right reason is the ultimate standard [though always subor-
dinate to God], giving definition to all other virtues of 
man, for example, wisdom, courage, or temperence.12  
According to writings of Augustine, reason's role is 
to keep the vicious elements of man's activities in check, 
as reason points man instead to do the truly virtuous that 
has been ordained by God. And yet, because of his corruption 
in sin, man's soul and reason do not always serve God as God 
himself has commanded that he should be served; rather, they 
become used to a person's self-serving interests and produce 
vices rather than virtues.13 
Predominance of Revelation 
It becomes clear through the reading of Augustine, 
that he held to the idea that an immutable truth exists 
11Ibid., 2. 6. 53-56. 12Ibid., 2. 18. 190. 
13The City of God, 19. 25. 
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apart from, and outside of, man.14 This seems a strong 
foundation for Augustine's tenet that faith precedes under-
standing; classically, this doctrine has come to be expressed 
by the formula, "I believe in order that I may understand" 
(credo ut intelligam).15  A confidence that God enlightens 
human reason, and that belief [faith] supersedes the know-
ledge that can be known through reason alone, is expressed 
by Augustine, who says to his student, Evodius, in On Free  
Choice of the Will: 
. . . For God will aid us and will make us understand 
what we believe. This is the course prescribed by the 
prophet who says, "Unless you believe, you shall not 
understand," and we are aware that we consider this 
course good for us.16  
Knowledge Leads to God 
The connection of God with understanding is of central 
importance for Augustine. For him, the only knowledge worth 
having is that of God and self; all other knowledge has value 
only as it contributes to the knowledge of God, and all proper 
14On Free Choice, 2. 12. 130. 
15See Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the  
Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 19, 
where Gilson cites Augustine, On the Gospel of Saint John, 
29. 6.: "Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore seek 
not to understand that thou mayest believe, but believe that 
thou mayest understand." The English translation of this 
passage is by H. Browne and J. H. Parker, A Library of  
Fathers, (Oxford, 1848), vol. 1, p. 440. Gilson notes that 
the actual formula, credo ut intelligam, was coined by Anselm 
of Canterbury (1033-1109); see Reason and Revelation, p. 24. 
16On Free Choice, 1. 2. 11., as translated by Anna 
Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff, p. 5; Cf. Is. 7:9, LXX. 
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knowledge should lead one closer to an understanding of God. 
Saint Augustine's background in philosophical thought 
surfaces also in the area of apologetics [giving defense of 
the truth claims of the Christian faith]. Here reason proves 
a useful tool for demonstrating that Christianity's basic 
dogma is to some degree palatable to human reason. While 
perhaps not as elaborate as later Thomistic proofs for the 
existence of God, Augustine proposes such a proof beginning 
from an understanding of reason itself. Proceeding from the 
premise that "this is God to which nothing is granted to be 
superior," Augustine's proof progresses along a clearly 
defined line of argumentation: (1) anything superior to reason 
is its God; (2) reason is the greatest attribute of man; 
(3) each man has his own reason, and can understand that 
which another does not; (4) truths and objects exist, which 
can be experienced by many at the same time, though the 
objects or truths remain unchanged by the perceivers.17 
Simplistic as this proof may be by scholastic standards, it 
does show that for Augustine, ratio did own a proper place 
in theological discussion and the search for truth. 
Thomas Aquinas  
Assimilation of Aristotle 
Saint Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224/25-1274) was one of 
the brightest lights to illumine the age of "High Scholas- 
17On Free Choice, 2. 7. 
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ticism."18 Aquinas became the pupil of the German Dominicans 
with Saint Albert in Cologne from 1248 to 1252, where the 
latter was to establish an institution of studies for the 
Dominican order.19 The relationship between Albert and 
Thomas is a significant one; for as David Knowles notes, 
” • . . in the first half of the thirteenth century, there 
was a gradual assimilation of Aristotle [into the field of 
theology] which became complete and programmatic with Albert 
the Great and his pupil Aquinas • • ,20 Here is an instance 
where the student grew to greater stature than his master; 
although Albert had done much to bring Aristotelian philos-
ophy to bear upon the study of theology, it is Thomas who was 
crowned prince of the Scholastics through his further inte- 
18The term is employed here in the same sense as used 
by Bengt Haegglund, to describe the apex of the scholastic 
age in the thirteenth century; see History of Theology, p. 
177. That author provides a general definition of scholas-
ticism on p. 163 of that work: ". . . scholasticism refers to 
the theology which took form in the Western universities be-
ginning in the middle of the 11th century, reached its cul-
mination in the 13th century, deteriorated in the late Middle 
Ages, and was finally destroyed by humanism and the Reforma-
tion." Scholasticism may be defined briefly as the applica-
tion of reason to revelation. 
19Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 
2, part 2: Mediaeval Philosophy: Albert the Great to Duns  
Scotus (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1959, Image 
Books, 1962), pp. 20-21. 
2 
°David Knowles, "The Middle Ages 604-1350," in A 
History of Christian Doctrine, In Succession to the Earlier 
Work of G. P. Fisher, published in the International Theo-
logical Library Series, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, assisted 
by Benjamin Drewery (Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978; Fortress 
Press, 1980), p. 269. 
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grating the thoughts of Aristotle into the Christian ideol- 
ogy.21 
Limitations of Ratio  
Aristotelianism had already made its way into theol- 
ogy by the time Aquinas had turned his attention toward the 
integration he sought to achieve. Perhaps Thomas has been 
more unfairly attacked by post-Reformation theologians than 
he deserves, for the role he played in the wedding of philos-
ophy with theology. Thomas noted the limitations of ratio in 
21Cf. David Knowles, "Middle Ages," p. 271; in 
Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, 1968 ed., 
s.v. "Aristotelianism: I. The Philosophy of Aristotle," 
Max Mueller indicates two great achievements of Aristotle: 
(1) he transformed the speculative idealism of Plato into a 
speculative realism, holding, with Plato, that the universal 
and the spiritual which transcends the particulars of time 
and space is on a higher plane of being and value than the 
sensible; but diverging from Plato in submitting that the 
spiritual has no reality of its own, but is real only when 
it has entered beings as a principle and is sustained by 
those beings; and (2) Aristotle provided the transition from 
the oneness of philosophy to a multiplicity of philosophical 
disciplines, giving separate treatment to movement in general 
(physics), vital movement on the human and infra-human level 
(psychology and philosophy of biological life), pure thought 
(Organon, logic), art (the Poetica) and social life (politics 
and ethics). 
Aristotle's philosophy came under attack in the 13th 
century, because of its inconsistency with the Christian 
faith. Mueller's article in Sacramentum Mundi notes, ". . . 
Aristotle's philosophy does not allow for a God who is really 
superior or transcendent to the world; hence there is in it 
no creator of the world. The world is eternal, and in its 
perpetual movement tends towards the centre [sic] of its 
movement which as such is the divine, blessed and self-suffi-
cient life and movement of the spirit." Because of Aris-
totle's views concerning the spiritual, his system required 
major adaptations in order to find a place in Christian 
theology--a place which Thomas sought to determine. 
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seeking to discover truths about God that can be known only 
through revelation. Aquinas defined a "twofold truth of div-
ine things," though he did so in a way contradictive to the 
system of Averroes (1126-1198) before him.22 Thomas divided 
revealed truth into two groups: (1) that which is attainable 
by human reason, such as the truths that God exists, that He 
is one, and the like; and (2) that which surpasses human 
22As Etienne Gilson submits in Reason and Revelation, 
pp. 39-53, if anyone is to be blamed for bringing Aristote-
lianism into the fore of theological discussion, to the det-
riment of the latter system, it ought be the Arabian philos-
opher, Averroes, rather than Thomas Aquinas. Averroes held 
that absolute truth was not to be found in any kind of Rev-
elation, but in the writings of Aristotle; and yet, Averroes 
took great measures not to burn his theological bridges, as 
he tried to arrive at some meaning of "truth" that would 
convince the theologians of his day that some sort of agree-
ment between religious faith and philosophical reason was 
not impossible. 
Averroes held to Aristotle's distinction between three 
main classes of arguments: the rhetorical, the dialectical, 
and the necessary ones, and proposed that all men be distri-
buted among three corresponding classes: those apt to be 
persuaded by clever speech only, those more open to dialec-
tical probabilities, and those satisfied only by the nec-
essary demonstrations of the mathematicians and of the meta-
physicians. Averroes thought that theologians might reach 
as high as the second class of people, at best; the third 
class was made up of the elite--the philosophers--who pos-
sessed such a superior kind of truth, that they did best to 
keep such truth to themselves, lest they risk unnecessary 
confusion of the more common people. 
The conclusions derived purely from philosophical reason-
ing are bound to be at variance with truths about God, known 
to man only through Revelation. Therefore, the followers of 
Averroes devised a scheme of "twofold truth," asserting that 
philosophical conclusions which differed from the teaching of 
Revelation should be held as necessary results of philosoph-
ical speculation, but, as Christians, they should believe 
that what Revelation says on such matters is true. In this 
way, they supposed, no contradictions would ever arise 
between philosophy and theology, or between Revelation and 
reason [see Gilson, Reason and Revelation, p. 57]. Aquinas 
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reason, as does the truth that God is triune.23 
Faith and Reason 
Because of human reason's lack of ability to know 
things about God that have not been revealed to it, Aquinas 
came to assert that it is faith, not reason, that must be 
the guiding principle of theological inquiry. Thomas asserts 
that the investigation of the human reason for the most part 
has falsity present within it, due partly to the weakness of 
our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of 
images.24 It is the Fall into sin that has impaired reason's 
ability to know the truth. Says Thomas: 
. . . there was a tine when original justice enabled 
reason to have complete control over the powers of the 
soul, and when reason itself was subject to God and made 
perfect by him. But original justice was lost through 
the sin of our first parent . . . .25 
Because human reason has thus been devalued through 
the Fall, it stands inferior to divine truth in the order of 
certitude. Therefore, faith must be a more reliable guide 
discredited this view of "twofold" truth. Gilson summarizes 
Aquinas's critique of that view thus: ". . . To say that the 
conclusions of Averroes were rationally necessary, but not 
necessarily true, was to empty the word 'truth' of all mean-
ing" [Gilson, p. 80]. 
23 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I. 3. 
[This work will hereafter be abbreviated "SCG".]; cf. SCG, 
I. 9. 
24Ibid., I. 4. 
25Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-2ae, 
q. 85, a. 3. [This work will hereafter be abbreviated "ST".] 
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toward true knowledge than is man's intellect, since faith 
relies upon divine truth for what it ascertains, whereas 
intellectual powers rely on human reason. To be sure, 
Aquinas realized that truths perceived through senses and 
observation do appear, on one level at least, to be more cer-
tain than those attained through faith; however, he main-
tained that the certainty of a given truth is weighed more 
carefully on the basis of the source of the truth, and it was 
apparent to Thomas that truth derived from the word of God, 
on which faith relies, is far more trustworthy than are 
axioms based on the natural light of reason.26 
Philosophy and Theology 
In a vein similar to that of Augustine, Aquinas pos-
ited that all true knowledge will lead ultimately to God, 
inasmuch as it is God who moves the intellect to act.27 
Philosophy, then, invariably plays a role subordinate to 
theology, as the primary source of truth in the latter is 
derived from God himself. Gilson seems correct in assessing 
the Thomistic view concerning the proper balance of faith 
and reason thus: 
To any sincere believer who is at the same time a true 
philosopher, the slightest opposition between his faith 
26ST, II-2ae, q.4, a.8. 
27ST, I-2ae, q.109, a.l. 
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and his reason is a sure sign that something is the 
matter with his philosophy .28 
In matters that could be more clearly illumined and 
defined through the use of reason, Thomas became the philos-
opher par excellence; but the truths of faith, as revealed 
by the word of God, which were found to be in apparent con-
tradiction with the assertions of philosophy, were to retain 
their paramount place of distinction as the ruling norm for 
what is held to be true. This is the careful balance between 
faith and reason that Aquinas sought to contribute to the pur-
suit of the study of theology in his generation, and into the 
present century. 
William of Ockham 
Toward a Proper Use of Aristotle 
The union between Aristotelian philosophy and theol-
ogy that Thomas tried to consummate was not to meet with imme-
diate acceptance; during his own lifetime, and in the period 
that followed, the jury was still out as to whether he had 
been successful in his endeavor.29 Still today, many wonder 
28Gilson, Reason and Revelation, p. 83. 
29See Knowles, "Middle Ages," pp. 280-281; Later in 
the same essay (p. 286), Knowles cites two primary reasons 
for the decline of medieval thought, which were not aimed at 
Aquinas's views per se, but against the general rise of 
Aristotelianism within the study of theology. The first 
reason for such reaction was the ascent of a new technique 
of criticism, which was based on logic: the disputation. The 
second was a growing attitude of dissatisfaction with the 
pursuit toward abstract truth that characterized Aristotelian 
logic and epistemology. Medieval argumentation had developed 
scholasticism to 
theology and philosophy, has been 
antiqua". Ockham cannot properly 
the rela- 
given the 
be listed 
tionship between 
designation "via 
The approach of Thomistic 
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if Aquinas had really synthesized the philosophy of Aristotle 
completely enough, so that it might truly find an appropriate 
place in theological discourse. 
It should not surprise us, then, that notable opposi-
tion to the use of Aristotelian presuppositions in theological 
inquiry should arise in the thirteenth century itself. This 
antithesis to Thomas's proposed solution to the "philosoph-
ical truth" versus "theological truth" debate was given fur-
ther expression in the fourteenth century by William of 
Ockham (ca. 1285-ca. 1349). 
among the proponents of the via antiqua; rather, he exempli-
fies the argumentation of those who helped give rise to the 
via moderna, the movement that was to give new definition to 
the relationship between philosophy and theology. But the 
term "via moderna" may be something of a misnomer. It was 
not the claim of Ockham and his followers [who came to be 
known as "Ockhamists," or "nominalists") that they had in-
vented a new way of knowing truths about man's existence; 
rather, it is more proper to say that the proponents of what 
into long chains of syllogisms that could be negated by the 
smallest infractions in one of the propositions. The trend 
had moved toward losing touch with the real world and its 
people, and with the living Christ of the gospel. The four-
teenth century theologians sought to correct this situation, 
initiating the decline of scholasticism. 
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is called the via moderna believed they had rediscovered a 
more correct understanding of Aristotle than had been true 
of their Thomistic predecessors.30 
It is Moody's contention that Ockham's goal was to 
go back to a more pure Aristotelianism, away from the distor-
tions brought into it by the Augustinian tradition and from 
the Arab commentators. This stance often pitted Ockham 
against even the moderni, such as Duns Scotus (ca. 1265-ca. 
1308); in fact, he criticized Scotus more directly than 
Aquinas, who, in philosophy, was less affected by Augustinian 
presuppositions.31 
Idealism Versus Realism 
If the proposition is true, that a key feature of 
Aristotle's philosophy was the transformation of Plato's 
speculative idealism into a speculative realism, then Moody's 
assessment of Ockham's approach to epistemology and ontology 
is indeed correct.32 Ockham represents a change of emphasis 
in philosophical inquiry in medieval thought, that moves away 
from speculation of the abstract and toward careful defin-
ition of realities that can be known to exist through the 
cognitive powers of man's reason, as guided by empiricism. 
30Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham 
(New York: Russell Russell, 1965), p. 17; cf. Haegglund, 
p. 212. 
31Ibid., p. 8. 
32Cf. page 19, n. 21, above. 
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This is evidenced by the respective weight that Ockham gives 
to the certitude of conclusions derived from "intuitive cog-
nition" and "abstractive cognition." Intuitive cognition 
here means that which can be known through man's sense exper-
ience in such a way that the intellect immediately judges 
that the thing exists and evidently knows that it exists; 
this kind of knowledge is of real entities, not of abstrac-
tive or universal ideas. But it cannot be said of Ockham 
that he posited the extreme thesis of those who would later 
be designated as "Ockhamists" or "nominalists," who emphat-
ically declared that universals, which could not be empir-
ically perceived, simply did not exist. Ockham maintained 
that things which can be known may be known either intui-
tively or abstractively; abstractive cognition, in contrast 
to intuitive cognition, deals with things that probably exist, 
but which cannot be known through empirical evidence.33 
Restrictions on Reason in Theology 
Because of the clear distinction which he makes 
between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, Ockham sharpens 
the delimitation between truths derived through philosophy 
and theology. A limit is placed on what can be known via 
man's reason. Man can know with certitude only those things 
which he can observe and describe through his experience 
33Ockham, Philosophical Writings, a selection edited 
and translated by Philotheus Boehner (New York: Thomas 
Nelson Sons, 1962), pp. 23-24. 
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[This criterion for determining certain truth was to earn 
the designation as "Ockham's razor."]; any knowledge of God 
and His nature is contingent on the divine will, and is not 
philosophically demonstrable.34 Thus, Ockham restricted 
reason's role in theology to elucidating the meaning and the 
implications of revealed truth, while contending that theo-
logical truths were, at most, probable.35 Gordon Leff's 
description of the contrast between fourteenth century theo-
logical methodology with that of previous scholastic method-
ology can aptly be applied to Ockham: 
Where before many theological propositions, held on 
faith, had been treated as conclusions to be reached by 
reason, in the fourteenth century they tended increas-
ingly to become premises, held only on faith, from which 
further conclusions could be drawn. Thus, reason could 
not display the certainty or often even the probability 
of revelation, merely the implications which could be 
shown to follow from its articles.36 
Reasoning That Involves Language 
In the arena of theological discourse, Ockham's 
concern is with logic, rather than with speculation; and 
Copleston's assertion seems correct, that the logic of the 
34Cf. Ibid., p. 103; also Frederick Copleston, A 
History of Medieval Philosophy, (New York: Harper Row, 
Pubilishers, 1972; Harper Torchbook, 1974), p. 238. 
35This view of Ockham's view of reason in theology 
is upheld in Gordon Leff, The Dissolution of the Medieval  
Outlook: An Essay on Intellectual and Spiritual Change in the  
Fourteenth Century (New York: New York University Press, 
1976), p. 16. 
36Ibid., p. 17. 
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fourteenth century was "reasoning that involves language," 
whereby all terms in a proposition must be carefully defined. 
With the greater emphasis placed on logic, paradoxes became 
more prominent in the theology of the fourteenth century, as 
did apparently insoluable statements, such as the declaration 
"What I am saying is false," if that phrase is the only 
utterance offered.37 On this basis, it does not seem tenable 
to suggest that Ockham abandoned altogether the use of ratio  
in theological discussion. It would be more appropriate to 
say that Ockham distrusted ratio's ability to determine the 
'trueness' of divine revelations of faith, inasmuch as he 
contended that the only 'necessary' being is God; and He is 
such that by His 'absolute' power He can do anything which 
does not involve a contradiction to His essence, even if it 
does involve a contradiction to man's logic.38 Insofar as 
man's ratio is involved in the process of "reasoning that 
involves language" that was the discipline of fourteenth 
century logic, human reason does find an important place in 
Ockham's theology. 
'Right Reason' and Ethics 
A further use of reason is significant for Ockham, 
namely, the employment of 'right reason' in the realm of a 
37See Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 
234-235. 
38See Ibid., p. 253. 
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'rational ethic.' This position is well presented by 
Copleston, who states Ockham's position that since God has 
created man in such a way that certain acts are harmful to 
human nature and to human society, man can engage the dic-
tates of his God-given 'right reason' to determine proper 
behavior and directives for human conduct.39 This view of 
'right reason' appears strikingly similar to that of Saint 
Augustine [see pages 14-15 above]. 
Gilson renders an apt summation of Ockham's place of 
importance in the pursuit of theological truth throughout 
subsequent generations of scholars: 
The influence of Ockham is everywhere present in the 
fourteenth century; it progressively invaded Oxford, 
Paris, and practically all the European universities. 
Some would profess it, others would refute it, but nobody 
was allowed to ignore it. The late Middle Ages were then 
called upon to witness the total wreck of both scholastic 
philosophy and scholastic theology as the necessary 
Gabriel Biel41 
The Age of Eclecticism 
Gilson [as quoted above] appears not to have over- 
stated the impact that Ockham's nominalism was to have on 
the theological studies of successive generations. But to 
this writer it seems that he rather exaggerates the extent 
of the cleavage between reason and Revelation that would take 
39Ibi 4d., pp. 253-255. 40Gilson, pp. 87-88. 
41The significant source for this discussion of Biel 
is Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology:  
upshot of the final divorce of reason and Revelation.40 
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place in the late Middle Ages. Rather than to suggest that 
a "final divorce" between reason and Revelation actually took 
place, one might more correctly propose that merely a trial 
separation was pursued--and this not advocated by all scholars 
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The opinion that 
especially the fifteenth century can be characterized by 
eclecticism seems correct, if one makes this judgment on the 
basis of a survey of important theologians of that age. An 
essay by Gordon Rupp suggests that Nominalists and Realists 
were at that time being affected by cross-currents of Augus-
tinianism, Platonic thought or by mystical religion. Rupp 
bestows upon this age the designation of 'Unklarheit'--
absence of definition.42 
The theology of Gabriel Biel (ca. 1420-1495) may well 
show the markings of eclecticism. While succeeding, through 
his important association with the University of Tuebingen, 
in bringing the via moderna to a place of pre-eminence,43 
Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Durham, North 
Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1983). This resource was helpful 
not only in its relating Oberman's astute presentation of 
Biel's theology, but also in its extensive inclusion of 
quotations from Biel's own writings, found throughout 
Oberman's work. 
42E. Gordon Rupp, "Christian Doctrine from 1350 to 
the Eve of the Reformation," in A History of Christian Doc-
trine, In Succession to the Earlier Work of G. P. Fisher, 
published in the International Theological Library Series, 
ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, assisted by Benjamin Drewery 
(Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978; Fortress Press, 1980), p. 
300. 
43Cf. Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 17. 
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Biel appears not to have followed consistently the method-
ology of the Nominalistic school that he came to represent. 
Whereas he follows the principle (held, on the whole, by 
nominalists of his day) that Scripture is the sole authority 
and only reliable guide in matters of faith, Biel remained 
strongly papalistic.44 His position on the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception exemplifies this inconsistency; for 
Biel takes as his foundation (in contrast to the principle of 
Scripture as sole authority in matters of faith) the formula-
tion established by the tradition and decision of the Church.45 
De Potentia Absoluta and Ordinata  
Heiko Oberman argues the case persuasively, that in 
seeking to understand the theology of Biel, one must recog-
nize the significance of the distinction between de potentia  
absoluta and de potentia ordinata; for, according to Oberman, 
these terms appear at all the decisive junctures of Biel's 
theology.46 Truths that can be known with certainty through 
human reason are those which can be demonstrated or per- 
44Cf. Haegglund, History of Theology, p. 199; Ernest 
G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a  
New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1950), p. 156; also Rupp, "Christian Doctrine from 1350," p. 
301. As Schwiebert points out, however, this inconsistency 
is to be found in many of the nominalistic theologians of 
that era. Therefore, it cannot be said that Biel demon-
strates an inconsistency that is peculiar only to him. 
4 5Biel, III Sent. d 3, q 1, art. 2 G, as quoted by 
Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 295. 
46Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 53. 
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ceived by experience and observation. This is knowledge 
according to de potentia ordinata. In this realm, man per-
ceives things as they are ordinarily found in nature. But 
this kind of knowledge cannot comprehend truths that lie 
beyond the realm of experience and observation; and such 
truths as transcend the empirical do exist, as the Creator 
is able to act also according to de potentia absoluta. God 
is limited in His work only by what is consistent with His 
own nature. As an example, the miracles can be explained as 
potentia absoluta; God's acts are not contingent on any powers 
higher than His own will, and for this reason He can act 
in ways which the human reason could not have predicted.47 
Agreement With Ockham 
Biel's distinction between potentia absoluta and 
ordinata seems remarkably congruent with that proposed by 
William of Ockham [see page 28 above]. In point of fact, 
Biel's thought follows rather consistently the salient 
features of Ockham's assessment of the relationship between 
theology and philosophy, and of the role that human reason 
properly may occupy within the parameters which he estab-
lished for that relationship. Biel holds, with Ockham, a 
confidence in the undisturbed connection between objects and 
thought, thought and reality; a rejection of the concept that 
universals coincide with individual things or with common na- 
47 Ibid., pp. 38-39; cf. Ibid. p. 61. 
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ture; the assertion that faith is a much more reliable form 
of knowledge than so-called scientific knowledge can be, by 
virtue of its having God as its object, who is more infal-
lible than any human object or inquiry can be; the position 
that human reason is of no avail in the realm of faith, but 
that in matters of this world, human reason should be employed 
to its fullest extent; the idea that once within the circle 
of faith, it is possible for at least part of the articles 
of faith to present certain probabilities by deductive rea-
soning; that unassisted reason can know of such things as 
God's existence, but nothing of His nature and essence; and 
that man's intellect knows by nature the difference between 
good and bad, and that good deeds have to be performed out 
of an innate love for virtue.48 
Reassessment of Philosophy and Theology 
The last point in the above listing of similarities 
in the thought of Gabriel Biel with that of William of 
Ockham has an undeniable resemblance to expressions found in 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics; and a question associated 
with this discovery is "What place, if any, did Biel hold for 
the employment of philosophy within the structure of his 
theology?" Oberman provides the answer to this question in 
the context of showing that, in Biel's case, one can speak 
4 8Cf. Ibid., pp. 61, 71, 81, 40, 48; also Schwiebert, 
Luther and His Times, p. 136. 
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of a ratio fidei--that faith is not irrational or contrary 
to natural reason, but rather is ungraspable by natural 
reason. He maintains that it is in the area of faith, and 
not in that of secular knowledge, that the authority of 
Aristotle's metaphysics is seriously questioned by Biel.49 
And thus, like Ockham before him, Biel underscores the limi-
tation of the use of ratio in the pursuit of theological 
truth: reason is always subordinate to revelation in any 
matters of faith. 
It does not follow from these observations, however, 
that Biel advocated the total divorce of reason from the 
field of theological inquiry. Rather, Biel's efforts sought 
to delimit clearly the parameters within which ratio could 
still operate in the field of theology; and the results of 
these labors was again to return Biel to the sharp distinc-
tion between philosophy and theology that had been outlined 
by William of Ockham. 
Three Levels of Apologetics 
The place which Biel reserves for ratio within the 
theological discipline may best be discovered in the three 
levels of apologetics which he maintains exist. The first 
level is founded on the assertion that natural philosophical 
and moral elements can be found in the Bible, which make it 
possible even for non-Christians who do not believe in the 
49Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 41-42. 
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infallibility of the Bible to understand and to accept them 
as truth. The second level of apologetics recognizes that 
the Bible yields certain results not found in other fields 
of research, and that these allow the doctors of Scripture 
to defend articles of faith to which they refer. However, 
the arguments made on this level are not viewed as being 
compelling; instead, they are sufficient to refute the accu-
sation of the absurdity of the basic tenets of the Christian 
faith. The top level is formed by pure credibilia, the 
inner core of faith. Here even the faithful are unable to 
acquire evident knowledge. To explain articles of faith 
held on this level, one must fall back on other articles of 
faith.50 
Within the first and second levels of Biel's 
apologetics, deductive reasoning plays an important role; 
but not without the involvement of faith. He presents no 
rational structure which can enable the systematic theologian 
to jump from one locus, accepted by faith, to another locus, 
by way of sheer logical demonstration, without the employment 
of faith. Yet Oberman contends that even in view of the pre-
mium Biel places on faith within theology's realm, it cannot 
be said that he expresses anything so extreme as the divorce 
of faith and reason.51 Oberman argues: 
50Ibid., pp. 75 and 88. 
51Ibid., pp. 74 and 81. 
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. . . Biel is a rationalist insofar as he holds that the 
distance between creator and creature as expressed in 
the distinction of the potentia absoluta and potentia  
ordinata can at least be partly bridged by reason.52 
Biel's expression of the relationship between faith 
and reason thus presented, the task may now be undertaken to 
determine some of the implications these views may have had 
for Luther's own approach to this problem. The next chapter 
will survey Luther's life, with special reference given to 
the background and setting of the primary works of Luther 
with which this thesis will concern itself in showing Luther's 
understanding of the role ratio is to play in the realm of 
theology. 
52Ibid., p. 81. 
CHAPTER II 
LUTHER'S YEARNING FOR TRUTH 
Educational Development  
Early Education 
Luther's education began at the small school in 
Mansfeld, the village in which he resided with his family 
for the first fourteen years of his life. It is reasonable 
to speculate that Luther began school at the age of seven, 
and that the curriculum was that of a so-called "trivial" 
school, a Latin school which taught principally three sub-
jects (trivium): grammar, logic, and rhetoric. These, along 
with music, would comprise the fundamental education of young 
Luther. All classes were conducted in the Latin language, 
the foremost among the subjects taught being grammar.1 
For reasons not fully known, Luther was sent by his 
parents to attend the school at Magdeburg in his fourteenth 
year, 1497. Magdeburg was a city of approximately 12,000 at 
that time, and it is not certain which of its schools he 
1Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Refor-
mation 1483-1521, trans. James L. Schaaf (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985), p. 12. Brecht notes also that the 
date on which Luther probably entered the school at Mansfeld 
was 12 March 1491, St. Gregory's Day, on which the new school 
year began. 
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attended. However, Luther himself hints that it was at this 
time in his learning that he first became introduced to the 
Brethren of the Common Life--an order which emphasized Bible 
reading and the return to simple, pious life for both the 
clergy and laity--the same order, interestingly enough, with 
which Gabriel Biel had associated himself in 1468, when he 
became Provost of the house of the Brethren of the Common 
Life at Butzbach.2 
Luther stayed at Magdeburg but one year; but during 
that year he made an important discovery. Ernest Schwiebert 
contends that in all likelihood, it was at Magdeburg, rather 
than at Erfurt, that Luther made his discovery of the Bible; 
and it would not have been unusual for Luther not to have 
seen a Bible before this, since at Mansfeld most of his 
instruction had been by the blackboard and wax tablets, and 
the students handled few books. 3  
Again for reasons unknown, Luther's parents decided 
to send their son to Eisenach following the one year of study 
at Magdeburg. Here, he would complete three years at the 
2Cf. Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The  
Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950), pp. 117-119 and n. 55; also Martin 
Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 15-16; also E. Gordon Rupp, 
"Christian Doctrine from 1350 to the Eve of the Reforma-
tion," in A History of Christian Doctrine, in succession to 
the earlier work of G. P. Fisher, published in the Interna-
tional Theological Library Series, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, 
assisted by Benjamin Drewery (Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978; 
Fortress Press, 1980), p. 301. 
3Luther and His Times, p. 119. 
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parish school of St. George. Apparently, Luther praised his 
teacher, Wigand Gueldenapf, as one who taught grammar in a 
fashion superior to any other.4 Such praise may have been 
reciprocal, as Luther emerged through all his studies as a 
most intelligent student. 
University of Erfurt 
Luther entered the University of Erfurt in the summer 
semester of 1501. The city of Erfurt was a populous one of 
some 20,000 inhabitants; and the university, though waning a 
bit from its lofty reputation as leader among German univer-
sities that it held in the middle of the fifteenth century, 
was still a prestigious one in the sixteenth century. Luther 
later comments that for him, all other universities appeared 
to be elementary schools in comparison with Erfurt.5 
Erfurt became a spawning ground for the rising 
tension between humanism (understood not in the modern, but 
in the sixteenth century sense of the term) and scholas-
ticism. Its teachers would include some who studied with the 
Tuebingen scholastic Gabriel Biel, and the influence of 
William of Ockham was becoming more noticeable at Erfurt 
since the second half of the fifteenth century. The univer-
sity was divided into four faculties: the liberal arts, or 
4Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 19-20. 
5Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. 
Boehlau, 1883-), TR 2, no. 2788 (hereafter cited as WA); cf. 
Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 29. 
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philosophical (which held a place of special distinction at 
this time), theology, jurisprudence, and medicine. All stu-
dents began their studies in the faculty of liberal arts. 
Only upon successful completion of the liberal arts was a 
student qualified to enter one of the three higher faculties.6 
Although Biel and Ockham are names associated with 
the university at Erfurt, following the prescribed course of 
studies would not have led Luther immediately to become aware 
of their profound influence on the field of theology. Rather, 
the young scholar had first to contend with traditional Logic, 
then with the so-called Physics, and Ethics in his career as 
university student. In point of fact, it appears that only 
in connection with the continuation of his studies in the 
monastery does Luther occupy himself with Ockham and Biel.7 
Koestlin marvels that the forces of humanism seemed 
to have so little affect upon Luther at this stage of his 
education; but that writer is careful to note that humanism, 
as taught at this juncture of Erfurt's history, contained 
"no manifestation whatever of a tendency . . . hostile to the 
6See Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 28-29. 
7Julius Koestlin, The Theology of Luther in its  
Historical Development and Inner Harmony, trans. Charles E. 
Hay, from the second German edition, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
Lutheran Publication Society, 1897; St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1986), 1:37; nonetheless, Bengt Haegglund, 
History of Theology, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1968), p. 197 indicates that 
Biel's theology was basic for the instruction in Erfurt. 
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" Church or even to Scholasticism.-8  Koestlin's astonishment 
seems based upon the premise that since the Erfurt faculty 
showed definite tendencies toward humanism, and since some 
of Luther's close associates took their studies from such 
men, Luther therefore must certainly have had a close circle 
of friends who must have been classed as "humanists." But 
Ernest Schwiebert takes exception to such presuppositions as 
these, finding no evidence that Luther traveled in the 
humanistic circles, and holding doubt that the humanistic 
tendencies of his professors would have found their way into 
the dialectic approach that he was being taught in the reg-
ular courses.9 
If the forces of Erfurt humanism made little impres-
sion on Luther, then may it be concluded that nothing of the 
faculty's positions left their marks upon that future Re-
former? Schwiebert answers a resounding "No!" According to 
that Luther-scholar, at least two of the Erfurt professors 
whom Luther admired may have helped give shape to the young 
8 Ibid., pp. 42-43; see also Koestlin's discussion 
concerning Luther's associations with his colleagues on pp. 
38-40 of that work. Chief among Koestlin's listing of the 
professors who gave rise to humanism at Erfurt are Maternus 
Pistoris, Nicholas Marschalk (who moved away in 1502), noted 
for promoting the study of Greek, and Mutianus Rufus (Conrad 
Muth), who resided at nearby Gotha and had apparent influence 
on the young students of the University. It is especially to 
this theory that those living in Gotha had profound influence 
on the University of Erfurt during Luther's undergraduate 
days that Schwiebert takes exception (see n. 9 below). 
9Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, pp. 134-135. 
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student's later rejection of Scholasticism in the Wittenberg 
curriculum, namely, Trutvetter and Usingen. Trutvetter tried 
to simplify the dialectics of Ockham and Biel for use in 
teaching, while Usingen distinguished, in theology, between 
Aristotle and the Bible as sources of information. Describing 
the teaching of Usingen, Schwiebert notes: 
In matters of faith he accepted the Scriptures as an 
unerring guide to truth, while his conception of the 
Church Fathers and later tradition as evaluated in rela-
tion to the revealed Word doubtless influenced Luther in 
his later discovery of Sola Scriptura, or the principle 
of relying on the Bible alone in determining Biblical 
doctrines. . . . Usingen was progressive, up-to-date, 
and quite receptive to new ideas.10 
The Order of Augustinian Hermits 
Luther became a Bachelor of Arts at Erfurt in 1502, 
completing his studies in the minimum amount of time, and a 
Master in 1505. Yet because of a crisis experience in his 
life, Luther would not maintain his goal of studying law. 
Instead, on July 17, 1505, he quite unexpectedly applied for 
admission to the "Black Cloister" in Erfurt, the chapter 
10Ibid., p. 135; cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation, 
pp. 34-36, where that writer notes also the importance of 
Jodokus Trutfetter (ca. 1460-1519) and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi 
von Usingen (1462-1532) for Luther's education at Erfurt; 
also noted in Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard:  
A Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1963), p. 6: ". . . we may safely 
say that the young Luther was influenced by the nominalist 
philosophy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and 
that this influence is evident throughout his life." 
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house of the Augustinian Hermits.11 
The events that led to Luther's becoming a monk, the 
near miss of a thunderbolt near Stotternheim and his near 
bleeding to death following an accidental slashing of the 
cephalic vein on another occasion, are well known and docu-
mented.12 It must be noted, however, that the events in 
themselves are not sufficient cause for Luther's engagement 
to the strictest monastic order in Erfurt; rather, they were 
final blows to a man terrified by his sense of guilt before 
his God, and driven to despair concerning whether he could 
ever know if he had done enough in life to appease God for 
his wrongdoing.13  
Luther would search diligently for such appeasement 
during his career as a monk; but he would find it neither in 
the completeness with which he carried out his monastic vows, 
nor in his ordination to the priesthood in 1507. Neverthe-
less, the Augustinian monk was exact in his studies. It is 
here, in the Black Cloister, that Martin came into close con-
tact with the writings of Gabriel Biel; for a standard text 
11See Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, pp. 136-138 
for the defense of this date as the authentic time of Luth-
er's entry into the monastery. 
12For careful documentation of the Stotternheim in-
cident, see Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 48, n. 14; 
Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 143, n. 121 lends docu-
mentation of the second event. 
13The word most often used to describe Luther's fears 
of Satan's assaults and of trials sent by God is Anfechtung. 
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of that day in preparation for the priesthood was Biel's 
lengthy Sacri cononis missae expositio (Canon of the Mass), 
in which Biel discusses in eighty-nine lessons the entire 
mass liturgy. Where necessary, Biel's writing also gave 
thorough consideration to theological problems, such as 
indulgences, veneration of the saints, the presence of Christ 
in the sacrament, or the Lord's Prayer, or to practical ques-
tions concerning the ceremony of the mass.14 Schwiebert 
notes that in his Tischreden, Luther evaluated Biel's work 
at the time as having been "the best book," even the Bible 
not being able to compare with its authority. Asserts 
Schwiebert: "This book made a fervent disciple of papalism 
out of the young monk, for, says Luther in the same conver-
sation: 'When I read therein, my heart bled.'"15  
During the years 1505-1509, Luther studied also Biel's 
Collectorium and Peter d'Ailly's (1350-1420) and Ockham's com-
mentaries on Peter Lombard's Sententiarum libri quatuor (long 
used as a doctrinal textbook in Medieval theological stu-
dies)•16 Melanchthon also indicates that Augustine's On 
The Letter and the Spirit deeply influenced Luther; and, as 
14See Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 71. 
15Luther and His Times, p. 148; the quotation is 
from WA, TR 3, no. 3722, rendered in English in Martin Luther, 
Luther's Works, 55 vols. gen. eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and 
Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, and 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 54:264 (hereafter cited 
as LW). 
16Haegglund, History of Theology, p. 212. 
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Schwiebert notes, . . . even though Luther remembered Biel 
and d'Ailly almost word for word, he remembered Augustine 
best of all."17 That well may be true; but it appears that 
Luther's ultimate discovery, while in the monastery, was his 
new relationship with the Bible. To quote the Tischreden: 
At that time [in the monastery] no other study pleased 
me so much as sacred literature. With great loathing I 
read physics, and my heart was aglow when the time came 
to return to the Bible. . . . I read the Bible dil-
igently. Sometimes one important statement occupied all 
my thoughts for a whole day. Such statements appeared 
especially in the weightier prophets, and (although I 
could not grasp their meaning) they have stuck in my 
memory to this day. 18 
Teacher of Theology 
Luther's studies continued with the Augustinian 
order, and by 1508 he found himself both a student and a 
lecturer in philosophy. He was transferred to Wittenberg in 
the fall of 1508, where he would continue as student and 
teacher, delivering lectures on Aristotle's Nichomachean 
Ethics. On 9 March 1509, Luther earned his first theological 
degree, bachelor of the Bible, and shortly thereafter became 
a bachelor of the sentences. Before he could begin his 
duties of giving cursory lectures on Lombard's Sentences, 
Luther was called back to Erfurt; and by this time in his 
career, according to Schwiebert, "he had progressed to the 
17Cf. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 157 and 
n. 36. 
18English translation of WA, TR 1, no. 116, as found 
in LW 54, p. 14. 
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point of criticizing all of the Schoolmen on the basis of 
the Latin Vulgate, but he had not gone far enough to realize 
that in time this principle would destroy his whole Catholic 
plan of salvation."19  
Following his journey to Rome (1510-1511) on business 
in behalf of the Erfurt order to which he belonged, Luther 
returned to the university at Wittenberg, where he would soon 
begin preparations toward becoming a Doctor of Theology. 
The degree was awarded to him on 19 October 1512, and Dr. 
Luther was officially received into the Theological Faculty 
at Wittenberg on the twenty-second of that same month. As 
far as can be known, Luther began his teaching activity 
during the winter semester of 1513/14.20 
Selected Writings in the Context 
of Luther's Career  
Luther's Early Lectures and the 
Galatians Commentary of 1519 
The first lectures given by Luther (at least the 
first ones to have been preserved), are those on the Psalms 
(1513-15). During this period of his Biblical studies, 
19Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 173. 
20As Brecht points out in Road to Reformation, p. 
127, the reason for the year's delay in Luther's teaching 
career is unknown. That author speculates that such a per-
iod of time could have been required by the young teacher as 
a preparation interval before his lectures could begin; 
Schwiebert maintains, in Luther and His Times, p. 282, that 
Luther may have lectured on Genesis in 1512-13, though no 
positive evidence exists. 
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Luther appears to have employed a positive aspect of Biblical 
Humanism,21 by endeavoring to pay close attention to the 
classical languages of Scripture, notably, Greek. It seems 
possible that this diligent study of the text of Scripture, 
in preparation for his lectures on the Psalms, could well 
have led to Luther's famous Tower Discovery, at which time 
he finally discovered the Gospel and the full impact of the 
ultimate dynamic of the Christian faith: the forgiveness of 
sins.22 
In his early lectures on the Scriptures, Luther used 
methodology similar to the other Wittenberg professors. The 
text was presented in a fourfold meaning: the literal, the 
allegorical, the tropological, and anagogical. Luther used 
21Schwiebert makes an important point regarding the 
role "Humanism" played in the German Reformation, revealing 
that scholars have discovered that there were no less than a 
half dozen different kinds of Humanism, the common denom-
inator being a Heimweh, or homesickness, for something in 
ages past; see Luther and His Times, p. 275. 
22Much discussion has taken place regarding the exact 
date of Luther's "Tower Discovery." Ernst Bizer and Uuras 
Saarnivaara, ascribe to the experience of Luther's discovery 
of the Gospel a late date at the end of 1518 (in this case, 
Luther would not have made his discovery until one year after 
his posting of the 95 theses in Wittenberg); but others, 
like Schwiebert, Gordon Rupp, and Heino Kadai, hold to the 
early date of 1513/14. See Heino 0. Kadai, "Luther's Theo-
logy of the Cross," in Accents in Luther's Theology: Essays  
in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation, 
ed. Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1967), p. 268, n. 50; Saarnivaara cites, in support of the 
later dating, Luther's Preface from the year 1545, as well 
as excerpts from other lectures and writings of Luther; cf. 
Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light  
upon Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical  
Faith (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), pp. 
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contemporary illustrations and anecdotes to liven the sub-
ject.23 But a marked change in Luther's approach to the 
Biblical texts arises by the time of his next series of 
lectures, those given in 1515/16 on Romans. From this time 
onward, he largely abandons the fourfold interpretation of 
the Scriptures in the classroom, rendering instead what one 
scholar calls "a historical-Christological"24 interpre-
tation--an approach rising from the grammatical historical 
method--that focuses especially on one's spiritual relation-
ship with Christ. This method of interpretation can be 
called solus Christus, as it seeks to pursuade every Bible 
student to find Jesus Christ in every passage.24 
103-105, and 122. Indeed, this seems to be powerful ammuni-
tion in support of the later dating of the Tower Discovery; 
Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 225, concurs, both with the 
evidence presented by Saarnivaara, and with the later dating 
of the experience itself. 
23Cf. Ernest Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 
283; A. Berkeley Mickelson, Interpreting the Bible (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 35-36, 
outlines the method of "fourfold interpretation" that was 
common for exegetes of the Middle Ages, rendering a rough 
paraphrase, in English, of some Latin poetry of the sixteenth 
century: "The letter shows us what God and our fathers did; 
The allegory shows us where our faith is hid; The moral  
meaning gives us rules of daily life; The anagogy shows us 
where we end our strife." Hence, Mickelson shows that the 
literal is the plain, evident meaning; the moral (tropol-
ogical) sense tells men what to do; the allegorical sets 
forth what they are to believe; the anagogical centers in 
what Christians are to hope. 
24Hilton C. Oswald, Luther's Works, vol. 25: Lectures  
On Romans: Glosses and Scholia, ed. Hilton C. Oswald (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972), p. xi; also Herbert 
T. Mayer, Interpreting the Holy Scriptures: Principles for  
the Proper Study of the Bible (St. Louis: Concordia Publish- 
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Luther's lectures were delivered from notes comprised 
of Glossae and Scholia. The Glossae (glosses) were copies 
of the Vulgate text with generous space between the lines, 
and wide margins, for the inclusion of Luther's interlinear 
and marginal notes in Latin; the Scholia were notes of exten-
ded commentary on various selected passages, written out in 
detail as a separate preparation for the lectures. Espe-
cially the Glossae were intended to be dictated almost verba-
tim in the classroom; but Schwiebert makes mention of the 
fact that when one compares Luther's own Glossae and Scholia  
of his lectures to the student notes that have been preserved 
on Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews, it must be concluded that 
Luther did not always closely follow his manuscripts when 
delivering his lectures.25 
Coinciding with Luther's lecturing on Romans, the 
humanist scholar, Erasmus of Rotterdam (ca. 1469-1536), had 
published his annotated edition of the Greek New Testament 
(February 1515). Apparently, Luther was making use of this 
new edition by the spring of 1516, a fact not insignificant 
for the lectures he would give on Galatians, which took place 
from 27 October 1516 until 13 March 1517.26 He was critical 
ing House, 1967), p. 39. 
25Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 283; also see 
Hilton Oswald, Lectures on Romans, LW 25, pp. ix-x. 
26Cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 129 and n. 3; 
Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel, pp. 74-75 and n. 
171, which refers the reader to a letter Luther wrote to 
50 
of Erasmus's "annotations" on Paul, because they spoke only 
of the Christian's freedom from the Cermonial Law, and not 
the whole Law. Saarnivaara notes that Luther thus must have 
known at that time that man cannot be justified without faith, 
simply by fulfilling the Moral Law [see note 26]. Clearly, 
this also is the central theme, not only of Paul's Letter to 
 
the Galatians, but of Luther's lectures on this part of 
Scripture, as well--a fact that further complicates trying to 
ascribe the proper date to Luther's Tower Discovery (Turm-
erlebnis) [see page 47, note 22, above]. Whether the Gala-
tians lectures occurred before, or after, that event remains 
an unsolved puzzle. 
The earliest of Luther's lectures on Galatians are 
preserved in a student notebook on the classes given in 1516 
-1517, first published in the twentieth century by Hans von 
Schubert and then revised for the Weimar edition by Karl 
Meissinger (WA, 57). Luther used those notes as a basis for 
the printed version of his exposition of 1519 (WA 2, 445-
618; Saint Louis, 8, 1352-1661; LW 27, 151-410), but signif-
icantly revised and expanded some of his earlier judgments. 
Four years later (1523), he published a revised and abbrev-
iated version of the commentary.27 The writer of this paper 
Spalatin on 19 October 1516, in which he relates his crit-
icism of Erasmus' annotations. 
27See Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther's Works, vol. 27: 
Lectures on Galatians 1535, Chapters 5-6 and Lectures on 
 
Galatians 1519, Chapters 1-6, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, associate 
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has chosen to give attention to the published version of 
1519, rather than to the lengthier commentary on Galatians of 
1535 (based on Luther's lectures from 1531), because of the 
earlier work's importance for understanding Luther's approach 
to theology, and of the proper role of ratio within that 
field of study, at the relative beginning of his career. 
[Luther's later ideas concerning man's ratio will be repre-
sented in this paper by his 1536 Disputation Concerning Man.] 
The extent to which the lectures on Galatians may 
have given rise to the events of October 1517 is open only 
to speculation. Certainly, Luther's study for his lectures 
on the Psalms, Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews (1517/18) 
could not have damaged his spiritual growth; yet the Luther-
scholars place far more weight on the controversy over indul-
gences as the cause for the 31 October 1517 declarations, 
than on the early lectures themselves. And well they should; 
for the Ninety-five Theses deal primarily with the abuses of 
the indulgences sold to individuals as satisfaction for their 
sins--a widespread practice as a result of Pope Leo X's 
(1475-1521; Pope 1513-21) revival of the jubilee indulgence 
of 1510 under Julius II (1443-1513; Pope 1503-13). But this 
writer finds wisdom in the words of Brecht, who states that 
between 1513 and 1516 a definite change certainly took place 
in Luther's image of God, a change apparently aided by his 
ed. Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1964), p. ix. 
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wrestling with the texts for his early lectures. Brecht 
asserts: 
No longer did he find himself in continual confrontation 
with the judging God. He knew that God did not reckon 
sins to the believer who confessed them, and to this 
extent he experienced forgiveness. But the emphasis on 
the continuing reality of human sinfulness remained con-
stant, and it was even conceived of more and more sharply, 
and along with it the inability of man to produce his 
own righteousness. . . . This was still the phase when 
Luther despised the word "righteousness," and would 
gladly have dispensed with it. . . . Luther's theology of 
1516 unmistakably shows important reformatory elements, 
chiefly in its emphasis upon the salvation which is given 
from without. But in its stubborn orientation toward the 
attitude of humility it is still obscure. The reason, 
therefore, why Luther research still disputes whether or 
not the Luther of the lectures on Romans was already a 
reformer lies in the ambiguity of the subject itself. He 
was, and yet he was not yet. But in the following lec-
tures on Galatians Luther's way of speaking is already 
much freer. There he is no longer oriented so much 
toward one's own righteousness. On the basis of the 
epistle text, humility takes a back seat to freedom.28 
Luther and Erasmus: On the Bondage  
of the Will  
Reaction to Luther's posting of the Ninety-five  
Theses in Wittenberg was both swift and severe. Not only 
had Luther fired a resounding volley into the midst of one 
of Rome's most precious fund-raising projects, the sale of 
indulgences for the further construction of the cathedral in 
Rome; but also had the shot been aimed directly (and delib- 
28Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 136-137; see also 
Kurt Aland, Four Reformers: Luther-Melanchthon-Calvin-
Zwingli, trans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1979), p. 11, where that writer notes that 
Luther's early lectures were decisively important in lending 
shape to the Reformer's theology. 
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erately) at the Pope himself. The Theses were but an over-
ture to Luther's endeavor to end the blatant tyranny by 
which the papacy had oppressed the souls of the faithful 
people of Christ's Church; for Luther had come to see that 
the forgiveness of sins rested on no human authority, but 
solely on the merits and grace of Christ Himself. 
Following the evening of 31 October 1517, Luther re-
ceived a startling education as to just how widespread his 
thoughts would come to be. He had apparently circulated 
copies of the Theses only to a small circle of close friends 
and colleagues; but to the astonishment of all, they spread 
to all of Germany within two weeks!29 This fact marks an 
extremely important point, one which J. I. Packer and 0. R. 
Johnston do not miss in their thorough, yet concise, histor-
ical and theological introduction to their English transla-
tion of On the Bondage of the Will, that the Lutheran 
Reformation was the first historical movement to have nation-
wide printed publicity. Luther would use this gift of 
history to his advantage, although he was not entirely 
pleased that the Theses themselves had been given such wide 
publication--for this was not his immediate intent.30 Never- 
theless, Luther became a prolific writer during these early 
29See Luther's comments in LW 41, p. 234. 
30Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New 
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's  
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer 
and O. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co., 
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years of the Reformation; and strong reaction to his efforts 
was not slow in coming from the Roman Church. 
The times were indeed changing. The spirit of the 
Renaissance of secular culture now seemed to be penetrating 
the bastion of the Church, or so it must have seemed to Rome. 
The calls for reform in the Church, that seemed only a whis-
per with John Wycliffe (1320-84) and John Hus (ca. 1370-1415), 
became a battle cry for those who followed Luther's lead. 
Many must have wondered when the other great mind of the 
Reformation era, Desiderius Erasmus, might join forces with 
the German reformer. 
Gordon Rupp bestows upon Erasmus the distinction of 
being "the greatest figure in the northern Renaissance . 
an indispensible link between the overlapping themes of 
humanism and reformation . . • •,31  Erasmus had studied 
with the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer (1475-84). 
He later became a monk, and was ordained a priest in 1492. 
His service to the bishop of Cambrai brought him out of the 
secluded life, and after a time he studied philosophy and 
theology at the College de Montaigu in Paris (1495-96). On 
the first of three visits to England (1499-1500), he came 
into the circle of Christian humanism through John Colet 
(ca. 1467-1519), who allegedly persuaded him to turn his 
1957), p. 38; and Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 205. 
31,Christian Doctrine from 1350," p. 302, though 
elsewhere he calls Erasmus the "flitting Dutchman." 
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humanistic interests in the direction of Biblical studies. 
During his studies, Erasmus acquired a distaste for Scholas-
ticism--and for theology, in general; therefore, Packer and 
Johnston aptly declare, "Erasmus was no theologian."32 But 
a man of incomparable learning he was, and no one could stand 
the same ground with Erasmus in his field of the reading and 
writing of classical languages. 
Erasmus took his position against the complexities 
of the scholastics, seeking a return to the simpler Chris-
tianity of the New Testament era. Here shines forth a 
thought held in common with Colet (and certainly the return 
to a simpler, more pious, Christian living was a major motif 
found in the Brethren of the Common Life, though one can 
only speculate as to how much influence this order had on a 
boy, who was at most eighteen--and probably fifteen--years 
of age when he left that school). On this count, Erasmus 
holds something in common with Luther; but there is more. 
With his humanistic approach to the classical lan-
guages, Erasmus paved the way for the deep Biblical scholar-
ship of Luther. That Luther made extensive use of Erasmus's 
magnum opus, his publication of the Greek New Testament, has 
already been noted [see page 49, above]. And it should be 
noted again (as pointed out previously on page two of the 
introduction to this thesis), that Luther's own magnum opus  
32On the Bondage of the Will, p. 19. 
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was not to be found in his volumes of commentaries, and the 
like; rather, his most towering achievement for the expansion 
of the Reformation was the translation of the Bible into the 
German language, the New Testament having been translated 
and published by September of 1522, from Erasmus's revised 
text of 1519 [the Old Testament would be translated from an 
equally fine edition of the Hebrew, as rendered by Johann 
Reuchlin (1455-1522)].33  
Erasmus approved of Luther's assault on abuses; yet 
he opposed innovations in doctrine and church life.34 Also, 
Erasmus was always careful to protect his close relationship 
with the Pope, and with Henry VIII (1491-1547), in shrewdly 
33Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 528 gives 
evidence that Luther had begun translating parts of the 
Psalms as early as 1517, while at Wittenberg. However, not 
until his stay at the Wartburg in 1521 did his work toward 
the translation of the entire Bible begin in earnest. The 
first complete translation of the Old and New Testaments did 
not appear until 1534; but this edition did not satisfy 
Luther's high standards. Two additional complete revisions 
were published, with the aid of Luther's fellow professors; 
the last did not appear in print until after Luther's death 
in 1546. Cf. Schwiebert, pp. 643-644; see also Heinrich 
Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career: 1521-1530, edited and with a 
Foreword by Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore Bachmann 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p. 46, for reference 
to older, out-dated German translations of the Bible extant 
at the time of Luther. These versions noted, Luther's was 
the first written in the idiom of the German people, equi-
valent to the Greek Koine, which made the Bible easily acces-
sible to a nation hungry to discover the Gospel. 
34Lewis W. Spitz, Jr., Lutheran Cyclopedia, 1975 ed., 
s.v. "Erasmus, Desiderius." See also the extremely fine sum-
mation of the relationship between Luther and Erasmus in 
Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theol-
ogy of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 156-167. 
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keeping his doors open to new opportunities. Therefore, his 
relationship to Luther, although he had many thoughts in 
common with the German theologian, was kept always at some 
distance, even though his friendship with other keys of the 
Reformation, Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), for example, 
(who also demonstrated a desire for a more cautious progress 
toward reform than was Luther's manner) would continue even 
after Luther's death. 
Finally, Erasmus's luxury of being allowed to remain 
in an intermediary position between Luther and the Roman 
Church was revoked. Henry VIII, himself looking for papal 
favors, began pressuring Erasmus to go into print, in pro-
viding the Church with a definitive refutation to Luther's 
new challenge. The Dutchman gave in to the insistance of his 
friends and enemies, and on 1 September 1524, his Diatribe  
seu collatio de libero arbitrio  (Discussion, or Collation,  
concerning Free-Will) appeared. 
The Diatribe of Erasmus did cut to the heart of the 
Reformation, giving Luther the opportunity to elucidate in 
his response, De servo arbitrio (On the Bondage of the Will), 
[WA 18:600-787; LW 33:(xi), (5-13), 15-295] the meaning of 
the pure Gospel proclamation. Luther says to Erasmus on his 
choice of topics with which to launch his public attack: 
Moreover, I give you hearty praise and commendation on 
this further account--that you alone, in contrast with 
all others, have attacked the real thing, that is, the 
essential issue. You have not wearied me with those 
extraneous issues about the Papacy, purgatory, indul- 
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gences and such like--trifles, rather than issues--in 
respect of which almost all to date have sought my blood 
(though without success); you, and you alone, have seen 
the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for the vital 
spot.35 
Published in December of 1525, the answer to Eras-
mus's Diatribe stands as one of the most important writings 
to come from Luther's hand; certainly, it is that, also, for 
a paper which seeks to discover Luther's concept of the use 
of ratio within the framework of theological discussion. It 
is in this writing that Luther meets Erasmus on the same 
humanistic ground, pushing his own intellect and reason to 
high limits, in making defense of the Biblical basis for the 
Reformation. Here, perhaps as nowhere else, does Luther 
demonstrate what he considers to be the proper role of man's 
reason in the pursuit of theological truths. 
The Later Disputations of Luther 
Luther's most prolific period of writing had been 
the decade of the 1520s. Fully two-thirds of his original 
works had appeared between the years 1516 and 1530. Through-
out his career as a reformer, Luther's health had not been 
good; but the years 1531-1546 would bring him more frequent 
and more serious illness.36 It is not surprising, then, 
35On the Bondage of the Will (Packer and Johnston), 
p. 319; cf. WA, 18, 786, 26-31; LW 54, 294. 
36Mark U. Edwards, Jr., Luther's Last Battles:  
Politics and Polemics, 1531-46, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), pp. 9-10. 
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that those years would see a corresponding decline of produc-
tivity from Luther's pen. 
In seeking to find, in the Reformer's later period 
in life, a work that demonstrates that theologian's mature 
views concerning the proper role of ratio in the course of 
theology, the Disputation Concerning Man (1536) was selected 
by this writer for inclusion in this paper's discussion. In 
that disputation, Luther pays tribute to man's gift of rea-
son, while at the same time carefully delimiting the scope 
in which reason is competent to search out truth. Unfortu-
nately, only a fragment of the entire disputation has been 
preserved.37 
As part of the academic exercises of the Medieval 
world, "disputations" were also a part of Luther's life and 
career, especially from the time he became a Doctor of Theol-
ogy in 1512. The statutes of the University of Wittenberg 
in the year 1508 noted three types of disputations in the 
faculty of theology: the disputation for receiving a degree, 
the festive and public quarterly disputations, and the weekly 
circular disputations, which professors conducted for the 
benefit of the students. In part due to the influence of 
humanist concepts of education, the three types of disputa- 
37This writer used the English translation of Lewis 
W. Spitz in LW 34, pages (135), and 137-144. That version 
is based upon WA 39 I, (174) 175-180; see Lewis W. Spitz, ed, 
Luther's Works, vol. 34: Career of the Reformer IV, gen. ed. 
Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960), p. 
135. 
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tions fell into disuse at Wittenberg from 1525-1533. In 
1533, however, their use was revived; and Luther favored 
their use greatly.38 
Care must be used, however, in seeking to use the 
disputations of Luther to prove his position on a particular 
area of theology. Many were not penned by him personally, 
and even those that were contained articles for discussion 
purposes alone, not intended to be final formulations of 
ideas.39 For this reason, this writer shall carefully weigh 
the concepts, as related in the Disputation, with the con-
tents of the two other primary documents with which this 
thesis will be concerned. 
Epilogue to Chapter II  
Literally volume upon volume has been written about 
the life, times, and teachings of Martin Luther. This chap-
ter has not begun even to consider all of the highest mom-
ents in his illustrious career; rather, it has been written 
especially with the intent of providing background informa-
tion for the three primary Luther sources being considered 
in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, as well as render-
ing pertinent facts concerning his education and career that 
have significant bearing on the development of the Reformer's 
understanding of the use of ratio within the context of 
38Ibid., p. xiii. 
39Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 14. 
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theological inquiry and presentation. 
Upon his death in 1546, Luther had provided the world 
with a reawakening to the light of the Gospel proclamation. 
Through the enormous library of work produced by that scholar, 
the realm of theology would feel such impact so that the 
world would give thanks for his birth five hundred years 
later. 
Luther's scholarship was profoundly important for the 
development of approaches to theology throughout the cen-
turies that would follow his lifespan. It is the thesis of 
this writer, that at no point is Luther's contribution to 
theology more decisive than at the juncture where the Refor-
mer determined faith must divorce reason. The following 
pages seek to underscore where Luther made that demarcation 
in his own pursuit of truth. 
CHAPTER III 
RATIO BEFORE AND SINCE THE FALL: 
LUTHER'S VIEW OF MAN BEFORE GOD 
Definitions  
Before any clear discussion of Luther's understanding 
of the way ratio may be employed in theology can take place, 
the term itself must be given adequate definition. The task 
of delimiting the scope of the word 'ratio' becomes all the 
more important, when its wide variety of nuances is taken 
into consideration. Just as the English noun, 'reason,' car-
ries more than one meaning, so does its Latin equivalent. 
'Ratio' may denote not only the faculty of mind which calcu-
lates or plans (the usage of the term which is employed 
throughout this paper), but also can it refer to the follow-
ing: (1) the motive, or ground, for an action; (2) a plan, 
scheme, or system; (3) a theory, doctrine, science; (4) con-
sideration taken, or account rendered, and (5) any trans-
action, affair, or business.1 
A complete word-study of the occurrences of the voc-
able 'ratio' in The Bondage of the Will, the Galatians Com-
mentary (1519), and the Disputation Concerning Man, would 
1Cassell's Latin Dictionary, 1968 ed., s.v. "ratio." 
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reveal that Luther used the word in especially the sense of 
"man's faculty of mind," and "the motive, or ground, for an 
action." The occasional usages of ratio in the latter sense 
are not of importance to this paper; rather, it is the mean-
ing of that word in the first connotation that is of interest 
here. That aspect of 'ratio' is expressed most fully by the 
German, 'Vernunft'. The German vocable expresses only the 
nuance of man's "reason, intellect, intelligence, understand-
ing," and so forth;2 hence, it is, in that respect, a more 
useful rendering than its Latin counterpart, in lending con-
tour to the topic being considered in these pages. 
Bengt Haegglund, in showing the antithesis between 
faith and reason in Luther's theology, further maintains that 
'Vernunft' does not merely denote the human ability to com-
prehend; rather it stands for the "entire attitude of natural 
man, which gives to him his natural knowledge and aspira-
tion".3 The qualification of Vernunft as applying to the 
'natural man' seems apt, especially in light of the discus-
sion below, which will contend that in Luther's theology, 
ratio can properly be categorized with the things of the 
flesh, in contrast with things of the Spirit. 
2The New Cassell's German Dictionary, 1971 ed., s.v. 
"Vernunft." 
3Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der  
Occamistischen Tradition: Luthers Stellung zur Theorie von  
der Doppelten Wahrheit (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1955), p. 84. 
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In the same vein, Gerhard Ebeling suggests that the 
term 'ratio' be distinguished from 'intellectus.' He holds 
that, for Luther, intellectus is not a mere human faculty, 
nor knowledge of an arbitrary object; rather, the term refers 
to something biblical--especially the wisdom of the cross. 
In contrast, human intellect is mere sensualitas; and this 
includes the human ratio, since it is likewise incapable of 
understanding spiritual things (spiritualia).4 
While it is not the purpose of this paper to present 
a word-study of Luther's use of the term 'ratio'--in con-
trast with its synonyms--the point made by Ebeling is a good 
one. If Luther's concept of ratio is to be rendered rightly, 
care must be given to distinguish the knowledge of things 
spiritual which belong to a believer, from that knowledge 
(or lack thereof) possessed by the unregenerate. As will be 
made clear below, Luther's quarrel with ratio stems only from 
its incapability to know, and to accept without argument, the 
gospel (things of the Spirit). Luther condemns human reason 
because it stands in opposition to man's salvation in Christ. 
Hence, as will be shown in the pages that follow, ratio  
stands--in Luther's theology--for that human faculty which 
enables man to think, calculate, or plan; but which, as be-
longing to man in his fallen state, is incapable of compre-
hending the mysteries and will of God. Let this, then, be 
4Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. 
Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 87. 
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the working definition of ratio in the discussion below. In 
order that this understanding might be properly conveyed in 
an English equivalent, this writer will employ the term 
'human reason,' when referring to ratio (Vernunft), thus de-
fined. 
"Ratio" Before the Fall  
The difficulty in substantiating the claim that one 
individual was influenced by the ideas of any other person 
or school, without the former's specifically stating such a 
dependence upon his forerunners, is well known; and certainly 
this also is the case with Luther research. One may only 
surmise that Luther's educational background--that would have 
made him familiar with the ideas of Augustine, Aquinas, Ock-
ham, and Biel--must have given some shape to his developing 
theological insights; and for this reason, what information 
has been related in the previous chapters of this paper bears 
significance to a survey of Luther's understanding of ratio. 
A further problem in the composition of a survey of 
Luther's understanding of ratio arises from the fact--and 
here this writer must beg the indulgence of the reader in 
being "trite"--that Luther was not a systematician.5 Too 
often stated, or not, that Luther did not write a treatise 
on the subject of the human reason remains an obstacle with 
5See Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A 
Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Pub-
lishing House, 1963), p. 14. 
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which the modern scholar must contend. This is unfortunate; 
for the want of such a work by Luther necessitates that gaps 
in the present examination be left open. In addition, the 
selectivity of writings with which this paper is concerned 
will cause still further gaps to appear, as the intent of the 
present project is to supplement the extant works of other 
scholars, who have given attention to the topic of this 
thesis. 
The first, and perhaps most noticeable, of the gaps 
in Luther's view of ratio, is discovered when seeking to 
outline his concept of the competence of human reason before 
the Fall of man took place. Little difficulty is encountered 
in relating what the Reformer considered ratio to be at the 
dawn of creation; but his ideas concerning the limits to 
which human reason could be employed in that era remain un-
spoken. 
Man's Highest Attribute 
In correlation with writings as far back as St. 
Augustine, Luther maintains in the Disputation Concerning  
Man that man's ratio "is the most important and the highest 
in rank among all things and, in comparison with other things 
of this life, the best and something divine."6 It renders 
humans the ability to invent and maintain the arts, medicine, 
6Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 
34:137, a.4 (hereafter cited as LW); cf. Martin Luther, D. 
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law, and whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and glory man pos-
sesses in this life.7 
Indeed, those are high accolades which Luther bestows 
upon man's reason, and they are not unexpected. In the Re-
former's view, reason, as a gift from God to man, is the 
essential difference by which man is distinguished from the 
animals and other things.8 It became man's possession at the 
creation, and this fact alone is sufficient to establish 
ratio as a prize to be cherished; for God saw that His work 
before the Fall was very good (Gen. 1:31).9 Luther asserts 
that Holy Scripture has established man's reason as lord over 
the earth, birds, fish and cattle, saying, "Have dominion" 
(Gen. 1:28); that reason is a sun and "a kind of god" appoin-
ted to administer these things in life.10 
Limitations 
These propositions suggest that Luther held human 
reason in high regard. Nevertheless, he also noted well the 
limitations of that special gift from God. Were these limits 
applicable to ratio even before the Fall of man? Luther does 
Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 39 1:175 
(hereafter cited as WA). 
7LW 34, 137, a.4; WA 39 I, 175 8lbid., a.6. 
9Cf. Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A 
New Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's  
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. by J. I. Packer 
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co., 
1957), p. 203 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 708-709. 
10LW 34, 137, a.7 and a.8; WA 39 I, 175. 
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not tell us. This silence may prove annoying to those who 
demand a philosophical answer to the question of ratio's com-
petence before the Fall; but Luther's tacit approach to the 
query is consistent with his theological methodology. Where 
Scripture is silent, he is silent. The Bible does not delve 
into the issue of the extent of man's knowledge before the 
Fall, and neither does Luther. 
Luther's approach to theology will be given a more 
detailed review in chapter five, below. For the present, 
suffice it to say that his method appears to have close con-
nection with man's relation to God. Man is ever the crea-
tion; God is the Creator--and never the twain shall converge 
[the incarnation of Christ notwithstanding]. God remains 
God, and man, man. God is always above the scope of man's 
comprehension. The Divine acts exceed man's grasp.11 God 
remains free above all things. He has not bound Himself 
totally by His word of revelation to man. Wherever God hides 
Himself, and wills to be unknown to us, there we have no con-
cern. "What is above us does not concern us."12 
Moot questions abound in the structure of Luther's 
thought. Why did God let Adam fall, and why did He create 
all men with his [Adam's] same sin?13 Why does God not alter 
11BOW, p. 93; WA 18, 627, 19. 
12Ibid., p. 170; WA 18, 685, 7: "Quae supra nos, 
nihil ad nos." 
13Ibid., p. 209; WA 18, 712, 29. 
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the evil wills of His creation?14 How is it that God would 
do that which is absurd to human reason, by requiring impos-
sibilities of man's 'free-will' [to will that which is 'good' 
and to avoid evil)? Luther's answer to all remains the same: 
let God be God. Reason may insist that God acts inconsist-
ently, but this is simply because the things of God lie be-
yond its grasp. Reason wants to shut out all articles of 
faith, and to judge the real by what she [Luther often refers 
to 'Reason' in the feminine gender, and the German noun, Ver- 
nunft, also is feminine] is able to see, feel, and 
understand.15 
A correlation seems to exist between Luther's con-
notation of human reason's sphere of competence, and Ockham's 
description of "intuitive cognition" [see page 26, above]. 
But Brian Gerrish signals a key difference between Luther 
and Ockham: for the former, Ockham's epistemological problem 
('How do we know God?') becomes subordinate to the soterio-
logical problem ('What must I do to be saved?').16 Luther's 
"razor" for distinguishing the true from the untrue (in the 
more important realm of the spiritual life of man) would not 
be, What is demonstrable by use of empirical evidence? but, 
Does the assertion agree, or disagree, with the Gospel? 
14Ibid., p. 208; WA 18, 712, 24. 
15Ibid., pp. 201-202; WA 18, 707-708. 
16 Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in 
the Theology of Luther (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), 
pp. 55-56. 
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The Reformer is critical of Erasmus's Diatribe pre-
cisely because it fails to acknowledge the necessity of rea-
son's submission to faith in matters that pertain to man's 
relationship to God. Ratio cannot fathom faith's response to 
the question, Why are some saved, while others are not? 
Luther contends that reason can make no other response to 
that question than to surmise that God is one of Chance--that 
God merely sits by in idleness, not using His own wisdom, 
will and presence to elect, separate and inspire, but en-
trusts to man the business of curbing God's wrath.17 Human 
reason will not allow God to be God. The basis for this fact 
lies in the Fall of man. 
"Ratio" Since the Fall  
The Totality of Sin's Effect on Man 
It has been observed that if we fail to grasp Luther's 
literally staggering idea of sin, we shall never do justice 
to the genius of Luther or fathom his profundities.18 Surely 
this applies to the realm of rightly understanding the Re-
former's concept of reason's limited scope within the param-
eters of things spiritual. And Luther's understanding of the 
totality of sin's binding effects upon man lies at the very 
center of his argumentation against Erasmus in The Bondage  
17BOW, pp. 199-200; WA 18, 706, 13. 
1 8Heinz Bluhm, "Luther's View of Man in His Early 
German Writings," Concordia Theological Monthly 34 (October 
1963):586. 
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of the Will.  
Erasmus condemned Luther's view of the severity of 
the effect which Adam's sin had upon all subsequent genera- 
tions of mankind: 
[Luther] exaggerates the importance of original sin by 
teaching that it has corrupted even the noblest faculties 
of man to such a degree that man cannot know God, that 
he hates him, and that even the believer who is justified 
by faith remains a sinner.19 
By editing Erasmus's words, substituting the vocable 
"underscores" for "exaggerates," one is given a fair summa-
tion of Luther's view of the condition of man after the Fall. 
Luther held fast to the words of Romans 5, that by the sin-
gle offense of the one man, Adam, all men lie under sin and 
condemnation.20 By virtue of that condition, man becomes 
hostile toward God, and refuses the aid of faith in Christ 
for his salvation. Man is a sinner; and his sin is seated, 
not in the skin or in the hair [or any of the lesser parts 
of man's being], but in the highest attributes of natural 
man: in the reason and the will [ratione et voluntate].21 
19On Free Will, IV, 13, as quoted in Hermann Sasse, 
"Luther and the Word of God," in Accents in Luther's Theol-
ogy: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the  
Reformation, ed. Heino O. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Pub-
lishing House, 1967), p. 65. 
20BOW, p. 297; WA 18, 773, 7. 
21Ibid., p. 311; WA 18, 782, 14; cf. BOW, p. 280 [WA 
18 761, 32]: "And doubtless that ignorance and contempt are 
not seated in the flesh, in the sense of the lower and gros-
ser affections, but in the highest and most excellent powers 
of man . . . that is, in reason and will . . . ." 
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That Erasmus would so vehemently attack Luther for 
suggesting that original sin has corrupted human reason along 
with all other attributes of man, probably did not surprise 
the Reformer. Rather, Erasmus's insistent endeavor to pre-
serve the integrity of ratio even after the Fall would merely 
prove that he was human. Luther cited Romans 1:21 in defense 
of his position, showing that, since the Fall, men became 
fools in their reasoning, and their heart was darkened--they 
became vain in their own reasonings [dialogismois].22 So 
blinded has man become in his vanity, that he would rather 
protect his reason and be damned, than to admit reason's cor-
ruptness.23 Luther criticizes the Diatribe for supposing 
that man is sound and whole after the Fall: 
. . . Scripture describes man as corrupted and led cap-
tive, and, furthermore, as proudly disdaining to notice, 
and failing to recognise [sic], his own corruption and 
captivity; . . .24 
Luther's concept of ratio after the Fall, then, takes 
notice that that gift has been profoundly impaired by the 
devastating effects of original sin. To what extent has 
man's reason been limited by his sin? That question is to be 
considered now. 
22BOW, p. 277; WA 18, 759, 29. 
23Ibid., p. 309; [WA 18, 780-781]: ". . . And as long 
as my will and my reason are blessed, I shall be glad for my 
filthy animal flesh to be taken away and damned; so far am I 
from wanting Christ to be its Redeemer!" 
24Ibid., p. 153; WA 18, 674, 9. 
73 
Ratio Impaired--Not Destroyed--by Sin 
In spite of the magnitude of Adam's sin for the human 
race, Luther did not defend the position that man's ratio was 
utterly destroyed in the Garden. It has been noted above 
[pages 65 and 66] that Luther held, with high regard, rea-
son's God-given abilities to have dominion over the rest of 
the created order, and to administer things in this life. 
And we note further, that he believed that God did not revoke 
this privilege from man after the Fall of Adam.25 But lost 
is reason's aptitude to know and to judge rightly, in accord-
ance with God's perfect will. Though reason has not been 
destroyed by the Fall, it is, nonetheless, made to serve the 
sinful self-awareness and self-glorification of fallen 
man.
26 
The nature of reason's impairment lies chiefly in the 
arena of man's knowledge of God. Pelikan assesses the extent 
to which Luther maintained ratio's ability to know God thus: 
Luther was perfectly willing to grant that the unaided 
human mind can know that there is a God, 'quod est Deus. 1 
But it cannot know what God is, 'quid est Deus'.27 
In The Bondage of the Will, Luther holds that the knowledge 
of God in reason, carried to its logical conclusion, is 
25LW 34, p. 137, a.9; WA 39 I, 175. 
26Cf. Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 
trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1966), p. 66. 
27Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 22. 
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nothing but atheism; for reason cannot resist the assault of 
the power and the paradox of evil in the world. 
Behold! God governs the external affairs of the world 
in such a way that, if you regard and follow the judg-
ment of human reason, you are forced to say, either that 
there is no God, or that God is unjust; as the poet said: 
'I am often tempted to think there are no gods.'28 
In view of Luther's personal struggles with the concept of 
the "righteousness of God" earlier in his career, these words 
might be self-descriptive of his own wrestling with the issue 
of man's natural knowledge of God. 
Luther's description of man's natural knowledge of 
God takes form in his contention that all men find the fol-
lowing in their hearts [as shall be shown in the next sec-
tion, man's "heart" can be synonymous with "reason," and 
other attributes, in Luther's language usage], even if they 
have no Scripture: (1) that God is omnipotent, not only in 
power but also in action, and (2) that He knows and foreknows 
all things, and can neither err nor be deceived. Taken 
together, these assertions form a sort of 'proof for the 
existence of God' for Luther. By them he seeks to show, 
from "irrefutable logic," that man must admit that he does 
not act by his own 'free-will,' but by necessity--that there 
must exist a God who, by virtue of His foreknowledge and His 
infallible and immutable counsel and power, is able to order 
the direction of the paths man walks in life. This same God 
28BOW, p. 315; WA 18, 784, 36; cf. Ebeling, Luther:  
An Introduction, p. 230. 
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writes every other law into the hearts of man.29 
The Scholastic axiom--that man can know from his 
natural reason that God exists, but that he can never know 
who that God is by the use of his unaided reason--is never 
more true than for Luther's theological understanding of 
man's condition since the Fall. What natural knowledge man 
has of God is, furthermore, of a legalistic order. When the 
'grace' of God is sought by unaided reason, a distorted 
picture is rendered. In his exposition of Galatians 5:14 
("For the whole Law is fulfilled in one word, in the state-
ment, 'YOU SHALL LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF'"--NASB.), 
Luther notes that nature may try to emulate grace, but 
especially when it gets to the "cross," it meets opposition 
to its own understanding of 'grace,' and rebels mightily.30 
That ratio since the Fall cannot comprehend things 
of a spiritual nature, is a characteristic description of 
Luther's view of fallen man. Unaided reason is blind to the 
knowledge of godliness.31 Reason, impaired by the Fall, now 
sees things of God as 'absurd.' For example, in discussing 
the complex issue of God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart, 
Luther notes: 
.. It is human reason that is offended; which, though 
[WA 18, 719, 33]: "In the same way, 
written in our hearts (we have Paul's 
29BOW, p. 218 
every other law is 
word for this [cf. Rom. 2:15]). . . ." 
30LW 27, p. 353; WA 2, 578-579. 
31Cf. BOW, pp. 280-281; WA 18, 761-762. 
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it is blind, deaf, senseless, godless, and sacrilegious, 
in its dealing with all God's words and works, is at this 
point brought in as judge of God's words and worksI32  
The Reformer continues: 
On these same grounds you [Erasmus] will deny all the 
articles of faith, for it is the highest absurdity by 
far--foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling-block 
to the Jews, as Paul says [1 Corinthians 1:23]--that God 
should be man, a virgin's son, crucified, sitting at the 
Father's right hand. It is, I repeat, absurd [emphasis 
theirs] to believe such things!33 
And elsewhere in the same work: 
How could reason conceive that faith in Jesus as Son of 
God and Son of Man was necessary, when even at this day 
it can neither grasp nor believe, though the whole cre-
ation should cry aloud, that there is a person who is 
both God and man! Indeed, it rather finds offence [sic] 
in such a statement, as Paul tells us in [1 Corinthians 
1]--so impossible is it that it should be either willing 
or able to believe itI34  
Ratio in Relation to Man's Will 
Flesh and spirit  
At one's first impression, it may seem rather odd 
that Luther would write a major book on "the bondage of the 
will," and then proceed to discuss at length, not only the 
topic of the human will, but also the state of man's reason. 
But when Luther's usage of language is considered more care-
fully, the apparent confusion of terms no longer looks pecul-
iar. 
32BOW, p. 201; WA 18, 707, 22; cf. p. 150 below. 
33Ibid.; WA 18, 707, 24. 
34Ibid., p. 187; WA 18, 698, 5. 
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Luther sees an extremely close connection between 
man's will and his reason. In fact, it is man's ratio that 
assists his will in lending directives to act. Returning to 
Luther's defining of ratio's condition before the Fall, as 
found in the Disputation, it appears significant that the 
purpose for God's bestowal of reason upon man at creation 
was not, primarily, that man might think, but that he might 
act in ways consistent with God's own will.35 Luther appar-
ently finds a defense in Scripture for drawing an unbroken 
relationship between human reason and man's will. To which 
aspect of the man is the Law spoken? To his will, as an 
imperative which causes a man to act upon God's directives? 
No. Rather, the Law is spoken to illuminate the blindness 
of reason, "so that it may see that its own light is nothing, 
and the power of the will is nothing." And further, "'By the 
law is knowledge [emphasis by this writer] of sin,' says Paul 
[Romans 3:20]. He does not say: abolition, or avoidance, of 
sin [emphasis theirs]."36  
Likewise, Luther finds an ally in Paul for treating 
nearly any aspect of man, that is hostile to God since the 
Fall, as synonymous. Paul lists among the "works of the 
flesh" heresy, idolatry, contentions, divisions, and so forth, 
which are in turn attitudes that reside in man's most exalted 
35LW 34, p. 137, a.7 and 8; WA 39 I, 175. 
36B0W, p. 158; WA 18, 677, 7. 
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faculties, namely, reason and the will.37 In Luther, as for 
Paul, all actions and attitudes of man can be classified in 
but two categories: "flesh" and "spirit." In addition, so 
complete is man's corruption since the Fall, that anything 
that is classed as "flesh" is, by its nature, against the 
spirit.38 
For this reason, Paul Althaus can rightly declare 
that when Luther says in one of his hymns, "My free will 
hated God's judgment," any one of these other concepts could 
take the place of "free will": "flesh," "flesh and blood," 
"nature" of man, "natural reason," "sense," "entire world," 
and so forth.39 
Because the flesh stands in opposition to the spirit, 
man's will and reason are always to be subordinated to the 
revelations of God. Luther's words: 
For if human words or examples, no matter how saintly, 
have begun to be boasted of in opposition to those that 
37Ibid., p. 313; WA 18, 783, 9. 
38Ibid., p. 242; WA 18, 735, 31; cf. Gen. 6:5; 8:21. 
39Theology of Luther, pp. 66-67; Heinrich Emil Brun-
ner seems not to know of Luther's way of treating such con-
cepts as synonymous, for he asserts in Revelation and Reason:  
The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge (Westminster 
Press, 1946), p. 301, n. 1: "The personification of reason 
by Luther in the controversial sense ('die Hure Vernunft,' 
et cetera) is not derived from the Bible but is to be under-
stood in the light of the Scholastic use of the rational 
principle. In the Bible it is not so much the reason that 
is sinful as the heart, and that means the person." 
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are divine, it is time for us confidently to regard what- 
ever is not divine as flesh and blood, yes, as nothing.40 
This is the kind of statement that Erasmus could not bear; 
and Luther laments the former's inability to understand the 
relationship of man's sin, with human reason and the will. 
According to Luther, it is fallen reason's misguiding that 
has caused so many men of outstanding ability to be offended 
at the truths of God's Word through the ages.41 Luther's 
lamentations are not spoken for "men of outstanding ability" 
alone. The bell tolls for all. He asserts that it is to be 
lamented whenever it happens that we human beings are praised 
as possessing reason, because of our free will, and because 
of our works, since Paul declares that it is impossible for 
one who pleases himself, or men, to be a servant of Christ 
and of the truth.42 
"Simul justus et peccator": the  
paradox of regenerate man  
Thus far, a description has been given of the condi-
tion of ratio in unregenerated man. Is the ratio possessed 
by a regenerated Christian man exactly the same as that found 
in his unbelieving counterpart? Luther's response to that 
question speaks the unreasonable; for he seeks to answer both 
Yes and No. By no rule of logic is this possible, and Luther 
40LW 27, p. 192; WA 2, 471, 21. 
41BOW, p. 232; WA 18, 729, 13. 
42LW 27, p. 181; WA 2, 464, 28; on Galatians 1:10. 
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would quickly admit such. Here, as in all articles of faith, 
reason and God's truth are rent asunder. 
'Paradox' abounds in Luther's thought, and perhaps 
the supreme example is the doctrine rendered as simul justus  
et peccator (simultaneously justified and sinner).43 Luther 
sees in the regenerated man a distinction not of 'either/or', 
in contrast with the unregenerated, but of 'both/and'. The 
believer in Christ is, on the one hand, enlightened by the 
Spirit to see God's truths, and on the other, darkened by 
his remaining sin. Luther saw this idea as wholly Biblical. 
Coupling 1 John 1:8 with 1 John 3:9, he shows that God's Word 
says, at one and the same time, that the believer is not able 
to sin, yet if he says he has no sin, he is lying.44 
Man in two kingdoms  
According to the Reformer, regenerated man, while 
still on this earth, finds himself in the realm of two over-
lapping kingdoms. In regard to the lesser kingdom of the 
creation [actually of Satan], man is able--even after the 
Fall--to be led by his own free will with regard to those 
43The exact phrase 'simul justus et peccator' is 
found in the Galatians Commentary (1519), WA 2, 497, 13, 
where the phrase is employed to describe the Biblical per-
sonage of Job. Another clear reference to this concept is 
found in WA 2, 489, 11-14. 
44LW 27, p. 230; WA 2, 496-497; the Biblical passages 
as rendered in LW 27: "He who is born of God does not sin" 
(1 John 3:9); and "If we say we have no sin, we deceive our-
selves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8). 
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things that are below him; in the other kingdom [the kingdom 
of God], he is not left in the hand of his own counsel, but 
is directed and led by the will and counsel of God.45 This 
places regenerated man in the precarious position of being 
caught between two kingdoms that are at war with each other; 
hence his life on earth will be one of great confusion and 
of paradox.46 
"Ratio Coram Deo" 
The "magisterium" and "ministerium"  
of man's use of reason  
If Luther's distinction of the two kingdoms is noted, 
attention must be given to the condition of ratio, as pos-
sessed by the regenerate man, and as it seeks to function 
within each of those distinct spheres. The first of the 
kingdoms to be treated here will be the kingdom of God. As 
noted in the previous discussion [pages 78-79], the will of 
God reigns supremely in this realm. Sin has darkened man's 
knowledge of God; and as man stands before God (coram deo), 
he is not able even to know what is right and wrong.47 
Classic surveys of Christian dogmatics delineate 
ratio's proper use before God, by carefully distinguishing 
45BOW, pp. 150-151 [WA 18, 672-673]: "For there is no 
middle kingdom between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of 
Satan, which are at war with each other." 
46Cf. Ibid., p. 253; WA 18, 743, 32. 
47Cf. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 14. 
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the so-called 'usus rationis ministerialis' from the 'usus 
rationis magisterialis'. In this distinction, the minister-
ium of reason is its proper sphere of competence, when as a 
maid it gives way to higher authority; the magisterium of 
reason speaks of ratio's arrogating to itself judgment in 
things about which it knows nothing, and which exceed its 
grasp of understanding.48 These categories fit well into 
Luther's view of ratio coram deo. According to the Reformer, 
reason is quite stupid and absurd when applied to holy 
things.49 Reason's relationship before God is a ministerial 
one. 
"Theologia crucis"  
At no crossroad is ratio's incompetence to understand 
articles of a spiritual nature more amplified, as when it 
encounters the cross of Christ. Much has been written con-
cerning the central importance of the 'theology of the cross' 
(theologia crucis) for Luther's thought.50 The 'theology of 
the cross' stands in contrast to the 'theology of glory' 
(theologia gloriae). While the 'theology of glory' seeks to 
48See Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols. 
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 1:199. 
49BOW, p. 152; WA 18, 674. 
50The most excellent treatment of this subject, known 
to this writer, is Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology 
 
of the Cross, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1976). See also Althaus, Theology 
of Luther, pp. 25-34. 
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know God through His works, the 'theology of the cross' rec-
ognizes, through faith, that a true knowledge of God is to 
be found only in the suffering Christ on Calvary.51 
"Deus absconditus" and "revelatus"  
The cross of Christ is the greatest stumbling-block 
to the reason of man [see page 76 above]. Human reason is 
totally baffled that God should reveal Himself to man in 
this way. This is the point at which another important dis-
tinction in Luther's understanding of man's ability to know 
things concerning God must be noted: the distinction between 
God, as He chooses to remain hidden from the reason of man 
(Deus absconditus), and God, as He has chosen to reveal Him-
self to man (Deus revelatus). 
In The Bondage of the Will, Luther again takes the 
offensive against Erasmus for the latter's failure to make 
the distinction between God hidden and revealed. The Re-
former notes that "Wherever God hides Himself, and wills to 
be unknown to us, there we have no concern. Here that senti- 
51An interesting passage in Althaus, Theology of  
Luther, pp. 26-27, further establishes that Luther deepens 
the meaning of these concepts by showing that, in the 'theo-
logy of glory,' man seeks to know God not only through His 
works, but also through man's works; in the same way, in the 
'theology of the cross,' God is found not only in the suf-
fering of Christ, but also in man's suffering. Hence, in 
Althaus's words, "natural theology and speculative meta-
physics which seek to learn to know God from the works of 
creation are in the same category as the work righteousness 
of the moralist. Both are ways in which man exalts himself 
to the level of God." 
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ment: 'what is above us does not concern us', [sic] really 
holds good."52 Against a philosophical approach toward seek-
ing to know God, Luther forcefully ascertains that God in His 
own nature and majesty is to be left alone. The magisterial 
use of human reason is to be shunned. Says Luther, "We have 
to do with Him as clothed and displayed in His Word, by which 
He presents Himself to us."53 
Thus even regenerated man must know God only as He 
has chosen to reveal Himself to him. Man must be guided by 
God's word, not by His inscrutable will which we cannot com-
prehend.54 If reason tries to know God by observing His 
works, then it will be confounded all the more; for God fre-
quently acts in paradoxical ways. For example, Luther states 
that when God quickens, He does so by killing [as occurs to 
this writer, the supreme instance was at Calvary!]; when He 
justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when He carries 
up to heaven, He does so by bringing down to hell. "Thus God 
conceals His eternal mercy and loving kindness beneath eter-
nal wrath, His righteousness beneath unrighteousness."55 
52BOW, p. 170; WA 18, 685, 6. 
53Ibid.; WA 18, 685, 16. 
54Ibid., pp. 170-171; WA 18, 685. 
55Ibid., p. 101; WA 18, 633, 9. Luther's 'proof 
texts' are 1 Kings 2, "The Lord killeth and maketh alive"; 
and 1 Samuel 2:6, "he bringeth down to the grave and bringeth 
up" (as rendered in the Packer-Johnston text). 
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Revelation at God's initiative  
Therefore, the essential need of man--in order that 
he might come to know God--is for God's revelation of Him-
self. Accordingly, in giving his exposition on Galatians 
4:9, Luther agrees with Augustine regarding the fact that, 
properly speaking, man does not come to know God at all; 
rather, God must come to know us first.56 God, not man, must 
take the initiative of this effort. As the Reformer makes 
mention of the fact, 'sons of God' [regenerate men] became 
such only by being born of God, not by human volition.57 
And, as Luther shows from 1 Corinthians 2, unless the Spirit 
[God] revealed the principal articles of faith concerning 
salvation itself, no man's heart would know anything about 
the matter of life everlasting.58 Luther: ". . . the whole 
world, human reason, yes, 'free-will', [sic] are forced to 
confess that they had not known nor heard of Christ before 
the gospel [God's revelation through the word] entered the 
world."59 
56LW 27, p. 294; WA 2, 539, 10. 
57BOW, p. 303; WA 18, 776, 30; cf. John 1:12-13. 
58lbid., p. 139; WA 18, 663. 
59 Ibid., p. 306; WA 18, 778, 34. As can be seen from 
these points, Gerrish's distinction between Luther and Ockham 
grows more significant as to its correctness [see page 69 
above]. Indeed, Luther's paramount concern in his concept of 
ratio is not of an epistemological, but of a soteriological, 
nature. 
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Without the aid of revelation from God, human reason 
cannot grasp Him. In the Galatians Commentary (1519), Luther 
states that Christ alone, not man's reason, is the Light and 
Life of all men.60 Indeed! Then what can be made of the 
ratio of unregenerated man? Has it not been shown above 
[pages 73-76] that man's reason--even in the realm of the 
unregenerate--was not destroyed, but merely impaired, by the 
Fall? Again Luther's position must be restated, that unaided 
reason is able to perceive that a God exists, but that it is 
utterly incapable of knowing who or what kind of God He truly 
is, namely, a God of grace. 
Three lights of illumination 
Luther distinguishes between three separate "lights," 
which illumine man's path to the truth: the light of nature, 
the light of grace, and the light of glory.61 Judging by 
Luther's usage of these terms in their context, the 'light 
of nature' refers to the God-given gift of ratio, as it is 
possessed even by the unregenerate, and is able to make de-
ductions and calculations in this life; the 'light of grace' 
60LW 27, p. 293; WA 2, 538, 15: "Solus Christus est 
lux et vita omnium hominum, non ratio nostra." 
61BOW, p. 317. Could these 'three lights' be a re-
working of the system of three classes of arguments that had 
been outlined by Averroes [see page 20, n. 22 above]? This 
writer does not pretend to have the answer; but what is in-
teresting is the observation that Luther's 'three lights' 
offer a complete reversal of the order of possessed truth 
that had been given by Averroes. In the latter's system, it 
is the natural philosopher who holds the most certain truth; 
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describes the enlightened reason of the regenerate man, who 
is able to perceive such things as the Gospel and other arti-
cles of faith (against which the 'light of nature' is hostile 
because of their supposed unreasonableness); and the 'light 
of glory' takes into account the eschatological aspect of 
man's knowledge of God, noting that our understanding of God 
and His will is imperfect, at best, while man remains in this 
world--that the regenerate will possess a more complete pic-
ture of God when they are taken to be with Him in heaven. 
Enemy of the gospel;  
friend to the law 
Much mention is made in writings about Luther's theol-
ogy that the Reformer spoke in condemning fashion concerning 
ratio. The "White Devil," "the Devil's whore," "Frau Hulda," 
"Madam Reason," [Domina Ratio] are but a few of the not so 
complimentary names which Luther employs when referring to 
human reason.62 But one must recall Luther's understanding 
that man's reason has not been totally destroyed, only im-
paired, by the Fall [see pages 73-76 above]. Reason is not 
always a tool of the devil. The context in which Luther 
in Luther's view, it is the regenerated man [in heaven], who 
holds that highest level of knowledge, while philosophy holds 
the lowest form of knowledge. 
62Cf. BOW, p. 154 [WA 18, 674, 13], p. 232 [WA 18, 
729, 7], and passim. These names do not appear, as such, in 
the Galatians Commentary (1519), nor in the Disputation, 
though in the latter, reason is described as being under the 
devil's influence, as the discussion on pages 93-95 (below) 
will indicate. 
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speaks of "Mistress Reason" in his writings bears important 
evidence, which shows that he viewed ratio in this dark light 
only as it is used in a 'magisterial' way [compare pages 81-
82]. 
Luther's criticism of reason stems from its inability 
to accept the gospel as true; put in stronger terms, he sees 
that misused reason has the ability to weaken--even destroy--
the gospel's saving impact upon fallen man. In The Bondage  
of the Will, "Mistress Reason" finds no friend in Luther: 
"Reason is . . . so entrapped in the inferences and words of 
her own wisdom, that she does not know what she is saying or 
talking about."63 The focus of Luther's argument, in this 
instance, is that reason will not allow natural man to ac-
knowledge his total inability to do anything toward working 
out his own salvation with God--or, for that matter, any-
thing that is at all God-pleasing. Erasmus has sought to 
preserve something in man's 'free-will' since the Fall, that 
will enable one to at least co-operate with God's will. Yet 
Luther has shown, to the contrary, that man has been totally 
corrupted by his sin, and is held in captivity apart from 
God as a consequence.64 The Reformer's point of contention, 
throughout his treatise On the Bondage of the Will, is that 
if man can be shown to retain something of his 'free-will' 
63BOW, p. 154; WA 18, 674, 22. 
64Cf. Ibid., p. 153; WA 18, 674, 9. 
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after the Fall, which enables man to co-operate with God's 
will in any way in working toward his salvation, then the 
sacrifice of Christ is diminished; for in that case, Christ 
would only have died to save the lesser attributes of man, 
and not his reason and will (his highest attributes). 
Unaided reason, as portrayed in Luther's writings, 
is no friend of the Gospel. This is because man's natural 
reason, since the Fall, is legalistic in character. Ratio  
wants to make works of the Law the criteria for determining 
who will be saved, and who will be lost, at the last judg-
ment of God. For this reason, Luther is highly critical of 
any, who would seek to use the wisdom of men as authoritative 
over the Gospel, in formulating any theology which depicts 
man as being able to contribute works of merit toward his 
own salvation: 
We learn these godless kinds of righteousness from the 
decrees of men and from the monstrous theology which has 
Aristotle as its head and Christ as its feet, since these 
decrees and these kinds of righteousness alone hold sway. 
For this is how they vaunt their petty works of satis-
faction; and it is amazing what value they place on these 
with their traffic in indulgences, as if it were not 
enough to believe in Christ, in whom our righteousness, 
redemption, satisfaction, life and glory are by faith 
alone [1 Corinthians 1:30: "But by His doing you are in 
Christ Jesus, who became to us wisdom from God, and 
righteousness and sanctification, and redemption" NASB].65 
65LW 27, p. 328 [WA 2, 562, 1], on Galatians 5:2; cf. 
a similar statement in that same work, p. 219 [WA 2, 489, 
24]: "This is the kind of righteousness Aristotle and other 
philosophers describe--the kind produced by laws of the state 
and of the church in ceremonies, the kind produced at the 
behest of reason and by prudence." 
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Reason as judge over God  
Allowing God alone to be the judge, over who is to 
be saved and who is to be damned, is contrary to the impulse 
of human reason, as described by Luther. This is the height 
of the magisterial use of ratio. Luther observes that the 
greatest possible offense confronts human reason, when it is 
noted that God, Who is proclaimed full of mercy and goodness, 
should of His own mere will abandon, harden, and damn men, 
as though He delighted in the sins and great eternal torments 
of such poor wretches. Says the Reformer, "And who would 
not stumble at it? I have stumbled at it myself more than 
once, down to the deepest pit of despair, so that I wished I 
had never been made a man."66 
In this arena of man's contemplation, fallen reason 
will not allow God to be God. Satan's influence is felt by 
the ratio of man.67 Reason praises God as God only when He 
acts as One who serves its own convenience. Ratio praises 
God when He saves the unworthy from their destruction, but 
finds fault with Him when He damns those who are also un-
deserving of His mercy.68 
66BOW, p. 217; WA 18, 719, 9. 
67In BOW, p. 134 [WA 18, 659, 32], Luther surmises 
that if Satan were not at work in this world, "the whole 
world could be converted by a single word of God, heard once: 
there would be no need of more." 
68Ibid., p. 234; WA 18, 733. 
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Invincible ignorance  
In light of reason's incompetence before God, man 
could easily adopt an entirely fatalistic outlook toward the 
question, Why are some saved, while others are not? Luther 
demonstrates, in the Galatians Commentary (1519), that teach-
ers of that era were doing just that. Some were hypothesiz-
ing three classes of ignorance: invincible ignorance, gross 
ignorance, and affected ignorance [ignorantiam aliam invinc-
ibilem, aliam crassam et affectatum].69 
Luther describes the three classes of ignorance in 
reference to Galatians 4:8 ["However at that time, when you 
did not know God, you were slaves to those which by nature 
are no gods" NASB.]. Ignorance that is affected [by the Holy 
Spirit] accuses man in his sin all the more; he can no longer 
plead innocence before God as Judge, claiming that he simply 
did not know any better than to act as he did in life. Gross 
ignorance of God's will is an intermediate category, between 
"affected" and "invincible" ignorance, which partially ex-
cuses one from his sin, but not entirely. Invincible igno-
rance, so it was said by those who composed the theory, was 
able to absolve a man from all sin. 
Luther indicted those who espoused the notion of an 
invincible ignorance with doing injury to God's grace, and 
inflating man's supposed 'free-will.'70 God is able to sur- 
69LW 27, pp. 292-293; WA 2, 537-538. 70Ibid. 
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mount any obstacle; hence, an "invincible" ignorance cannot 
exist. It might also be added, that what has been shown 
above, namely, the idea that God has written His law into 
the heart of man as part of his very nature [see pages 74-
75], shatters the mistaken concept of a so-called 'invincible 
ignorance' on the part of man. 
"Ratio Coram Humanitate" 
Attention must now be given to the second of the two 
kingdoms in which regenerated man finds himself living while 
in this world, that is, the kingdom of Satan [also, "the 
world," and "the flesh"]. It has been established above, 
that Luther envisioned as being improper, any so-called 'ma-
gisterial' use of reason before God (coram deo), which does 
not allow God to be God, and which usurps to itself the au-
thority to declare what is righteous and unrighteous, just 
and unjust. But the preceding discussion also acknowledged 
a 'ministerial' use of reason, which described an appropriate 
sphere of action and thinking, where ratio is free to work 
within properly defined parameters. This 'ministerium' of 
reason speaks of man's living with his fellowman in the 
world: hence the phrase, 'ratio coram humanitate'. 
Reason's majesty 
In describing man's gift of ratio before the Fall, 
Luther heaped praise upon it as man's highest attribute [see 
pages 66-67]. Because of the lofty importance which reason 
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holds for the proper maintenance of God's creation, and for 
the improvement of man's life on earth, Luther also speaks 
of ratio as possessing a certain "majesty."71 But this ma- • 
jesty belongs to reason not for its own sake, but because it 
is a gift of God at creation; it is God who both bestowed, 
and confirmed, the majestic honor upon man's reason. 
Even for the unregenerate man, reason is an essential 
tool for service. With it, man can "have dominion" over the 
other living things on the earth; that is, he can properly 
administer the things of this life.72 A high gift, reason 
owns the distinction of being the inventor of all the arts, 
medicines, laws, and so forth.73 Thus, it can be noted that 
Luther valued man's reason highly. 
Influence of the devil  
Since the world can also be called the kingdom of 
Satan, can it be inferred that every action of man, while he 
is in this domain, is controlled by the devil; and further, 
is every earthly act of man necessarily evil? As shown in 
the section concerning ratio coram deo above, distinction 
must be made between unregenerate, and regenerate man. If 
consideration is given only to man apart from faith, then 
articles 24 and 25 of the Disputation lend a certain answer: 
71LW 34, p. 137, a.9 and 10; WA 39 I, 175. 
72Ibid., a.7 and 8; WA 39 I, 175. 
73Ibid., a.5; WA 39 I, 175. 
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even though reason remains man's highest attribute after the 
Fall, it still lies under the devil's power, and it must be 
concluded that the whole man and every man--regardless of 
one's station in life--is and remains guilty of sin and death 
under the power of Satan.74 Likewise, unregenerated man is 
totally unable to choose between what is 'good' and that 
which is 'evil,' neither is he able to merit the grace of God 
and life; moreover, the light of God's countenance is no 
longer in the unregenerate since the Fall.75 
If the regenerated man is taken into consideration, 
the picture of man under the devil's power changes somewhat. 
Yet here the caveat must again be sounded, that the fragmen-
tary articles for debate, which follow the Disputation pro-
per, may not necessarily represent Luther's final formula-
tions on the topics in question. This warning in mind, the 
tentative response to the question of Satan's level of dom-
inance over regenerate man might be rendered as follows: 
(1) an apparent implication in the argument against thesis 
24 in the Disputation, is that man is utterly incapable of 
doing anything that is 'good' (before God) apart from his 
being regenerated by God; (2) against the reactionary comment 
outlined in that same section--that is, "if reason is of the 
devil, no one does good; but we ought to do good; therefore, 
74LW 34, pp. 138-139; WA 39 I, 176. 
75Ibid., p. 139, a.30, 27, and 29; WA 39 I, 176. 
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all reason is not under the power of the devil"--Luther makes 
defense by noting that "we are not debating about the pious 
man"; (3) Luther's further comment in that section states 
"all good things which are over and above the divine gift 
are subject to the devil"; (4) ergo, regenerate man does, 
indeed, live within two kingdoms (the kingdom of God and of 
Satan), and whatever part of that individual as lies outside 
God's active influence, such is as remains under the domina-
tion of the devil. However, insofar as God is actively at 
work to enlighten the reason of regenerate man, the latter 
is able to know the 'good' that remains a mystery to the man 
without faith.76 Hence, in the case of the regenerate man, 
not all reason lies necessarily under the devil's control. 
One may speak of an enlightened reason, or (as in Luther's 
terms), of a "theological man."77  
Right reason 
Paul Althaus lends interesting insight into the 
theology of Luther. In summarizing Luther's view of reason, 
as it is employed in earthly affairs, Althaus notes that 
theology has no other task than to allow reason its place, to 
76Ibid., p. 142; WA 39 I, 179. 
77Ibid., p. 139, a.28; WA 39 I, 176; "theological 
man" is a term which Luther uses to distinguish man, as he is 
portrayed in Scripture, in contrast to a philosophical, Aris-
totelian, idea of man. The term refers especially to regen-
erate man: "Theological man is outside the realm of the 
devil. Civic man has virtues to be sure, but he is not free 
from the devil" (LW 34, p. 144; WA 39 I, 180, 30). 
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recognize it, and to testify that it is God's creation. 
Still further, in the matters of "earthly government," reason 
alone is the final authority, containing within itself the 
basis for judging and deciding about the proper regulation 
and administration of earthly matters such as economics and 
politics. Says Althaus, "In these matters the Bible, Chris-
tian preaching, and theology have nothing to say. Holy 
Scripture and the gospel do not teach us how to make right 
laws or administer the affairs of state."78 
The selected writings of Luther with which this paper 
is concerned do not allow as complete a construction of 
Luther's view of reason's scope in earthly affairs, as 
Althaus is able to render. However, hints do appear in a 
fragmentary way within the Disputation, that reason is meant 
to play a significant role in the task of administering the 
affairs of this world, even for the unregenerate. 
The Disputation fragment speaks of a "right reason" 
[recta ratio], which is the principal part of man that dis-
tinguishes man from beasts.79 Since the early articles of 
the Disputation had determined that man's "reason" was his 
highest gift at creation, and that which differentiated man 
from animal, it seems logical to deduce that the terms 
'ratio' and 'recta ratio' denote one and the same concept, 
78Theology of Luther, p. 65. 
79LW 34, p. 144; WA 39 I, 180, 16. 
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insofar as they are used to describe that faculty of man that 
is able to properly administer the affairs of this world, act 
as the inventor and mentor of all the arts, medicines, laws, 
and so forth.80 Thus, "right reason" is presented as that 
attribute of man which is able to act as a guide in matters 
concerning this life, regardless of whether a man be regen-
erate or unregenerate. 
As stated before, the primary works under considera-
tion in this paper do not lend sufficient information to con-
struct a thorough presentation of Luther's concept of "right 
reason." To go further than what is presented here, however, 
would be an interesting project, especially in seeking to 
discover the similarities (and dissimilarities) of Luther's 
defining of this term, as contrasted with Augustine and other 
prominent theologians who lived before the sixteenth century. 
The focus of the current project will concentrate on matters 
more fully discussed in the primary writings under present 
review, beginning with Luther's understanding of the rela-
tionship of ratio to the study of Scripture. 
80Ibid., p. 137, a.4, 5, and 6; WA 39 I, 175. 
CHAPTER IV 
LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF RATIO 
AS APPLIED TO SCRIPTURE 
Scripture as Word of God  
The previous chapter established Luther's views con-
cerning the severe limitations incurred by human reason since 
the Fall of man. Before attention may be given to the topic 
of how the Reformer viewed ratio's acceptable employment in 
theological concerns, the importance of ratio's relationship 
to his study of Scripture must be considered. Clearly, 
Luther's concept of Scripture is central to his theology; for 
the teachings of Holy Writ form the very basis for the doc-
trines which he upheld in the many open debates of the Refor-
mation. 
The relationship between ratio and the word of God, 
as drawn by Luther, is paramount toward understanding the 
significance of what one writer has called the "Schrift-
prinzip" of the Reformation--Sola Scriptural Establishing 
that correlation demands, first, that attention be given to 
Luther's conception of the meaning of 'word of God'. 
1A. Skevington Wood, "Luther's Concept of Revela-
tion," Evangelical Quarterly 35 (July-September 1963):150. 
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"Word of God" Defined 
In the Galatians Commentary (1519), Luther notes that 
the word of God (verbum Dei) is the church's first and great-
est benefit; and, on the other hand, there is no greater harm 
by which the church is destroyed than the word of man and the 
traditions of this world. "God alone is true, and every man 
a liar [Psalm 116:11]."2 From this passage, it is exceed-
ingly clear that the word of God held the place of highest 
authority in Luther's theology, and that the words of man 
pale in comparison as vehicles of proclaiming truth. But 
what, exactly, is meant by the phrase "word of God" in the 
Reformer's thinking? 
The context of the many references to "word of God" 
in the writings of Luther indicates, most often, that he 
means the written words of Scripture as God's revelation of 
Himself to man. Yet the phrase does not signify only that 
to Luther. One notices, for example, such passages as the 
following: 
I am conscious of being a debtor to the Word [verbi], no 
matter how unworthy I am. It has never been possible to 
discuss the Word of God [verbum del] without incurring 
danger of bloodshed; but just as the Word died for us, 
so it requires, in turn, that we die for it when we con-
fess it. The servant is not greater than his master.3  
2Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 
27:165 (hereafter cited as LW); Martin Luther, D. Martin  
Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 2:453, 33 (here-
after cited as WA). 
3LW 27, p. 159; WA 2, 449, 11. 
100 
The interchange in this excerpt between the vocable "Word," 
and the phrase "Word of God," is striking. And if the usage 
of each is noted within the context of the cited passage, one 
must concede that--by both the vocable and the phrase--Luther 
refers not to the words of Scripture, but to Christ Jesus 
Himself: the Word made flesh. Certainly, in view of the 
Reformer's acknowledgment that the written word is the 
church's greatest benefit, it may be given that Luther may 
have--in some sense--felt indebted to it; but this kind of 
nuance does not fit the occurrence of the vocable in the sen-
tences quoted above. Further, the third occasion of the use 
of "Word" in the quotation [line 4] does not occur in the 
Weimar edition, as it does in the American translation; in-
stead, it is implied by the grammar, so that the sentence 
could read, "It has never been possible to discuss the Word 
of God . . .; but just as it [the Word of God] died . . . ." 
Surely Luther cannot mean to say that the written pages of 
Scripture died! Rather, the rendering makes more sense if 
"the Word of God" is understood as "Christ Jesus," who died 
for us. Ergo, "word of God" must be understood always within 
the context of Luther's writings; for only then may one 
determine whether by the phrase is meant either God's written 
word, or the Word made flesh--Jesus Christ. 
A further connotation of Luther's concept of the word 
can be found in the continuation of the passage cited above: 
• • 'If they persecuted Me,' says Christ (John 15:20), 
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'they will also persecute you; if they have kept My Word 
[sermonem], they will also keep yours.' ,4 
 The Latin vocable 
"sermonem" bears the import of a word that is spoken, or pro-
claimed. Therefore, Paul Althaus is not out of line in sug-
gesting that the idea of the "spoken" word is also of great 
moment in Luther's understanding of "word of God."5 For 
Luther, the word of God is not something static, or lifeless. 
Rather, it is a vibrant, living word; it is Christ made man-
ifest for man through the verbal proclamation of God through 
the apostles. 
Scripture as Revelation of God's Word 
Vehicle of the Spirit  
In Luther's concept, the word of God--whether spoken 
or written--does not possess power to save by its own right, 
but only insofar as it is a vehicle for conveying the Holy 
Spirit to man. This point is established most lucidly in the 
Galatians Commentary (1519), by the Reformer's discussion 
concerning whether or not infants (or the deaf) can believe 
in Christ if they have not heard the preached word. Luther 
finds agreement with Jerome,6 who concluded that, to the word 
4LW 27, p. 159; WA 2, 449, 13. 
5The Theology of Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 72. 
6Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus, born probably in the 
340s, died 419 or 420. In addition to Augustine, Luther cites 
this church father often in the Galatians Commentary--this in 
accordance with the expected method of Luther's time, that a 
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of God, nothing is deaf, and that it speaks to those ears of 
which it is said: "He who has ears to hear, let him hear" 
[Matthew 11:15]. Says Luther: 
I like this answer very much, because the Word of God 
[verbum dei] is not heard even among adults and those 
who hear unless the Spirit promotes growth inwardly. 
Accordingly, it is a Word of power and grace when it 
infuses the Spirit at the same time that it strikes the 
ears. But if it does not infuse the Spirit, then he who 
hears does not differ at all from one who is deaf.? 
Thus, for Luther the word of God receives its power 
by virtue of the working of the Holy Spirit. As vehicle of 
the Spirit, the word has the force to create new life in its 
hearers. Apart from the Spirit's work, the word remains 
empty. But the Reformer goes one step further: he indicates 
not only that the word is null without the Spirit, but also 
that the Spirit does not work faith into the hearts of men 
apart from the word. To quote from The Bondage of the Will  
at length: 
If Reason should here wrinkle up her nose and say: 'Why 
does God will that these things be done by His words, 
when nothing is achieved by such words, and the will 
cannot turn itself in either direction? Why does He not 
do what He does without speaking a word, when He can do 
all things without a word? For a will that has heard His 
Word can do and does no more than before, if the inner 
moving of the Spirit is wanting; nor could it avail or 
do any less without the Word being spoken, if the Spirit 
was with it; for all depends on the power and operation 
of the Spirit' to this I shall say: It has pleased God 
lecturer on Biblical exegesis was required to present to his 
students the thoughts of approved expositors; cf. Uuras 
Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light upon 
Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical Faith  
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), p. 60. 
7LW 27, p. 249; WA 2, 509, 1. 
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not to give the Spirit without the Word, but through the 
Word; that He might have us as workers together with Him, 
we sounding forth without what He alone breathes within 
wheresoever He will. This He could do without the Word; 
but He will not. And who are we to inquire into the 
cause of the Divine will? It is enough for us to know 
that God so wills, and it becomes us to worship, love and 
adore His will, bridling the presumption of reason.8  
It is clear from this excerpt that there is no dif-
ference between the "early Luther" and the "mature Luther" 
on the matter of the word's being the vehicle of the Holy 
Spirit. Because of this close correlation between the word 
and the Spirit, the written word, too, becomes authoritative 
and all-important for the formulation of Luther's affirma-
tions of the Reformation. 
Means of grace  
In addition to being the sole vehicle of the Holy 
Spirit's interaction with man, the word (in Luther's theol-
ogy) is also the only means whereby God bestows His grace 
upon man. Luther could not be more clear on this point: "If 
you want to obtain grace, then see to it that you hear the 
Word of God attentively or meditate on it diligently." And 
again: "The Word, I say, and only the Word, is the vehicle 
of God's grace."9 It is obvious from this passage that by 
stating that only the word is God's means of grace, Luther 
8Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New 
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's  
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer 
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co., 
1957), p. 184 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 695, 22. 
9LW 27, p. 249; WA 2, 509, 13. 
104 
is referring to both the spoken and written word of God; 
because of the reference to "hearing" and "meditating," the 
word of God may not be taken as denoting Christ in this par-
ticular excerpt, though because of His atoning sacrifice, 
Jesus Christ might also be considered a "means of God's 
grace" to man.10 
"Sola Scriptura"  
As noted above [page 98], the Scriftprinzip of the 
Reformation came to be known by the phrase "sola Scriptura." 
But it must be kept in mind that the concept that Scripture 
was the sole authority for any article of faith, was not an 
invention of Martin Luther, nor of the Reformation era. The 
assertion of Scripture's primacy had been held at least since 
the time of Augustine.11 Nevertheless, one can maintain the 
position of Luther's having further developed the idea of 
the absolute supremacy of the Scriptures in defense of true 
doctrine. Yet, interestingly enough, when seeking to lend 
10The discussion in this portion of the present paper 
is not meant to be taken as exhaustive of Luther's enumera-
tion of the "Means of Grace"; for surely one must consider 
also the sacraments in Luther's theology, if the listing is 
to be complete. For a more comprehensive overview of the 
Means of Grace in Luther's theology, see Jaroslav Pelikan, 
"The Theology of the Means of Grace," in Accents in Luther's  
Theology: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary 
 
of the Reformation, ed. Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1967), pp. 124-147. 
11For an excellent treatment of this subject, see 
Hermann Sasse, "The Rise of the Dogma of Holy Scripture in 
the Middle Ages," The Reformed Theological Review 18 (June 
1959):45-54. 
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force to his argument for the primacy of Holy Writ, even in 
the eyes of Rome, Luther cites the early Fathers as support: 
St. Augustine teaches that no one should be believed, no 
matter how greatly he may excel in sanctity and learning 
(even the highest degree of sanctity, I believe), unless 
he convinces you by Holy Writ or acceptable reasoning 
[here Luther must mean the 'usus rationis ministerialis'], 
lest we be tricked if we play some other game.12 
While many of Luther's predecessors had espoused the 
supremacy of Scripture in establishing theological truths, 
few went quite so far as the Reformer in subordinating even 
the authority of the Church to the Bible.13 The fundamental 
reasons for Luther's extreme position of the primacy of 
Scripture are clear. Man's ratio has been seriously impaired 
by the Fall, thereby making him totally dependent upon God's 
revelation of Himself in order that anything certain about 
His nature and will can be known. God's self-disclosure is 
given by the power of the Holy Spirit; and the relationship 
of the Spirit to the word, as vehicle of His power to reveal 
and to convert, has already been determined [see pages 101-
103 above]; in the larger excerpt, Luther argues from the 
strength of Matthew 4:4 ["But He answered and said, 'It is 
written, "MAN SHALL NOT LIVE ON BREAD ALONE, BUT ON EVERY 
WORD THAT PROCEEDS OUT OF THE MOUTH OF GOD"'" NASB]. 
12LW 27, p. 156; WA 2, 447, 15. 
13Cf. Lewis W. Spitz, Sr., "Luther's Sola Scriptura," 
Concordia Theological Monthly 31 (December 1960):740-745; 
see also BOW, p. 69 [WA 18, 604]. 
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Because of Luther's view of the necessity for the 
presence and working of the Holy Spirit in order for the 
Scriptures to be effective, a careful definition of 'sola 
Scriptura' must be rendered, lest one be misled into thinking 
that the Bible has supremacy even over the Spirit. On this 
point, Bernhard Lohse has sounded the appropriate caveat: 
Luther is known for his principle 'Sola Scriptura' [sic]. 
But Luther never forgot that man needs the enlightening 
by the Holy Spirt, though the Holy Spirit never works 
apart from the means of teaching and preaching. The 
revelation of which the Scripture is a witness and the 
revelation of the Holy Spirit cannot be separated from 
each other. Luther makes the objection to the enthu-
siasts of his time that they try to do this. The result 
of such an attempt always is that one is led not by the 
Holy Spirit, but by one's own spirit. The revelation of 
the Scripture and the revelation of the Holy Spirit are 
in the same way one, as the works of the different per-
sons of the Trinity are one. One must distinguish but 
may not separate them.14 
The Content of Scripture 
Even though Luther may not be credited as the orig-
inator of the tendency toward the sola Scriptura principle of 
formulating doctrine in the church, his findings were dis-
tinctive nonetheless. In an essay entitled "Luther and the 
Word of God," Hermann Sasse presents the following summation: 
If this tendency [sola Scriptura] is obviously in the 
background of the Reformation and one of the reasons for 
its success, it does not explain Luther's new under-
standing of the authority of Holy Scripture. For this 
was linked up from the beginning with a completely new 
discovery that was as important to him as it was new to 
14,Reason and Revelation in Luther," Scottish Journal  
of Theology 13 (December 1960):337-365, p. 346. 
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the Christian world of that time: the distinction between 
Law and Gospel in the Word of God.15  
The discovery of the proper distinction between Law 
and Gospel was significant; for as Sasse notes elsewhere in 
the same essay, the Gospel for all medieval men to that time 
had been the lex Christi: 'Do this and you will live.'16 The 
lex Christi was found especially in Matthew 19, in Jesus' 
response to the young rich man; and when the young man heard 
this statement, "he went away grieved" [Matthew 19:22, NASB]. 
This 'gospel' is no Gospel at all to Luther. Quite in con-
trast to the response of the young rich man, Luther rejoices 
at having found in Scripture the true Gospel proclamation. 
The clear Gospel, then, is yet another way to understand the 
phrase "word of God" in Luther's writings, as can be seen in 
the following excerpt from the Galatians Commentary (1519): 
To put it clearly, . . . as often as the Word of God is 
preached, it renders consciences joyful, expansive, and 
untroubled toward God, because it is a Word of grace and 
forgiveness, a kind and sweet Word.17 
And in comparison with this sweet word of God is the word of 
man: "As often as the word of man is preached, it renders the 
conscience sad, cramped, and full of fear in itself, because 
it is a word of the Law, of wrath and sin; it shows what a 
15See Accents in Luther's Theology: Essays in Com-
memoration of the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation, ed. 
Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), 
pp. 47-97, especially p. 60. 
16Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
17LW 27, p. 164; WA 2, 453, 2. 
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person has failed to do and how deeply he is in debt."18 
Because of the importance in understanding Luther's 
distinction between Law and Gospel in Scripture, it is again 
necessary to quote the Reformer at length: 
The Gospel and the Law, taken in their proper sense, 
differ in this way: The Law proclaims what must be done 
and left undone; or better, it proclaims what deeds have 
already been committed and omitted, and also that pos-
sible things are done and left undone (hence the only 
thing it provides is the knowledge of sin); the Gospel, 
however, proclaims that sins have been remitted and that 
all things have been fulfilled and done. For the Law 
says: "Pay what you owe"; but the Gospel says: "Your sins 
or [sic] forgiven you." Thus in [Romans 3:20] we read: 
"Through the Law comes knowledge of sin"; and in the 
fourth chapter Paul says [verse 15]: "The Law works 
wrath; for where there is no Law, there is no transgres-
sion." But concerning the Gospel Luke [24:46-47] says: 
"Thus it was necessary that Christ should suffer and rise 
again from the dead, and that repentance and remission 
of sins should be preached to all nations in His name." 
. . . Therefore he who has been justified through grace 
flees from the Law to the Gospel and says [Matthew 6:12]: 
"Forgive us our debts."19 
Thus the content of Scripture, for Luther, can be 
properly divided between the two major categories of Law and 
Gospel. Yet again let the reader beware; just as the vocable 
"word" can be found in an equivocal manner throughout the 
writings of Luther, so can the word "Gospel" have more than 
the nuance just noted. "Gospel" may also denote the entirety 
of God's revelation to man, whether this be Law or Gospel in 
the narrow sense of these words. The context must determine 
for the reader which connotation Luther intends for each 
18Ibid.; WA 2, 453, 4. 
19LW 27, 183-184; WA 2, 466, 3. 
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occurrence of this term. 
The Competence of "Ratio" in 
Understanding Scripture  
Luther's approach to Scripture demonstrates a keen 
awareness of the Bible's being a divine collection of writ-
ings, intended for the purpose of making men wise unto sal-
vation in Jesus Christ.20 But alongside of the assertion 
that the Scriptures are God's own revelation to man must be 
placed the contrasting view of the incompetence of ratio, 
since the Fall, to comprehend things of a spiritual nature 
[as demonstrated from Luther's theology in Chapter Three 
above]. How are these two ideas reconciled one to another? 
Is man's reason at all capable of understanding the content 
of sacred Scripture since the Fall? The following survey of 
Luther's words will seek to unveil the Reformer's answers to 
these questions. 
The Nature of Scripture's Language 
Scripture is no dark book  
Erasmus had been critical of Luther for the latter's 
reliance upon Holy Scripture without realizing that Scrip-
ture needs interpretation and does not interpret itself. The 
former writer maintained that Scripture is in most of its 
20Sasse offers a word of clarification as to the def-
inition of "Scriptures" at the time of Luther, that is worth 
noting: one must keep in mind that in Luther's era no one in 
Christendom had a clear conception of what the Holy Scrip-
tures really were; for it was not until the decision of the 
Council of Trent [held in three sessions--1545-1547; 1551- 
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passages dark either on account of the language it uses, or 
because it even contradicts itself for the superficial 
reader; and for these reasons, Erasmus held that one is com-
pelled to deviate somehow from its literal meaning and must 
reach a more moderate understanding of Scripture by way of 
interpretation.21 
But Luther was not willing to concede to Erasmus the 
validity of the medieval viewpoint that Scripture was a dark 
book which needed the interpretation of the church. To be 
sure, the Reformer asserted the need for the Holy Spirit's 
involvement, if any part of Scripture was truly to be under-
stood by man. Nevertheless, he contended against Erasmus 
that in its external perspicuity, the words of Scripture are 
not at all obscure or ambiguous, but all that is in the 
Scripture is through the word brought forth into the clearest 
light and proclaimed to the whole world.22 
Luther is adamant in his defense of the clarity of 
Scripture. The reason for his firmness may lie in the inher-
ent danger which Luther finds lurking within the presuppos- 
1552; and 1562-1563] that the antilegomena of the New Tes-
tament and the Apocrypha of the Old Testament were made 
canonical for the Christians under the pope. See "Luther 
and the Word of God," pp. 85-86. 
21Cf. Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the 
Will: A Diatribe or Discourse, trans. and ed. E. Gordon Rupp, 
in collaboration with A. N. Marlow, in Luther and Erasmus:  
Free Will and Salvation, The Library of Christian Classics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 97; also, Sasse, 
"Luther and the Word of God," p. 66. 
22BOW, p. 74; WA 18, 609, 12. 
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ition of those who would take an elitist, philosophical 
approach to the study of Scripture. Says Luther: 
. . . the notion that in Scripture some things are recon-
dite and all is not plain was spread by the godless 
Sophists . . . who have never yet cited a single item to 
prove their crazy view; nor can they. And Satan has used 
these unsubstantial spectres to scare men off reading the 
sacred text, and to destroy all sense of its value, so as 
to ensure that his own brand of poisonous philosophy 
reigns supreme in the church.23 
On the accessibility of clear words of Scripture to 
the human mind, Luther fights against two fronts. Against 
the notion of the Roman Church, that only its interpretation 
of Holy Writ holds validity, the Reformer's piercing arrows 
are aimed to protect the church against the philosophical 
errors of the ungodly. However, Luther must defend his 
flank from another, equally devastating, assault from the 
"enthusiasts," who were wont to interpret Scripture in to-
tally free fashion, according to any misguided notions. 
Addressing the need to establish right doctrines only 
by the authority of Scripture, Luther writes: 
It is true that we shall not detect the spirits by 
appeals to learning, life, abilities, majorities, dis-
tinction, or to ignorance and lack of education, or num-
bers, or standing. However, I do not applaud those who 
take refuge in bragging about the Spirit. I fought last 
year, and am still fighting, a pretty fierce campaign 
against those fanatics who subject the Scriptures to the 
interpretation of their own spirit. On the same account 
I have thus far hounded the Pope, in whose kingdom noth-
ing is more commonly said or more widely accepted than 
this dictum: 'the Scriptures are obscure and equivocal; 
we must seek the interpreting Spirit from the apostolic 
see of Rome!' No more disastrous words could be spoken; 
for by this means ungodly men have exalted themselves 
23Ibid., p. 71; WA 18, 606, 16. 
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above the Scriptures and done what they like, till the 
Scriptures were completely trodden down and we could be-
lieve and teach nothing but maniacs' dreams.24 
In both of the extreme positions mentioned above lies 
a common pitfall: they subject the Scriptures to a human 
authority, not fully taking into account man's incompetence, 
since the Fall, to know truth about God's nature and will. 
For Luther, who recognized the totality of the effect of sin 
upon man's reason and will [see pages 70-72 above], the sub-
ordination of God's revelation of Himself to the "so-called" 
authority of human reason--whether the interpretation of 
Scripture be of ancient or modern origin--was a theological 
error of the most heinous kind.25 For the Reformer, the 
problem of understanding Scripture lay not in the written 
record of God's proclamation to man, but within fallen man 
himself. Man's reason is no friend of the Gospel [see above, 
pages 87-89]. 
Problems of language  
While Luther sustained his position concerning the 
natural clarity of the words of Scripture against the view 
that Scripture was in most passages a "dark" book, he was 
not unaware of the problems that arise when seeking to deter-
mine the meaning of select portions of the Bible which, by 
their composition, are undeniably "obscure" and difficult to 
24Ibid., p. 124; WA 18, 652, 35. 
25Cf. BOW, p. 260; WA 18, 748, 29. 
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understand. "I certainly grant that many passages [emphasis 
theirs] in the Scriptures are obscure and hard to elucidate," 
writes Luther, "but that is due, not to the exalted nature 
of their subject, but to our own linguistic and grammatical 
ignorance; and it does not in any way prevent our knowing 
all the contents [emphasis theirs] of Scripture."26 
For the Reformer, the content of Scripture is Christ. 
"Take Christ from the Scriptures--and what more will you find 
in them?"27 The proclamation of the written word about 
Christ is presented in wondrous clarity; and yet, Luther 
agrees that some passages remain dark to human understanding. 
Nevertheless, he contends that to declare the bulk of Scrip-
ture "obscure" on the basis of passages which contain words 
that remain unknown, is not tenable. Assistance in regaining 
the import of difficult passages is lent by Scripture itself. 
If words are obscure in one place, they are clear in 
another. What God has so plainly declared to the world 
is in some parts of Scripture stated in plain words, 
while in other parts it still lies hidden under obscure 
words. But when something stands in broad daylight, and 
a mass of evidence for it is in broad daylight also, it 
does not matter whether there is any evidence for it in 
the dark. Who will maintain that the town fountain does 
not stand in the light because the people down some alley 
cannot see it, while everyone in the square can see it?28  
The nature of the obscurity of the words of Scripture 
which Luther identifies cannot fully be perceived unless one 
26BOW, p. 71; WA 18, 606, 22. 
27Ibid.; WA 18, 606, 29. 
28BOW, pp. 71-72; WA 18, 606, 34. 
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takes into account that the Bible was originally given in 
ancient languages. The positive influence of the humanism 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries [see pages 40-42 
above] seemed to surface in Luther's approach toward the 
establishment of the most reliable text of Scripture that 
was possible. The Galatians Commentary (1519) and The 
Bondage of the Will bear ample testimony of Luther's endeavor 
to know the text of Scripture on the basis of the Greek and 
Hebrew languages in which the New and the Old Testaments, 
respectively, were given.29 
The mere determination of the actual meaning of the 
original Greek and Hebrew vocables in Scripture was not the 
only malady which Luther encountered in seeking a proper 
interpretation of the texts of the Bible. Grammatical prob-
lems also begged conquest. To compound this difficulty, one 
must also take into account the perplexing connotations being 
forced into the passages of Scripture by the procedure, com-
mon to medieval exegetical practice, of establishing a 
"fourfold meaning" for the contents of the Bible [see page 
48, note 23, above]. 
These obstacles to the clarity of Scripture do not 
stem directly from the deficiencies of ratio; rather they 
are inherent within the texts themselves, by virtue of the 
task of translating the ideas of one idiom of language into 
29An extended example of Luther's disputation with 
Jerome's commentary on Isaiah 40, on the basis of the Hebrew 
text, is found in BOW, pp. 243-246; WA 18, 736-738. 
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another language of another culture--and another era. How-
ever, the inadequacy of ratio becomes apparent in yet another 
aspect of Biblical interpretation: in the understanding of 
articles which require acceptance by faith. 
Difficult articles  
Luther does not imply that man is able to understand 
every article of Scripture, in the sense of being capable of 
grasping each article by logic. Scripture is plain on such 
doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so forth, 
insofar as they are rendered as statements of fact; but Holy 
Writ does not need to explain how these things are what they 
are. Again we are reminded of the Reformer's plea to let 
God be God. Some things will remain obscure to us because 
God has chosen not to reveal them in Scripture.30 Man's com-
prehension may not exceed God's revelation. In this arena of 
seeking to know the truth about God's person and works, ratio 
feels the brunt of its struggle with the blindness of the 
sinful will, as shall be shown through Luther's distinguish-
ing between the "letter" and the "spirit" of Scripture. 
The Letter and the Spirit 
of Scripture 
It was shown above [pages 109-111] that, according 
to the 'external' perspicuity of Scripture, Luther contended 
that the written word was no dark book, but instead is easily 
30Cf. BOW, p. 73; WA 18, 608, 5. 
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understood by all who read it. This idea must now be con-
trasted with Luther's concept of the 'internal' perspicuity 
of the word of God; and, as one might suspect, the 'external' 
and the 'internal' perspicuity of Scripture are presented by 
the Reformer as polar opposites. Luther outlines the essen-
tial difference: 
In a word: The perspicuity [claritas] of Scripture is 
twofold, just as there is a double lack of light. The 
first is external, and relates to the ministry of the 
Word; the second concerns the knowledge of the heart. 
If you speak of internal [emphasis theirs] perspicuity, 
the truth is that nobody who has not the Spirit of God 
sees a jot of what is in the Scriptures. All men have 
their hearts darkened, so that, even when they can dis-
cuss and quote all that is in Scripture, they do not 
understand or really know any of it. . . .31 
The critical distinction between the 'external' and 
the 'internal' clarity of Scripture rests with the working 
of the Holy Spirit [compare pages 101-103 above]. If the 
Spirit is impeded in His pursuit to "infuse" faith into the 
hearts of those giving audience to Scripture, then the words 
will remain empty. Still better, the words will no longer 
act in their life-giving mode; for Luther's contrasting of 
the 'internal' and the 'external' perspicuity of the word, 
is analogous to the difference between a 'living' and a 
'lifeless' word. These comparative analogies are apt, since 
Luther's primary contention is that, for those who receive 
the Spirit through the proper vehicle of the word, new life 
is added. Those who have received enlightenment from the 
31Ibid.; WA 18, 609, 4. 
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Holy Spirit are able to see the "spirit" of the word of God, 
not merely the "letter." 
One might, at first, be tempted to press the issue 
further, by attempting to show an exact correspondence 
between Luther's contrast of the "letter" and the "spirit" 
of Scripture, on the one hand, and the distinction of the 
will's motivation by the "flesh" and the "spirit," on the 
other. To be sure, a correlation can indeed be found among 
these concepts, as in both instances the "spirit" connotes 
God's activity of winning men back from their fallen state--
through the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit--so that those 
redeemed might again comprehend God's perfect will, and em-
ulate Him in their own righteous living with one another. 
But the concepts of "flesh" and "letter" are not so parallel. 
"Flesh" referred to all aspects of man that are hostile 
toward the Spirit, and therefore under the condemnation of 
the Law. However, the "letter" of Scripture may refer not 
only to things of the law, but to things of the gospel as 
well. One who reads Scripture may well understand the 
outward meaning of Christ's death and resurrection (and all 
other related facts of the gospel), but without the Spirit 
the words remain only empty symbols to those who live outside 
of the grace of God. Even worse, those without the Spirit's 
guidance are unable to discern the true Gospel--that God's 
grace is given apart from the works of the letter of the Law. 
For this reason, Luther warns that the "letter" can kill 
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[compare 2 Corinthians 3:6], since those without the Spirit 
are deluded into thinking that God's grace is given through 
works of the Law.32 
"Ratio" and Method in Biblical  
Interpretation  
The foregoing discussion of Luther's standpoint of 
Scripture as being the word of God--God's own revelation of 
Himself through the Gospel--and of the deficiency of ratio  
in knowing God and His will apart from this revelation, 
brings focus to the Reformer's intense concern for the proper 
interpretation of the Bible for any matter of the Christian 
faith and life. In view of fallen reason's inability to com-
prehend things of a spiritual nature, Luther consigns to that 
faculty of man a position of profound subordination to Holy 
Writ in all aspects of Biblical interpretation. 
For Luther, human reason is an extremely poor stand-
ard for discerning the truths of Scripture, "for reason, by 
her inferences and syllogisms, explains and pulls the Scrip-
tures of God whichever way she likes."33 Not even the auth- 
ority of the Fathers is to be trusted on the same level as 
Scripture, since their reason, too, is susceptible to error.34 
32See LW 27, pp. 312-313; WA 2, 551-552. 
33BOW, p. 152; WA 18, 673, 8. 
34Cf. pages 104-106 above; also BOW, p. 97 [WA 18, 
630, 14]. 
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Yet, to classify Luther as an "irrationalist"35 in his 
approach to Biblical doctrine is unjustifiable. The pages 
which follow will seek to determine to what extent ratio  
found employment within Luther's method of Biblical inter-
pretation. 
Distinction of Law and Gospel 
Because Luther saw reason's greatest defect to lie 
in its utter failure to distinguish properly between the Law 
and the Gospel [see pages 87-89 above], it is not surprising 
to find the same theme at the very center of his methodology 
of Biblical exegesis. Hermann Sasse has found this to be 
one of the most distinctive features of Luther's new approach 
to the study of Scriptures in his time [see quotation, page 
106-107 above]. 
The proper distinction between Law and Gospel com-
prises a main criterion by which Luther judges the validity 
of any interpretation of Scripture; for, in the first place, 
those who operate with the "rule of reason" (dictante  
ratione) as a guide seek, by nature, to use the works of the 
Law as a means to become justified by God. Such persons are 
accused by Luther as taking away from men the fear of God 
and teaching them to be smug, as they foolishly proclaim 
that their moral works done in accordance with the rule of 
35The term "irrationalist" is used here in the sense 
of one who opposes the use of reason in any aspect of epis-
temology (how one comes to know). 
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reason are not sins.36 This diminishes man's ability to 
recognize his extreme need of Christ's atoning sacrifice. 
This gives occasion for a second point, that in his 
review of methods of Biblical interpretation, Luther is 
extremely critical of any opinion which holds that man can 
be justified by God apart from faith in Christ (that is, the 
Gospel). In his exposition of Galatians 3:12 ("But the Law 
does not rest on faith. For he who does them shall live by 
them."), Luther dismisses the opinions of Jerome, on the 
basis of the latter's failure to recognize the works of the 
Law correctly. Whereas Jerome had asserted in his commentary 
that some virtues existed without faith, Luther contends that 
this is an impossibility. The Reformer holds that no one is 
righteous before faith--that even Moses and the prophets 
lived before God justified and sanctified, even before the 
Law and the works of the Law were enjoined.37 
As was noted in the third chapter of the present 
work [pages 87-88], Luther unleashed his most scathing cri-
tique of the competence of ratio for those instances when 
human reason was allowed to guide theological pursuits at 
36LW 27, p. 189; WA 2, 469, 21. 
37LW 27, p. 259; WA 2, 515. Luther's accusations 
against Jerome include the charge that Jerome brought his 
ideas of virtues existing apart from faith into Scripture 
from an outside source. It seems, to this writer, that the 
source might have been Aristotle's influential Nichomachean 
 
Ethics, which sought to demonstrate that man's innate 'good-
ness' caused him to strive toward the attainment of the goal 
of emulating the perfect virtues. 
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the expense of the Gospel. That the clarity of the Gospel be 
preserved from all dilution through any method of Biblical 
exegesis, appears to be the foundation of Luther's modus  
operandi of interpreting every Bible passage from the view-
point of solus Christus [see page 48 above]. The Reformer's 
razor sharp focus on the Gospel is also at the heart of 
another of his criteria for the correctness of the inter-
pretation of Scripture: the "analogy of faith." 
The Analogy of Faith 
In his reading of the Scriptures in the light of the 
distinction of Law and Gospel, or any other essential doc-
trine of the Christian faith, Luther was establishing a basic 
rule of interpretation that subjected ratio to a more sub-
servient role to the word of God. This rule of Biblical 
exegesis came to be known as the "analogy of faith" (analogia 
fidei).38 
The principle of the "analogy of faith" states in 
lucid terms that no interpretation of Scripture may be 
allowed to stand, if it in any way contradicts an article of 
faith that is clearly established in the word of God. Even 
more, all valid Biblical exegesis must revolve especially 
around the chief article of faith: the Gospel proclamation 
38Otto Hof contends that Luther himself formulated 
the term 'analogia fidei' to represent this principle of 
exegesis, and finds the phrase used repeatedly in Luther's 
writings; cf. "Luther's Exegetical Principle of the Analogy 
of Faith," Concordia Theological Monthly 38 (April 1967): 
242-257. 
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that man is justified before God solely through the work and 
sacrifice of Christ Jesus. If any rendering of a Biblical 
text contradicts the true message of the Gospel, or any of 
its related articles, such an interpretation must be totally 
disregarded as being false.39 
The 'analogia fidei' was, for Luther, a safeguard 
against the overly speculative and creative interpretations 
of Scripture in his day. One must remember that the common 
method of exegesis in Luther's time was to establish a 
'fourfold' interpretation of each text in Scripture: literal, 
allegorical, tropological, and anagogical.40 This procedure 
often introduced many strange ideas--even heresy--via the 
liberal use of 'figures' and 'implications' that were drawn 
from the text. Against Erasmus's habitual finding of such 
nuances in Scripture, Luther proposed that each passage be 
interpreted in the most straightforward manner possible. 
Luther wrote: 
Rather let this be our conviction: that no 'implication' 
or 'figure' may be allowed to exist in any passage of 
Scripture unless such be required by some obvious feature 
39Cf. Ibid.; Hof elucidates this principle further, 
by noting that the analogy of faith does not, for Luther, set 
up the church's dogma as the supreme norm over the under-
standing of Scripture; nor is the analogy of faith subordi-
nate to the tradition of the church, as is still the case 
today in the Roman Catholic church. Rather, the articles of 
faith to be used as the guiding norm of Biblical interpreta-
tion must themselves be derived from the Scriptures alone. 
See pp. 247-248 of Hof's article. 
40The explanation of each of these interpretive cate-
gories is given on pages 47-48 above, especially page 48, 
note 23. 
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of the words and the absurdity of their plain sense, as 
offending against an article of faith. Everywhere we 
should stick to just the simple, natural meaning of the 
words, as yielded by the rules of grammar and the habits 
of speech that God has created among men; for if anyone 
may devise 'implications' and 'figures' in Scripture at 
his own pleasure, what will all Scripture be but a reed 
shaken with the wind, and a sort of chameleon? 41 
Luther recognizes that all heresies and errors in 
handling the Scriptures have come from not regarding the 
simplicity of the words of the text, and from the creating 
of figures and implications that come out of men's own heads. 
This practice had given rise to such heresy as the Arians' 
making Christ less than God, and the denial of some of 
Luther's contemporaries that Christ is present in the Lord's 
Supper.42 Those kinds of false doctrine Luther sought to 
repudiate through the use of the analogy of faith as a guid-
ing principle in Biblical exegetical practice, as also he 
established, by that means, a method of protecting the true 
articles of faith against the "enthusiasts" of his day [see 
page 111 above], who played havoc with the dogma of the 
Christian church through their free lance method of the in-
terpretation of Scripture. 
Scripture Interprets Scripture 
Closely related with the principle of the analogy of 
faith for the proper interpretation of the Bible is Luther's 
41BOW, pp. 191-192; WA 18, 700, 31. 
42Cf. BOW, p. 192; WA 18, 701, 8; an excellent expo-
sition of Luther's polemic against especially the latter 
heresy is Hermann Sasse, This is My Body: Luther's Contention 
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contention that Scripture interprets itself. The Reformer's 
concern is that the word of God be understood in the clearest 
explanations possible, rather than to allow the exegete free 
license to impose upon the Bible any preconceived notions of 
"doctrine." 
Allusion to Luther's proposition of the self-
interpreting Scripture has been given on pages 112-114 of 
the present paper. In those pages, The Bondage of the Will  
was cited, bearing testimony of the Reformer's thesis that 
obscure words in one place in Holy Writ are plainly explained 
in another part of the Bible [compare the quotation rendered 
on page 113]. However, the principle of Scripture's inter-
preting itself is broader than merely clearing up obscurities 
of language. The maxim seeks also to underscore the need for 
considering the subject-matter and the speaker's intention 
before postulating a meaning for passages of God's word.43 
Further, seeing the words of Scripture in their context is 
of primary importance to the proper understanding of any 
passage. The significance of context refers not only to the 
text in its immediate setting, but also to the wider scope 
for the Sacrament of the Altar, revised edition (Adelaide: 
Lutheran Publishing House, 1977). That work also renders an 
extremely useful analysis of Luther's concept of the use of 
ratio in theology, based upon writings not under considera-
tion in the present work. 
43Cf. BOW, pp. 264-265; WA 18, 751, 33; here, Luther 
takes Erasmus to task for not considering these aspects of 
the text prior to his giving interpretation to 2 Corinthians 
3:6-9. 
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of the Old and New Testaments; for all must be interpreted 
in the light of the Gospel proclamation [compare pages 
119-121 above].44 
In his response to the fourfold method of interpret-
ing the word of God, Luther was not seeking to forbid 
altogether the use of such linguistic devices as allegory to 
discover the true meaning of the text. Yet neither did he 
espouse the unlimited employment of such figures in exeget-
ical practice. That the Reformer was aware of many dangers 
inherent in these procedures has already been mentioned 
[pages 122-123 above]. Therefore, Luther's approach to let 
Scripture determine what is allegory, and so forth, was a 
protection against the abuse of such devices. 
To demonstrate Luther's exegetical methodology would 
take many more pages than are available here. However, one 
lengthy example in the Galatians Commentary (1519) serves to 
point out his procedure of looking to the text for clues as 
to how best to interpret the words of Scripture.45 In the 
exposition of Galatians 4:24-31, Luther employs an allegor-
ical method of interpretation. But he does so on the 
strength of Paul's own words, which proclaim at the beginning 
of that section of his letter that what he writes is to be 
taken as an allegory. Luther lets the text dictate how it 
is to be read: if literal, then literally; if allegory, then 
44Cf. BOW, p. 180; WA 18, 692, 17. 
45Cf. LW 27, pp. 310-324; WA 2, 549-559. 
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allegorically. This way is the only completely trustworthy 
way of Biblical interpretation for Luther. To be sure, he 
mentions that fourfold interpretations lend added ornamenta-
tion to the text--and Luther does not forbid their usage in 
toto; nevertheless, the Reformer contends that no doctrine 
of faith should be established by them. The fourfold method 
is not well enough supported by the authority of Scripture.46 
A word of caution is also given by Luther against 
the pellmell linking of Biblical passages in order to formu-
late doctrines. Says the Reformer, "There is, as I have 
often shown, no easier or commoner failing in dealing with 
the Scriptures than to bring together diverse passages as if 
they were alike."47 The intent of each passage must be 
studied carefully in order to determine a proper comparison 
between like thoughts. 
Obviously, such methods of Biblical interpretation 
as are promoted by Luther demand a great deal of the use of 
human reason. Not only is reason required to comprehend the 
general sense of language, but also is it a veritable neces-
sity for the analytical comparison of one passage of Scrip-
ture with another. The formulation of dogma depends as well 
on the sanctified use of reason, recognizing from the pre-
ceding discussions of this paper that without the activity 
of the Holy Spirit, such ratio of man is utterly incapable 
46LW 27, p. 311; WA 2, 550, 29-35. 
47BOW, pp. 230-231; WA 18, 728, 6. 
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of making the determination of right doctrine from Scripture. 
One more important aspect of the employment of ratio  
in Luther's Biblical interpretation must now be considered. 
That is the topic of the use of logical argument to discern 
the meaning of Scripture. 
Logical Reasoning 
A serious problem confronts any who would seek to 
demonstrate an undeniable influence of a particular school 
of thought upon any other person, regardless of period. The 
making of such assertions, apart from irrefutable testimony 
of the subject being studied, is mere speculation. The 
question presented now straddles the fence line between prob-
able truth, and speculation: Was Luther at all influenced by 
the methodology of the via moderna in his exegetical process? 
Without doubt, the ways of dialectics and rhetoric 
were of monumental significance to all areas of scholarship 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That dialectics, 
with its syllogistic procedure from premise to conclusion, 
and rhetoric, with its emphasis upon persuasive speech and 
organized thought, were central to the educational institu-
tions of the medieval period, is a fact that no scholar (to 
this writer's knowledge) would dispute. Similarly, it would 
appear that no one who has done any extended reading of 
Luther's works could refute the assertion that the Reformer 
frequently displays his skills of dialectics, logic, and 
rhetoric in his discussions of theology--even when that dis- 
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cussion takes place in the field of Biblical interpretation. 
To be sure, all of Luther's warnings against the 
magisterial use of reason must be kept firmly in place when 
suggesting that Luther employs logical reasoning in his 
exegetical method. Scripture is always the supreme authority 
for any matter of faith and life in the Reformer's exposition 
of the word of God. Nevertheless, Luther often speaks as a 
formidable opponent--even to Erasmus's Diatribe--when refu-
ting what he sees to be erroneous conjectures on the part of 
other commentators on the Bible. 
The instances of Luther's use of logic and rhetoric 
to elucidate the arguments of Scripture are far too numerous 
to list, even though the current work gains this insight from 
but three of his writings. Those skills seem too far in-
grained in the Reformer's thought, even in the manner of 
presenting the ideas of God's word in commentary form, for 
one to read even a few pages without the notice of at least 
one rhetorical device or logical argument. For the sake of 
example, however, the selection of Luther's exposition of 
Galatians 2:11-13 seems apt.48 The text is rendered in the 
American edition of Luther's Works thus: 
[11] But when Cephas came to Antioch, I opposed him to 
his face, because he stood condemned. [12] For before 
certain men came from James, he ate with the Gentiles; 
but when they came, he drew back and separated himself, 
fearing the circumcision party. [13] And with him the 
rest of the Jews acted insincerely, so that even Barnabas 
was carried away by their insincerity.49 
48LW 27, pp. 211-216; WA 2, 483-487. 49LW 27, 211. 
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Jerome had taken the position that Paul was being 
hypocritical against Peter in this instance, since the former 
had insisted that he circumcise Timothy on account of the 
Jews who were in those regions [Acts 16:3]. Augustine had 
established a contrary view of the text, citing Galatians 
1:20 ["In what I am writing to you, before God, I do not lie" 
--rendering of the American edition of Luther's Works] as 
proof that Paul could not be acting in a hypocritical manner 
in this instance, or else Paul would at least be telling an 
obliging lie; and if this were allowed to stand, the author-
ity of all Scripture would crumble--if in a single passage 
one thing is said and another thing is meant [a forceful 
argument indeed!]. 
Luther finds Augustine's argument the more satisfac-
tory of the two presented, though he sees therein a weakness 
in Augustine's rendering as "blameworthy" the Greek word for 
"stood condemned" [kategnosmenos] in verse 11--a minor matter 
to Luther. The Reformer then sets forth his logical argu-
mentation for the preference of Augustine's position, over 
that of Jerome: (1) Paul did not reprove Peter for having 
lived in the manner of the Gentiles, as Jerome thinks (for 
then he would really have been directing the same reproof 
against himself, and Jerome's opinion would stand on a solid 
footing) [Luther here states his antithesis to Jerome's 
thesis, and establishes the ground on which the argument will 
take place]; (2) Jerome must have brought to the text a 
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preconceived notion that deeds done according to the Law are 
not permissible after Christ's Passion, to have arrived at 
such a conclusion [Luther analyzes Jerome's conclusion, and 
states a most likely premise upon which Jerome must have 
based his opinion]; (3) on the strength of the text, Paul is 
seen to reprove Peter only for his hypocritical behavior, 
censuring him for withdrawing and segregating himself from 
the foods of the Gentiles when the Jews came, and causing 
the Jews to believe that the ways of the Gentiles were for-
bidden [Luther states his major premise, that the evidence of 
the text establishes that Paul censured Peter only for the 
latter's hypocritical behavior in this instance]; (4) Peter 
must certainly have been aware of his hypocrisy, as the text 
goes to lengths to establish that he knew that the things of 
the Gentiles were unrestricted, by his prior action of eat-
ing with them [Luther renders support for the position of 
his major premise, on the basis of the text, while establish-
ing his minor premise, that surely the text shows that Peter 
was living in a hypocritical manner]; (5) ergo, Paul's com-
plaint is not that the Jews concurred with respect to food--
whether Gentile or Jewish--but that they concurred in Peter's 
hypocrisy in forcing Gentiles and Jews into Judaism as some-
thing that was necessary [Luther draws his conclusion from 
the first two premises, which he has established from the 
text, thus declaring his reasoning for disagreeing with the 
commentary of Jerome on this issue]. The following pages of 
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Luther's commentary on these passages then continue to give 
further support of his syllogism, on the basis of the textual 
language, and of supporting passages, from other portions of 
Scripture, which are shown to favor Luther's linguistic 
analyses of the present text. 
Does this kind of argumentation demonstrate Luther 
to be a product of his age? Certainly he shows keen ability 
in presenting his insights into Scripture with logical pre-
cision and great skill. That this method of rhetoric was 
espoused by proponents of the via moderna in setting forth 
argument and thought is also undeniable. But these cor-
relations do not prove anything of Luther's dependency upon 
any particular school of thought for his aptitude for inter-
preting the Bible. Regardless of where the Reformer learned 
his skill for logical reasoning, he finds precedent for his 
reasonable approach to Scripture in the very texts them-
selves.50 Yet let the reader take note: Luther's defense 
throughout the lengthy analysis above was based solely upon 
the words of the text. Great care seems to have been taken 
not to fall into the trap of Jerome--that of bringing any 
preconceived notions into the argument of the passage itself. 
Luther seeks to prove only what the words of the Scriptures 
50See, for example, LW 27, p. 264 [WA 2, 518-519], 
where Luther gives analysis of Galatians 3:13-15 ["Christ 
redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse  
for us--for it is written: Cursed be everyone who hangs on a 
tree--that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come 
upon the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise of the  
132 
seek to prove. This kind of approach to the text of Holy 
Writ appears uniform throughout the works consulted for the 
current project. Logical reasoning is employed by Luther 
only to benefit the process of establishing the answer to 
the question: What does the text say? 
Conclusion Concerning Luther's 
Method of Interpretation 
Of Luther's concept of the proper use of ratio within 
the interpretation of Scripture, then, it can be said that 
the Reformer found human reason a most cherished gift, 
indeed, as a God-given tool for understanding and proclaiming 
God's revelation of Himself to man. However, ratio was held 
by the Reformer to be always subordinate to the Word of God 
[here, that term may refer to any of the definitions given 
on pages 99-101 above]. Luther did not appear to care for 
the use of speculation when seeking to determine the truths 
Spirit through faith. To give a human example, brethren: no 
one annuls even a man's will, or adds to it, once it has  
been ratified"--as rendered in that text]: "Let us, there-
fore, set before our eyes both things: the analogy and the 
fact itself. Then we shall see with how strong an argument 
Paul again breaks down the righteousness of the Law. Now 
the conclusion he wants to draw is this: If righteousness 
can be acquired of ourselves through the Law and its works, 
the promise of a blessing made to Abraham is useless, because 
then we are able to become righteous without it through the 
Law; or it itself is surely not sufficient to justify if the 
righteousness of the Law has to be added to it; and thus the 
testament and promise of God is either superfluous, or it is 
deficient and requires the addition of something else. Both 
notions, however, are utterly detestable. Therefore the 
opposite is true, namely, that the righteousness of the Law 
is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take note! A very 
strong argument indeed!" 
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of Scripture. A rule of thumb for his approach toward the 
determination of right doctrine, as derived from the careful 
exegesis of the Bible, might be presented in the same manner 
in which Luther proposes his method of debate against Erasmus 
in The Bondage of the Will: 
Let it suffice for now . . . that the Scriptures are 
perfectly clear in their teaching, and that by their 
help such a defence [sic] of our position may be made 
that our adversaries cannot resist; and that what cannot 
be thus defended is not our business, and is of no con-
cern to Christians.51 
Luther's concept of the ministerial use of reason in 
the study of Scripture, as suggested by that passage, serves 
to anticipate the topic for consideration in the next chapter 
of the present work: Luther's view of the proper place of 
ratio within the framework of theological discussion, and 
the responsible formulation of doctrine. 
51BOW, p. 133; WA 18, 659, 18. 
CHAPTER V 
LUTHER'S POSITION CONCERNING THE 
USE OF RATIO IN APPLIED THEOLOGY 
Luther's Critique of Philosophy 
as Contrasted with Theology 
Noted Luther-scholars have suggested that an impor-
tant aspect of Luther's theology is his delimiting of the 
extent to which philosophy might be employed in conversation 
concerning man's relationship to God.1 The significance of 
that task grows all the more, when one considers the extent 
to which philosophy had come to influence theology between 
the apostolic age and the time of the Reformation. Chapter 
One of the current work demonstrated how Augustine, Aquinas, 
Ockham and Biel had all employed a philosophical methodology 
in their theological endeavors, especially as they wrestled 
with the question as to how man might come to know things 
about God. Jaroslav Pelikan summarizes the extent to which 
1This point is shared by so many such scholars, that 
a full listing of references is not practical. However, an 
apt quotation on this subject is given in Gerhard Ebeling, 
Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 92: "The task posed 
by Luther's theology is that of giving a fuller exposition 
of the relationship between theology and philosophy in the 
light of his extremely contradictory assertions concerning 
reason." 
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philosophy had become a part of applied theology in the six-
teenth century, suggesting that as a man in that era, Luther 
inherited a tradition in which Christianity and philosophy 
were much more closely intertwined than they are today. 
Says Pelikan, ". . . the many Summae of the medieval thinkers 
bear witness to the fact that there was no eminent theologian 
in the Middle Ages who was not also at least something of a 
philosopher, and vice versa."2 The present chapter will seek 
to give expression to Luther's distinguishing between the 
proper--and improper--usage of philosophy (as the exercise 
of ratio to discover that which is true) within the sphere 
of theological discussion, and the formulation of right 
doctrine. 
The Proper Realm of Philosophy 
Philosophy's area of competency 
The passages which uncover Luther's view of philos-
ophy's area of competency (as found in the primary sources 
under consideration by the current work) are few in number. 
But a synthesis of those excerpts reveals the fact that the 
Reformer held for a very limited scope in which philosophy, 
as a discipline engaging ratio in the pursuit of truth, was 
free to operate. The most significant of those references 
can be found in thesis nineteen of the Disputation Concern- 
2Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A 
Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Pub-
lishing House, 1963), p. 3. 
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ing Man: "But as this life is, such is the definition and 
knowledge [cognitio] of man, that is, fragmentary, fleeting, 
and exceedingly material."3 This passage appears to intimate 
that man's certain knowledge (referring to unregenerate man) 
is limited to the realm of the empirical. Any meaningful 
knowledge which can be possessed through human contemplation 
must find its basis only in what can be perceived by the 
outward senses.4 If that premise is true, then that which 
could be said of Luther's concept of the limitations of 
ratio in knowing truth [compare pages 67-70 above] applies 
also to his view of the competency of philosophy. Especially 
things which concern God are always beyond the scope of man's 
grasp, and if anything is to be known about God's nature and 
will, it must be given via outside revelation. 
Thesis nineteen of the Disputation seems to indicate 
Luther's acceptance of a Nominalistic critique of that which 
can be known through philosophy. The Reformer's limiting of 
certitude to the observable and the experiential, seems to 
establish a correlation between Luther's understanding of a 
'valid' philosophy, and the epistemology of the tradition ala 
3Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 
34:138 (hereafter cited as LW); Martin Luther, D. Martin 
Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 39 1:176 (here-
after cited as WA). 
4This writer finds justification, in the passage 
cited, for Paul Althaus's holding for the same contention; 
cf. The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 62. 
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Ockham and Biel, in which Luther was educated. Abstract 
cognition was not thought to bear any large degree of cer-
titude among the followers of Ockham [see the discussion on 
pages 26-27 above]. Abstractive ideas dealt only with things 
that probably exist, and were not trustworthy to the same 
degree which could be said of those things that were demon-
strable via empirical evidence. 
Luther's limitations on that which can be known 
through philosophical inquiry established a clear boundary 
between reason and revelation as sources of truth. Applied 
reason could comprehend only the mundane things concerning 
man's own existence, whereas, the revelation which comes to 
man from without knows truths of a broader scope. If one is 
permitted to deduce from statements in the Disputation frag-
ment (against theses thirteen and fourteen), it becomes evi-
dent that Luther believed that the Gentiles [in this context, 
"Gentiles" apparently means "unenlightened men," before such 
have come to receive faith through God's revelation] are able 
to discern that God exists, but that they are not capable of 
knowing anything of substance about Him.5  This delimitation 
of the competence of philosophy is entirely consistent with 
5LW 34, p. 140 [WA 39 I, 177]: "Those who know God 
also know their own efficient cause. But the Gentiles have 
known God. Therefore, the Gentiles have also known their own 
efficient cause. By logical consequence, therefore, it is 
mistakenly asserted in the thirteenth and fourteenth argument 
that human reason and philosophy do not know the efficient 
cause of man. I prove the minor premise: The Gentiles knew 
God, but they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him 
[Romans 1:21]. Objection: They have indeed known God, but 
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Luther's concept of ratio since the Fall of man [compare 
above, especially pages 73-75, 85-86, 105]. In fact, the 
Reformer's primary criterion for setting limits on the use 
of philosophy in theological discussion is, apparently, the 
recognition that philosophy does not take into account the 
fallen state of mankind. 
Improper anthropology  
According to Luther, philosophy fails in its task to 
determine truths about God, and man's relationship to Him, 
because it knows nothing of "theological man" (Theologico  
homine).6 
 The scope of philosophy is limited to that which 
can be deduced through reflection about things that are per-
ceivable in this world; and since human wisdom does not take 
into account man in his fallen condition, it renders an 
inaccurate picture of the creation and of the creator.7 
Hence, philosophy's improper anthropology is wont to render 
falsehood instead of truth. Says Luther: 
Therefore let those people who have learned from the tree 
of Porphyry and from the teachings of Aristotle and other 
philosophers how to praise, boast of, and love rational 
not as creator. Explanation: Yes, to know God is indeed 
something else than to know that he is the creator of all 
things. For the most excellent knowledge of God is to know 
that he has created all things. 
6Cf. LW 34, p. 139, a. 28 [WA 39 I, 176]: "So also, 
of those who introduce Aristotle (who knows nothing of theo-
logical man) to witness that reason aspires to the best 
things;" 
7Cf. LW 34, p. 138, a. 13 and 14; WA 39 I, 175; these 
articles are fully quoted in note 11, page 140, below. 
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man and then to trust in their own precepts and to jus-
tify their own counsels--let them see how well their 
wisdom savors of the truth of God, which allots every-
thing human to falsehood, vanity, and destruction.8 
Luther's writings also indicate that the difference 
in opinion concerning the anthropology of philosophy and of 
theology is not, simply, that philosophy tends to see man in 
a more positive light than does theology. Descriptions of 
some philosophers, instead of acknowledging man and his at-
tributes as a gift from God, portray man in far lesser terms. 
Luther notes the terminology of various men, who have as-
cribed to "man" the distinctions "chaos" (Plato), "vacuum" 
(Leucippus), and "infinite" (Aristotle).9 Not seeing man as 
theological man, philosophy often misses the point as to the 
real meaning and worth of man as the crown of God's crea-
tion.10  
A further flaw in philosophy's view of man rests in 
its limited concept of life itself. Natural philosophy is 
not capable of seeing beyond the present world; hence, it has 
8LW 27, p. 181; WA 2, 464, 24-31. 
9Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New 
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's  
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer 
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co., 
1957), p. 266 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 752, 25. 
10Cf. LW 34, p. 138, a. 20 and 21 [WA 39 I, 176]: 
"[20] Theology to be sure from the fulness of its wisdom 
defines man as whole and perfect: [21] Namely, that man is 
a creature of God consisting of body and a living soul, made 
in the beginning after the image of God, without sin, so that 
he should procreate and rule over the created things, and 
never die, . . ." 
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a terminal vision of things as they are, and does not grasp 
the immortality that God bestows upon man--nor, most signif-
icantly, does philosophy know anything of the gift of eternal 
life that is given only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ, 
to all who believe in Him.11 In The Bondage of the Will, 
Luther points to experience as lending validity to that 
assertion: 
Look at experience; see what the most distinguished minds 
among the nations have thought of the future life and the 
resurrection. Is it not a fact that the more distin-
guished their minds were, the more ridiculous the resur-
rection and eternal life was to them? Or were not those 
philosophers and Greeks at Athens, who called Paul a 
'babbler' and a 'setter forth of strange gods' when he 
taught these things (Acts 17.18), men of mind? Porcius 
Festus in Acts 24 (26.24) cried out that Paul was mad 
because of his preaching of eternal life. What of Pliny's 
yapping about these matters in his seventh book? What of 
Lucian, that great wit? Were these stupid men? To this 
day, it is true of most men that the greater their wit 
and learning, the more they deride this article, and that 
openly, thinking it a fable. For no man on earth, unless 
imbued with the Holy Ghost, ever in his heart knows of, 
or believes in, or longs for, eternal salvation, even if 
he harps upon it by tongue and pen.12 
From this excerpt, one can also determine the distinctive 
feature of Luther's understanding of the proper sphere of 
theology: the radical difference in its source of knowledge, 
as distinct from philosophy. 
11LW 34, p. 138, a. 13 and 14 [WA 39 I, 175]: 
"[13] For philosophy does not know the efficient cause for 
certain, nor likewise the final cause, [14] Because it posits 
no other final cause than the peace of this life, and does 
not know that the efficient cause is God the creator." Cf. 
LW 34, p. 138, a. 23 [WA 39 I, 176]: "[Man] can be freed and 
given eternal life only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ 
(if he believes in him)." 
12BOW, pp. 139-140; WA 18, 663, 27. 
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The Proper Sphere of Theology 
Epistemology 
The epistemology [the process of how one comes to 
know] of philosophy had as its source of truth (according to 
Luther) man's capability to make deductions based upon things 
which he was able to observe with his senses. Beyond these 
demonstrative truths, little else could be known via philo-
sophical speculation; and what additional theories man de-
rived from such speculation was, at best, only probable 
 
"truth" [see pages 136-137 above]. Therefore, theological 
articles of faith lay outside the scope of philosophy's com-
petency. 
If anything more is to be known of things which 
transcend the observable and the demonstrative--and, cer-
tainly, this is the focus of concern for theology, which 
seeks to know all that can be known about God--such truth 
must come to man from without [see pages 73-76 above]. And 
Luther's assertion that God has deliberately chosen, in some 
things, to remain hidden from man's reason [compare pages 
83-84 above], makes the need for a reliable source of outside 
truth all the more essential to the task of theology. 
Luther finds that outside source of truth in God's 
own revelation of Himself to man. The Word of God [Christ 
and the Scriptures] acts as that vehicle of the Holy Spirit 
which enlightens man's thinking to include truths not avail-
able to it via the observable creation. As Chapter Four of 
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the current work has established, Luther contended for the 
primacy of Scripture as the supreme source of God's revealed 
knowledge. But although this view is consistently present 
throughout all three of the primary sources under considera-
tion in these pages, Luther's educational background lends 
evidence that such was not always the case for him. The 
study of Biel, while in the Erfurt monastery, would have put 
Luther in contact with the inconsistency in theological auth-
ority so prevalent in those days of eclecticism [see pages 
29-31 above]. As in the case of Biel, is was not rare for a 
theologian to hold for Scripture's being the sole source of 
truth for articles of faith, while at the same time allowing 
the dogma of the church to enjoy an equal honor--especially 
in the instance of papal decrees. [The "tradition" of the 
Roman church was not officially declared to be on equal foot-
ing with Scripture as authoritative for doctrine and prac-
tice, until the Council of Trent, session IV.] This dis-
agreement in the view of epistemology, it would appear, was 
at the center of any doctrinal controversy within the Chris-
tian church; and key to one's method of determining theolog-
ical truth is the understanding of the limitations (if any) 
that should be placed on human reason within that exercise. 
For this reason, the noting of Luther's point of view in 
delimiting the competency of ratio to know things that are 
true is critically important, if one is to understand the 
basis of his many criticisms of false doctrine within the 
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church of the sixteenth century. 
As in philosophy, which has always been a field in 
which not one, but several views concerning the proper source 
of truth have contended for supremacy, so also is the case 
in theology. Luther was well aware that not all theologians 
shared his position that Scripture alone was to be the norm 
for all true doctrine and right practice in the Christian 
church. Moreover, the Reformer demonstrates in the Bondage  
of the Will that he realized that this struggle had been 
raging since the time of Christ . . . and beyond.13 Also, 
the Reformer acknowledged the fact that the differences in 
epistemology for theology--as distinct from philosophy--tend-
ed to place theology on a more suspect foundation than sys-
tems based on human reason were willing to allow. For this 
reason, Luther notes in the Galatians Commentary (1519) that 
even Paul preferred to call faith a persuasion, "because it 
is something that cannot be demonstrated unless you believe 
13BOW, pp. 129-131 [WA 18, 656-657]; in this excerpt, 
Luther shows how people through the ages have shut off their 
common sense, when confronted with the clarity of Scripture, 
so as to defend, stubbornly, their own presuppositions. Among 
the examples given are: Christ silencing the Sadduccees 
[Matthew 22] by proving the resurrection of the dead with a 
Scripture quotation from Exodus, while they continued to 
oppose Him; Stephen spoke on Luke's testimony [Acts 6], but 
his audience continued to resist him; John Hus preached 
against the Pope from Matthew 16, demonstrating that the 
Pope and his men are not the church of which Christ speaks, 
but the authorities burnt him instead of abandoning their 
views; and Luther himself refutes the notions concerning 
'free-will' by the clear teachings of Scripture, yet his 
opponents vigorously reject his statements. 
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the one who is persuading you; for faith does not tolerate 
the quarrels of the sophists."14  
A critical distinction:  
Law and Gospel  
The most critical point of disagreement between 
theology and philosophy that is found throughout Luther's 
writings, is the proper distinction between Law and Gospel. 
As was shown in the general discussion concerning Luther's 
condemnatory allegations against the use of ratio in matters 
having to do with man's relationship with God [see pages 87-
89 above], so is Luther's main contention against the knowl-
edge of philosophy that it is unable to comprehend the grace 
of God and the Gospel proclamation.15 
For defense of his assertion that, above all, the 
purity of the Gospel must be preserved at all cost to reason-
ability and rational argument, Luther needed look only to 
Paul's letter to the Galatians: 
Therefore let us say confidently with Paul: "Damned and 
accursed be every doctrine from heaven, from earth, or 
from whatever source it is brought--every doctrine that 
teaches us to trust in works, righteousness, and merits 
other than those that belong to Jesus Christ." And by 
saying this we are not being insolent toward the popes 
14LW 27, p. 339; WA 2, 569, 17-19. 
15Cf. Pelikan, Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 4, where 
that writer asserts that Luther repudiated the systems of 
the medieval thinkers because of what they had done to free 
grace, and not principally because of what they had done with 
Aristotle. On page 11 of that same work, Pelikan posits that 
what Luther most passionately feared was a repetition of the 
medieval error by which Aristotelian philosophy had been per-
mitted to obscure the Gospel. 
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and the successors of the apostles; we are being dutiful 
and truthful toward Christ. For one must prefer Him to 
them; and if they should refuse to allow this, we must 
shun them altogether as being anathema.16 
Philosophy, like fallen reason itself, was seen by 
Luther as being legalistic in nature. The Reformer cataloged 
the kind of righteousness espoused by Aristotle and other 
philosophers, as being a righteousness that came only through 
works of the Law, and by habit.17 But true theology finds 
man's righteousness only in the merits of Christ, bestowed 
upon man through the faith given by the Holy Spirit. That 
these two approaches to reconciliation with God stand con-
trary to one another is self evident. The way of philosophy 
is based upon the conclusions of human reason, whereas the 
way of true theology is founded in faith. 
The proper sphere of theology (in contrast to philos-
ophy), then, is centered especially in the pursuit of the 
pure Gospel; for only as man receives this Gospel through the 
Holy Spirit's activity in Word and sacrament, is he enabled 
to see the truth about his relationship with God. The source 
of this truth lies outside of man's own intellect and ratio; 
hence, theology contributes to his knowledge of that which is 
true, by expounding the content of God's revelation of Him-
self to mankind. 
16LW 27, p. 179; WA 2, 462, 29-34. 
17LW 27, p. 219; WA 2, 489; this reference is fully 
rendered in English on page 89, note 65, above. 
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Against Joining Philosophy with Theology 
Gerhard Ebeling has taken the position that Luther 
represents not merely an antithesis between philosophy and 
theology in general, but of good and bad theology--of true 
theology and pseudo-theology.18 On the basis of the previous 
discussion above, this writer finds Ebeling's statement an 
agreeable one. Understood as defined by Luther's writings, 
philosophy, as such, was not guilty of spreading only false 
statements; to entertain this kind of idea about man's abil-
ity to deduce truths about his life and environment via em-
pirical evidence would be ludicrous. "Good" theology takes 
into consideration reason's capability to discern truth based 
upon experience and the observable. "Bad" theology (pseudo-
theology), on the other hand, fails to grasp the inherent 
limitations of human reason to know of truths which lie 
beyond the perceivable world and life. 
Luther had seen that the church had lost sight of 
Christ and the pure Gospel, because some were preoccupied 
with Aristotle's philosophy--a system which did not clearly 
distinguish between the demonstrably provable and that which 
can be known only through the outside revelation of God.19 
According to the Reformer, not a few theologians and jurists 
sometimes followed monstrous opinions (monstra sententiarum) 
18Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 79. 
19Cf. Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study 
in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 
P. 33. 
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instead of the familiar doctrine of the church (domestica 
ecclesiae doctrina).20 Erasmus himself, it is charged by 
Luther, was guilty of treating Christian doctrines as no 
better than the views of human philosophers, choosing to 
argue that it was stupid to wrangle and fight and assert 
concerning such doctrines, because doing so only resulted in 
bad feelings and in a disruption of outward peace.21 
Where any philosophical point is in conflict with the 
word of God, Luther would contend that true theology is under 
obligation to dispute against the joining of philosophy with 
theology to the extreme. To do such was not merely for the 
sake of winning an argument; rather, at stake was the Gospel 
itself . . . and that destructive result was, for the Re-
former, not only a possibility, but a foregone reality within 
the church. In the Galatians Commentary (1519), it is noted 
that Paul's theology of salvation by grace, for Christ's 
sake, through faith had vanished entirely in some circles, 
and could not be understood by those who declared falsely 
that Aristotle's ethics were entirely in accord with the doc-
trine of Christ and of Paul. On this point, Luther says: 
For our righteousness looks down from heaven and descends 
to us. But those godless men have presumed to ascend 
20LW 27, p. 248; WA 2, 508, 29-31; here, one must 
read the "familiar doctrine of the church" as doctrine that 
has rightly been deduced from Scripture (and not such as is 
contrary to the word of God), since Luther has no qualifying, 
nor condemnatory, remarks concerning those teachings in the 
passage noted. 
21BOW, pp. 69-70; WA 18, 605, 15. 
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into heaven by means of their righteousness and from 
there to bring the truth which has arisen among us from 
the earth.22  
Luther's position concerning the joining of philos-
ophy with theology, then, is that a clear distinction must 
be made between the kind of knowledge that is appropriate to 
each sphere of inquiry. The speculations of philosophy must 
not in any way interfere with the articles of faith that are 
regarded as truth in theology. For example, Luther's words 
concerning the right understanding of the righteousness that 
can come to man only through faith: 
For those men should be kept far away from Holy Writ who, 
with distinctions drawn from their own brains [cerebro], 
bring into theology various kinds of righteousness and 
say that one is ethical, that another is the righteous-
ness of faith, and speak of I know not what other kinds. 
By all means let the state have its own righteousness, 
the philosophers their own, and everyone his own. But 
here [Galatians 2:21] one must take righteousness in the 
Scriptural sense; and the apostle says plainly that this 
righteousness does not exist except through faith in 
Jesus Christ . . . .23 
For Luther, the key question which calls for a strict 
cleavage between philosophy and theology is of a soteriolog-
ical nature.24 His concern for the use of philosophy with 
theology is, above all, that men might be saved through the 
proclamation of right theology. Luther aptly paraphrases 
the words of Psalm 51:13 ["Then I will teach transgressors 
22LW 27, p. 225; WA 2, 493, 8-14. 
23LW 27, p. 240; WA 2, 503, 23-28. 
24Cf. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 55-56; this ref-
erence also cited on page 69 above. 
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Thy ways, And sinners will be converted to Thee"--NASB]: 
[That passage] is as if [the psalmist] were saying: "Let 
me not, I pray, teach the ways of men and the doctrines 
of our own righteousness, since thereby they will not be 
converted to Thee but will be turned farther away from 
Thee. . . ." 25  
Those words truly sound forth Luther's focus of the entire 
realm of the theological pursuit of truth. 
The Employment of "Ratio" in 
Theological Discussion  
Defense by Reason 
If the statement is true, that Luther would contend 
that true theology is under obligation to dispute against any 
point which is in conflict with the word of God (that might 
imperil the Gospel) [see page 147 above], then the question 
arises as to what extent ratio is to be employed in such 
defense of doctrine (polemics and apologetics).26 On this 
subject, two passages from The Bondage of the Will (which is 
perhaps Luther's most significant "apologetic" work) are 
especially noteworthy. On the one hand, Luther says: 
So one of the main reasons why the words of Moses and 
Paul are not taken in their plain sense [by the Diatribe] 
is their 'absurdity'. But against what article of faith 
does that 'absurdity' transgress? And who is offended 
25LW 27, p. 185; WA 2, 466, 34-37. 
26 This writer defines 'polemics' as that aspect of 
applied theology which is concerned with the defense of right 
doctrine within the realm of the Christian church, and 'apol-
ogetics' in the narrow sense of the term--that of making a 
so-called "scientific" defense of the basic tenets of the 
Christian faith to those who stand outside of the Christian 
faith. 
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by it? It is human reason that is offended; which, 
though it is blind, deaf, senseless, godless, and sacri-
legious, in its dealing with all God's words and works, 
is at this point brought in as judge of God's words and 
works! On these same grounds you will deny all the ar-
ticles of faith, for it is the highest absurdity by far--
foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling-block to the 
Jews, as Paul says [compare 1 Corinthians 1:23]--that 
God should be man, a virgin's son, crucified, sitting at 
the Father's right hand. It is, I repeat, absurd [em-
phasis theirs] to believe such things! So let us invent 
some figures with the Manichaeans, and say that he is 
not truly man, but a phantom who passed through the vir-
gin like a ray of light through glass, and then fell, and 
so was crucified! This would be a fine way for us to 
handle the Scriptures!27 
In this quotation, Luther contends against the use 
of reason in theological debate, since that human faculty is 
unable to comprehend articles of faith which are based upon 
Scripture as the supreme authority for determining truth. As 
the Reformer notes, human reason finds such articles absurd, 
and is wont to rewrite them according to its own standpoint. 
To engage in such practice is, for Luther, an abominable way 
to "do" theology. Faith must always take precedence over 
reason in theological endeavors. 
In light of the excerpt given above, justification 
can be found for conclusions which find Luther critical of 
the validity of 'Christian apologetics.'28 Faith cannot be 
proved, in the same sense that philosophical methodology 
seeks to "prove" its arguments on the basis of experience 
27BOW, p. 201 [WA 18, 707, 19]; cf. pp. 69 and 76 of 
the present work. 
28See Siegbert W. Becker, "Luther's Apologetics," 
Concordia Theological Monthly 29 (October 1958):742-759. 
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and observable evidence. But to push such a condemnation of 
apologetics to the extreme, suggesting that Luther had abso-
lutely no place in his theology for making defense of the 
truth claims of Christianity, is without warrant. Indeed, 
the entire writing on The Bondage of the Will shows demon-
strably that Luther had precious much to say in defense of 
the doctrine of Scripture. Specifically, Luther writes: 
To take no pleasure in assertions is not the mark of a 
Christian heart; indeed, one must delight in assertions 
to be a Christian at all. (Now, lest we be misled by 
words, let me say here that by 'assertion' I mean 
staunchly holding your ground, stating your position, 
confessing it, defending it and preserving it unvan-
quished. . . .)29 
In this second passage, Luther makes a strong a case for the 
validity of a Christian apologetic, even within his own view 
against the improper joining of philosophy with theology. 
In the final analysis, then, is Luther for, or 
against, a reasonable defense of the Christian faith? This 
writer finds the proper answer in the synthesis of Luther's 
ideas, as rendered by Paul Althaus. As that writer surveys 
Luther's arguments against Erasmus in The Bondage of the Will  
he notes that Luther uses philosophy and natural reason to 
provide secondary proof for theological theses. However, 
that remains a secondary and peripheral addition to his meth- 
od.30 Therein lies the key to Luther's view of the proper 
29BOW, p. 66; WA 18, 603, 10. 
30Cf. Theology of Luther, p. 4. 
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employment of reason in applied theology: as long as reason 
remains subordinate to Scripture in all aspects of theo-
logical practice, it may be used to its fullest extent as a 
gift of God. 
Speculation 
Within the presentation of Chapter Three of the cur-
rent work [pages 68-69], mention was made of Luther's aver-
sion to speculation, when approaching matters of theology. 
There the apt quotation "What is above us does not concern 
us" was shown to be a basic rule for the Reformer's procedure 
of relating truths concerning God.31 Speculation about 
things which God has not revealed to man (beyond the empiri-
cal) does not yield any certain truths. 
Yet, Jaroslav Pelikan comments: "In general [Luther] 
regarded philosophy as dangerous; and yet, when the occasion 
seemed to demand it, he was not at all averse to philosoph-
ical speculation."32 What situations might occasion Luther 
to employ philosophical speculation within the framework of 
his applied theology? The Reformer's writings give indica-
tion that, when involved in controversy, Luther's general 
way was to meet his opponents on their own ground; if they 
were to attack with the weapon of philosophical argument, he 
would parry by showing--via logic and philosophical specula- 
31See above, page 68; cf. BOW, p. 170; WA 18, 685, 7. 
32Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 10. 
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tion--the weaknesses in the statements of his adversaries.33 
A clear example of this method is found in Luther's debate 
with Erasmus concerning the problem of evil. 
Against Erasmus's Diatribe Luther takes up the query 
as regards by what means God is said to work evil in man. A 
word of introduction concerning such speculative inquiry 
seems appropriate to the Reformer: 
We should in any case be content with the words of God, 
and simply believe what they say; for the works of God 
are wholly indescribable. However, to humour reason 
(that is, human folly), I do not mind aping its stupid-
ity and foolishness and seeing if I can make any impres-
sion on it by my own broken words on this subject.34  
Luther then proceeds to his argumentation, by establishing 
basic premises which even reason and the Diatribe had to 
accept: namely, that God works all in all, and that without 
Him nothing is effected nor effective--by definition of His 
omnipotence. Once these foundations are in place, the Re-
former's argumentation follows a brilliant line of thought: 
(1) Satan and man, being fallen and abandoned by God, cannot 
will good; (2) but their will's turning away from God cannot 
have turned itself into nothing, since they ever remain part 
of God's creation; (3) as part of God's creation, man's will 
remains subject to God's omnipotence and action [by virtue of 
the agreed definition of God's actions, at the outset of the 
33Cf. James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus," 
Concordia Theological Monthly 37 (April 1966):207-221. 
34BOW, p. 203; WA 18, 709, 6. 
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argument]; (4) therefore, God must move and work of necessity 
even in Satan and the ungodly; but since they are evil and 
corrupt, God must work through them such as they are; 
(5) ergo, although God is not the cause of evil (since it is 
against His nature to act evilly Himself), he can be said to 
work evil insofar as He works through evil instruments!35 
Devices of Logic 
That Luther was no mere novice in his use of logic 
within his theological method has been shown [Chapter Four, 
pages 127-132 above]. In fact, in those writings with which 
the present work is concerned, the Reformer demonstrates 
adeptness in formulating highly persuasive argument. Listing 
instances of Luther's usage of logical devices is a task that 
would be tedious for both reader and writer alike. But in 
the interest of demonstrably proving the assertion that the 
Reformer makes use of such argument, a few examples shall be 
given [the following examples are excerpted from The Bondage  
of the Will]: (1) Luther finds a most essential fault in 
Erasmus's argument for 'free-will,' in that the latter has 
failed to adequately define the term--the definition fails 
to cover the thing defined;36 (2) Luther places Erasmus on 
35BOW, pp. 203-204 [WA 18, 709-710]; it is in this 
reference that Luther makes a well-known analogy concerning 
a man who rides a horse with only three, or two, good feet--
his riding corresponds with what the horse is, which means 
that the horse goes badly, but this is not the rider's fault. 
36BOW, p. 137; WA 18, 662, 12. 
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the horns of a dilemma, forcing a decision between the asser-
tion that the great scholars and martyrs of the church (who 
held that the Scriptures were clear) were to be admired for 
their skill in the sacred writings, or the statement that the 
Scriptures are not clear;37 (3) Luther reduces Erasmus's 
argument--that because God promises a reward to those who 
keep His commandments, therefore man must have the 'free-
will' to accomplish them--to the absurd statement "The prize 
is set before all in the race; therefore, all can run and 
obtain it," and so forth;38 (4) Luther associates Erasmus's 
position with that of the Pelagians, who were noted for the 
heresy that man's will was not at all corrupted by the Fall 
of man;39 (5) Luther employs a rule of logic that a condi-
tional statement asserts nothing indicatively, as "if the 
devil be God, he is deservedly worshipped"; or, "if an ass 
flies, an ass has wings"; or, "if there be 'free-will', [sic] 
grace is nothing".40 
In each of these examples, Luther employs various 
devices of logic and rhetoric, in order to gain advantage 
over his opponent in the debate at hand. The devices appear 
not to be meant to prove the meaning of the texts of Scrip- 
37BOW, pp. 134-135; WA 18, 661. 
38BOW, p. 181; WA 18, 693, 19. 
39BOW, pp. 140-141; WA 18, 664, 14. 
40BOW, p. 151; WA 18, 672, 33. 
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ture, which are his most important line of defense; but in 
their usage, Luther seeks to weaken the argumentation of his 
adversary, to make way for the acceptance of his exposition 
of the meaning of those Biblical passages that support his 
theological standpoint. 
Philosophical Language 
The writings of Luther that are under survey in the 
present work, indicate his frequent usage of terminology and 
categories from the realm of philosophy. However, in recog-
nition of his adamant position of defending the purity of the 
Gospel against the perversion of philosophical method, it 
hardly seems likely that the Reformer was intent on employing 
the distinctions of philosophy as proof for theological 
assertions. If the present writer might be allowed to specu-
late on this matter, it would appear that evaluating Luther's 
applied theology in light of his historical context is of 
importance; for one must remember that the predominant way of 
theological method in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, 
was one which had not divorced theology from philosophy. In 
order for Luther to make the most of his argumentation within 
that setting, therefore, it seems likely that by the use of 
such terminology he was again meeting the opposition on its 
own ground, clearing the way for his exposition of Scripture. 
Such seems the case in the instance of Luther's men-
tion of the philosophical controversy over the validity of 
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"universals" within the Galatians Commentary (1519).41 
In that reference, he shows his familiarity with the ongoing 
debates of his time, while at the same time demonstrating 
that all the uproar concerning the validity of "universals" 
was not of significance for the proper understanding of the 
text of Scripture. In so doing, Luther seems also to employ 
another device of logic, in undermining any argument against 
his exposition of the text through anticipating objections 
that his opponents might raise, thus stealing away the force 
of their assertions to the contrary. 
Therefore, Luther's employment of philosophical lan-
guage in applied theology appears to have a twofold purpose: 
first, that he might demonstrate his cognizance of the pos-
ition of other theologians and philosophers on the matters 
being discussed, and secondly, that by mentioning such ideas, 
he might show their irrelevancy toward trying to disprove the 
clear import of Scripture toward the development of true doc-
trine. To this twofold purpose, Pelikan might also add a 
third, stating, ". . . it is significant that when the opin-
ions of ancient philosophers, dramists, or poets seemed to 
coincide with his own, Luther was perfectly willing to cite 
41LW 27, p. 390 [WA 2, 604, 9-11]: ". . . And would 
that the Thomists, the Scotists, and the moderns would thus 
settle their question whether universals are real things or 
are terms predicated indifferently of real things! Man is 
man. Flesh is flesh. Flesh has never done anything that 
similar flesh would not do wherever God did not make a dis-
tinction." 
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such opinions as evidence."42 
Limitations 
This chapter of the present work has established that 
Luther was not altogether intolerant in the use of ratio in 
applied theology, even as ratio might be used in a manner in 
some ways consistent with philosophy. Human reason was seen 
to remain a gift from God, which enables man to infer truths 
based upon what can be observed and experienced. It has also 
been shown in the preceding pages, that reason was held to be 
incompetent in matters of faith: that such truths as lay 
outside the realm of the empirical were dependent upon the 
revelation from God, if man was to know articles of faith 
with any certitude. 
As Luther considers the propriety of coupling philo-
sophical method with theological defense and investigation, 
he establishes clear limitations as being essential before 
any such co-operative endeavor can take place. Above all do 
the mottos "Let God be God" [pages 67-70 above] and "Sola 
Scriptura" [pages 104-106 above] hold places of prominence 
in Luther-an theology. A shining example of these guidelines 
in action is found in the Galatians Commentary (1519), where 
the Reformer expostulates the meaning of Paul's words of 
Galatians 3:5-7.43 In that place, Luther asserts that Paul 
42Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 13. 
43LW 27, pp. 251-253; WA 2, 510-511; the Biblical 
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does not follow the rules of logical argumentation in making 
the point, that the righteous are made such apart from any 
similarity of action (or ancestry) with Abraham--that only 
the Spirit's action brings the grace of God to men. The 
Reformer surmises that the formulation "Abraham believed; 
therefore those who are of faith are the children of Abraham" 
simply does not stand up to logical analysis. 
Luther's point appears to be this: that truths given 
to man via God's revelation must not be expected to square 
with human reason or logic. Some things exceed man's grasp, 
and are better left for faith to take hold, rather than for 
ratio to gain the upper hand. Above all, reason must yield 
to the incomprehensible nature of the Gospel. Especially at 
this point, Luther is apt to quote Colossians 2:8: "See to 
it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty 
deceit, according to human tradition, according to the ele-
ments of the world, and not according to Christ."44 Here 
again we see that Luther's primary concern is, above all 
else, of a soteriological nature. That concern is reflected 
in his stern words against Erasmus: 
passage is rendered in that location: "[5] Does He who sup-
plies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so 
by works of the Law or by hearing with faith? [6] Just as 
Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him as right-
eousness. [7] So you see that it is men of faith who are the 
sons of Abraham." 
44LW 27, p. 285; WA 2, 533. 12-13. 
160 
Your craft and cunning may gain forbearance in secular 
matters, but in a theological discussion, where plain 
straightforward truth is required, for the salvation of 
souls, it is supremely objectionable and intolerable.45 
Here, this writer allows Luther to have that last word on 
the matter of his own theological guidelines for the use of 
reason and philosophy in matters that concern man's relation-
ship with God. 
45BOW, p. 221; WA 18, 721, 31. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Martin Luther lived in a time when the Copernican 
revolution in the field of astronomy still lay in the future; 
and yet, as Brian Gerrish suggests, Luther gave rise to a 
'Copernican Revolution' of his own--in the field of theology. 
According to Gerrish, Luther's great achievement was, above 
all else, his substitution of a God-centered Christianity for 
the man-centered religion of the Schoolmen of the Middle 
Ages.1 That summation of Luther's approach to Biblical 
theology is apt, especially when considering the topic of the 
present work. The preceding pages have offered a survey of 
the Reformer's understanding of the proper use of ratio with-
in the realm of theological method and discourse; and what 
has been shown as the focal point throughout that discussion 
was Luther's keen awareness of man's relationship to God 
since the Fall. Those who had seen no apparent contradiction 
between the truth claims of philosophy and theology had not 
(in Luther's view) taken seriously enough the magnitude of 
sin's effect upon mankind; and because of that major error 
1Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in  
the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 2. 
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in judgment, the theologians of the Middle Ages had developed 
a system of thought which had placed reasonable speculation 
on the same plain of authority with God's revelation. 
Luther's primary concern over the marriage of philos-
ophy with theology was of a soteriological nature. The 
theologians of his era had brought the man-centered presup-
positions of philosophical speculation to bear upon the very 
word of God: and all to the detriment of the saving proclama-
tion of the Gospel. Allowing fallen ratio the privilege of 
guiding man's thoughts about God, was bound to bring about 
the total removal of the Gospel [salvation by grace, for 
Christ's sake, through faith alone] from its pivotal position 
as the very heart of the Christian proclamation. Although 
human reason remains, even since the Fall in Eden, as a gift 
from God--and man's highest attribute, distinguishing him 
from the animal kingdom of the creation--it, too, has suf-
fered the dire consequences of man's sin. Corrupted by the 
self-centered essence of sin, reason distorts the image it 
has of God, and of man's relationship to Him. Thinking his 
situation before God not to be as serious as the Scriptures 
proclaim, unregenerate man stands as an enemy of the Gospel, 
desiring to rely upon works of the Law to make his relation-
ship with God right again. That God should have to take up 
the task of reconciling man to Himself solely by His efforts 
(especially by way of a cross) is the ultimate absurdity to 
fallen reason. This Luther seemed to know more than anyone 
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else at his time. 
Of course, even in Luther-an theology, reason has its 
place. Those who would accuse Luther of irrationalism do not 
take into consideration the profound use of reason that is 
prevalent throughout the works under consideration in the 
current thesis. In Chapter Five, Luther's widespread use of 
reasonable argumentation as a secondary proof for the doc-
trine of Scripture was outlined. However, in that section 
careful distinctions were drawn between the "epistemology" 
of philosophy and theology. It appears that Luther held a 
"nominalistic" evaluation of that which can be known through 
philosophy: that man is able to know with certitude only that 
which is empirical, that is, gathered through observation and 
experience. For theology, God's revelation of Himself to man 
must remain the ultimate standard of truth; for God is able 
to reveal more to man than the latter is capable of determin-
ing through introspection and observation. 
In the same vein, Chapter Four surveyed Luther's 
critique of reason's competence in the realm of Biblical 
interpretation. Even in this sphere of theological inquiry, 
ratio serves a useful purpose; for God has made revelation 
of Himself in such a way as intelligible to human reason, 
through the use of human language that in its basic proclama-
tion is clearly understood by the human mind. Yet, there are 
certain articles of faith that remain incomprehensible to 
ratio, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the Real Presence 
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in the Lord's Supper, and (especially) the Gospel itself. 
Luther did not attempt to explain such articles of faith; nor 
did he find much use for speculation about things which God 
has not directly revealed to man through His word. "What is 
above us does not concern us" [see page 68]. The Divine 
exceeds man's grasp. God has chosen to remain hidden in some 
ways from man. 
The later Lutheran systematicians condensed quite 
well the Reformer's view of the use of reason in theology in 
their formulations which distinguish the so-called 'usus ra-
tionis ministerialis' from the 'usus rationis magisterialis' 
[pages 81-82]. The former term refers to reason's proper 
sphere of competency in theological questions, as it acts as 
a servant to God's revelation, and does not attempt to usurp 
authority to itself in determining what is true about God 
and His relationship to man. In this realm, man not only is 
able to interpret the language of Scripture, but even 
unregenerate man is able to judge over civil affairs, and to 
otherwise exercise his God-given dominion over the creation 
in which he lives. 
The 'magisterial' use of reason is the converse pos-
ition of the 'ministerial': that is, when ratio oversteps its 
bounds of competency and becomes supreme judge over what is 
'true,' even at the expense of Scriptural statements to the 
contrary. It is reason acting in this capacity that draws 
Luther's adamant attacks, and upon which the Reformer bestows 
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the names "White Devil," "the Devil's whore," "Frau Hulda," 
"Madam Reason," and so forth [pages 87-89]. When ratio is 
given license to determine 'right' doctrine on a plain equal 
to the revelation of God, the Gospel itself is at stake. 
Being no friend of the Gospel (it is utter foolishness to 
unenlightened reason), fallen reason--in its magisterial use 
--is no friend to Luther. 
One scholar points to what he calls the "two-fold 
advice" that Luther has for all who come to search for truth 
in theology: (1) leave alone all speculation and inquiry into 
God's hidden purposes, and confine all attention to what He 
has revealed and affirmed in His word; and (2) remember that 
theology is ultimately a matter of eschatology.2 The central 
concern of theology is man's relationship with God, that will 
climax in the believer's being received into heaven by Christ 
at the last. And whatever is unknown to man in this present 
world, will be at last revealed to him in glory! This writer 
feels certain that Martin Luther understands this all the 
more . . . now. 
Some Remaining Questions  
The focus of this thesis was to give a presentation 
of Luther's view as to the proper place of the use of ratio 
in theology, as can be determined by the Galatians Commentary 
(1519), On the Bondage of the Will, and the Disputation Con- 
2James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus," Concordia 
Theological Monthly 37 (April 1966):207-221. 
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cerning Man. Thus, the subject of the current project was 
necessarily narrowed for the sake of manageability. But any 
such limiting of the topic and source material comes at a 
price. In the case of the present survey of Luther's under-
standing of the use of reason in theology, that cost is re-
flected in several significant questions which will have to 
remain unanswered until a future endeavor is able to treat 
them adequately. 
One of the most intriguing of these questions, for 
this writer, has to do with the development of Lutheran 
theology after the Reformer's death: recognizing that Philip 
Melanchthon was an integral part of the systematizing of 
Lutheran theology, it would be important to discover the 
parallels and dissimilarities of Melanchthon's views concern-
ing the place of reason in theology, as contrasted with 
Luther's. The present thesis has shown, to no small extent, 
that Luther's view of reason is not a dogmatic statement in 
isolation from other questions, but is instead integral to 
his entire theological structure and method. If the same is 
true for Melanchthon, then perhaps this is an important fac-
tor for his taking mediating positions with theologians at 
variance with Luther's theology after the latter's death. 
Other questions are perhaps of more pertinence to 
our present day, such as What relationship does Luther's 
view of ratio have to current "Lutheran" theological method 
and doctrine? Are there any true "Luther-ans" in present-day 
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theology? To what extent has Luther's view of reason helped 
to give shape to theological practice in the various circles 
of Lutheranism today? What changes, if any, would need to 
be effected in current Lutheran theology, if that system 
were to be brought back into line with Luther's concept of 
reason? 
Another class of questions has to do with Luther 
himself: specifically, Since no perceivable difference in 
understanding of the use of ratio in theology is present in 
the writings surveyed in the current thesis, is it true that 
during Luther's entire career after the posting of the 
Ninety-five Theses he maintained a uniform view of human rea-
son? Would a comparison of the present work with Luther's 
earlier lectures--those before the year 1517--yield any dif-
ferences in insight? 
And, finally, there are the queries of speculation, 
which though they can never be answered with certitude, are 
interesting, nonetheless. To what extent was Luther influ-
enced by his predecessors in giving shape to his theological 
method and insight? Where would Luther have stood in the 
later controversies within the Lutheran church? Would Luther 
have joined in the later questioning of the inspiration and 
inerrency of Scriptures, or would he have continued to equate 
them with the word of God? Interesting questions, all. 
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